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Abstract 
 
On April 2, 1987, the Treaty on Fisheries Between Governments of Certain Pacific Island 
States and the Government of the United States of America was signed. The signatories to the 
Fisheries were the 16 members of the South Pacific Forum and the United States of America. 
After six difficult years of negotiations, the Treaty permitted American fishing vessels to fish 
in Pacific Islands’ waters in exchange for a substantial access fee.  
 
This thesis identifies key aspects of that treaty and examines what it meant from both a 
theoretical and practical standpoint. How did a collection of small, comparatively weak 
Pacific states strike a satisfactory deal with the most powerful state on the planet? What did 
the agreement mean in terms of its political, legal and environmental consequences? As well 
as looking at the events and negotiations that led to the treaty, this thesis also attempts to 
discern the key political lessons that flow from this case that might be relevant for the future 
development of the Pacific island States in the key area of fisheries regulation. 
 
The thesis argues that disputes between Pacific nations and the United States over tuna 
resources and the presence of the Soviet Union in the Pacific region were the two critical 
factors that led to the adoption of the Treaty. From the United States’ perspective, the Treaty 
was seen (at the time) as the only viable option if it were to reconsolidate its long and 
prosperous position in the Pacific region. The US did not want the Soviet Union to capitalize 
on American fishing disputes with the Pacific islands, and it could not afford for the Soviet 
Union to establish a strong association with the Pacific islands. The Treaty therefore served 
three purposes for Washington: (i) it maintained its long friendship with the Pacific islands, 
(ii) it maintained its fisheries interests in the region, (iii) and it kept the Pacific communist-
free. This fusion of US economic and strategic interests gave Pacific Island States a stronger 
hand in the negotiations than their size and power would have otherwise offered 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
In April 1987, a group of small Pacific island nations signed a fisheries treaty with the United 
States of America.  For Pacific leaders, the treaty represented a significant achievement in 
terms of securing their resources and obtaining a financial arrangement that would help their 
countries develop.  After years of often bitter dispute with the United States, it also marked a 
new chapter in positive diplomatic relations.   
 
But the satisfaction of Pacific leaders raises questions for international relations scholars.  
How was this possible?  How did a collection of tiny and weak micro-states negotiate a 
satisfactory resource sharing deal with the most powerful nation in history?  Why didn’t a 
richer, more powerful great power simply dictate terms, or at least get the much better end of 
the bargain? This thesis attempts to explore these questions through a detailed examination of 
the origins and development of the Treaty of Fisheries between the Governments of Certain 
Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of America (hereafter The 
Treaty).
1
   
 
The Treaty was signed on 2 April 1987 between Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), New Zealand, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu,
2
 and the 
Government of the United States of America.
3
 It came into effect on June 15, 1988 and was 
valid for five years until its expiry on June 14, 1993. The original Treaty consisted of the 
                                                          
1
 “Treaty” otherwise acknowledged. See Tsamenyi, B.M. “The Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of 
Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of America: The Final Chapter in United 
States Tuna Policy”, Brooklyn Journal of International Law 15 (1989); Gubon, F.  “The South Pacific 
Multilateral Fisheries Treaty: Some Possible Implications for Fisheries Development, Management and 
Conversation in the Pacific Islands Region”, Melanesian Law Journal 22 (1994); Bennion, T.H. Treaty-making 
in the Tropical Pacific (1988); Bilder, R.B. Managing the Risks of International Agreement, University of 
Wisconsin Press (1981); Blix, H. Treaty-making Power, Stevens, London (1960). 
2
 “Pacific Island States” to the Treaty, otherwise acknowledged. See Tsamenyi, B.M. “The Treaty on Fisheries 
Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of America, 
the U.S.A and Sovereignty Over Highly Migratory Species”, Marine Policy 10(1) (1986).  
3
 http://www.ffa.int/. 
principal Treaty and two Annexes. After the original Treaty expired, a further 10 years 
extension was agreed, effective from June 15, 1993 to June 14, 2003. Since then, the Treaty 
has been renewed again and is currently valid until 2013.
4
  
 
While the Treaty has been written about and studied by academics since its adoption,
5
 there 
has been no comprehensive study linking its negotiation to the treaty’s legal, political and 
economic outcomes. Providing such an analysis is the central purpose of this study. To that 
end, the thesis comprises four main parts. First, it offers a legal analysis examining the 
consistency (or otherwise) of certain provisions of the Treaty and the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. These provisions were a key part of the treaty 
negotiations. Second, the thesis explores the political implications of the Treaty and what 
both parties gained from the agreement. Third, an analysis examines the financial and 
distributional components of the agreement, exploring how parties negotiated who got what 
and when and how they would get it. Finally, the thesis touches on environmental 
management and the conservation measures that came up in the treaty context. It seeks to 
analyze the key political lessons flowing from the experiences of the Pacific Island States 
and, as far as possible, to consider proposals for the future policy development of the Pacific 
Island States in the area of fisheries regulation. 
 
The agreement broke new ground in treaty making, particular in terms of the content of 
Articles 3, 4, and 5, and Part 5 of Annex I. Article 3 provides terms and conditions to which 
American fishing vessels must adhere when conducting fishing activities in the areas allowed 
by the Treaty. Article 4 places responsibility on the United States to enforce the Treaty and to 
ensure its fishing vessels are fully observing its provisions. Part 5 (Enforcement) of Annex I 
provides a process for the American fishing vessels to follow, when they are required by an 
authorized officer of the Pacific Island States. A detailed analysis of these innovative 
provisions is also provided in the chapters that follow.  
 
The Origins of the Treaty 
 
                                                          
4
 http://www.ffa.int/. 
5
 See Tsamenyi, B.M. “The Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and 
the Government of the United States of America: The Final Chapter in United States Tuna Policy”, Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law 15 (1989); Gubon, F.  “The South Pacific Multilateral Fisheries Treaty: Some 
During the 1970s, the Pacific Island States’ attitudes toward the US gradually but 
fundamentally changed. This was largely due to the US’s refusal to recognize the Pacific 
Island States’ sovereign rights over highly migratory species (HMS). Around this time, the 
Pacific Island States became aware that despite their generally good diplomatic relations with 
Washington, friendship was not enough to ensure the United States would respect their 
claims over important fisheries resources. Subsequently, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the 
Solomon Islands directly confronted the US by arresting and seizing American registered 
fishing vessels. They did so on the grounds that these vessels were operating without a 
license within exclusive national economic zones (EEZs). 
 
These disputes between the Pacific Island States and the United States over HMS occurred at 
the same time that the Soviet Union was beginning to show a greater interest in the Pacific 
region. Kiribati and Vanuatu reacted strongly against what they regarded as an unpopular and 
controversial United States fisheries policy; they considered inviting the Soviet Union into a 
fishing partnership that would potentially entail economic and (unspecified) security 
arrangements. This was a strategic move that gave these small island states much greater 
influence than their material power or size offered naturally.  
 
United States’ officials became increasingly worried about their deteriorating political 
relationship with the Pacific Island States and they sought to find a solution through the 
negotiation of a multilateral resource sharing arrangement. This treaty served three key US 
interests. First, it allowed the US to continue its lucrative fishing activities in the region. 
Second, it helped repair and re-establish their traditionally friendly relations with nations in 
the Pacific.
6
 Third, it prevented Moscow from capitalizing on American fishing disputes with 
the Pacific Island States. The agreement addressed immediate resource and diplomatic 
concerns, but it also served a broader strategic purpose in contributing to the containment of 
the Soviet Union. 
 
The United States’ proposal for a fisheries agreement with the Pacific Island States and the 
subsequent adoption of the Treaty showed that Washington was willing to recognize the 
sovereign rights of the Pacific Island States over HMS. How this recognition was dealt with 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Possible Implications for Fisheries Development, Management and Conversation in the Pacific Islands Region”, 
Melanesian Law Journal 22 (1994). 
6
 http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/. 
by the Treaty is examined in the thesis’s third chapter, along with the common practice 
followed by coastal States regarding sovereign rights over HMS as provided by the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 Convention).
7
  
 
From the perspective of the Pacific Island signatories, the Treaty was significant as an 
important source of funds for economic development.
8
 It enabled them to exert a greater 
degree of control over fisheries than had been previously the case. The Treaty also 
represented an important expression of the Pacific Island States’ sovereign rights over their 
EEZ.
9
 
 
Salient Points of interest 
 
The detailed examination of the Treaty provided here raises a number of substantive issues 
that, at the outset, are posed as significant questions. For example, the consistency (or 
otherwise) of the Treaty with the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention is 
examined. In particular, questions around the legal status of HMS with reference to the US 
fisheries policy are addressed. US policy does not recognize any form of jurisdiction over 
HMS within the EEZ, as is evident from the Fishermen's Protective Act 1954 (FPA) and the 
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 1976 (FCMA). 
 
Second, it is crucial for small Pacific states to co-operate in dealing with fisheries issues. The 
Treaty can therefore be viewed as a model for closer political and economic co-operation 
among Pacific Island States. Have they been able to achieve this objective? This thesis 
attempts to draw up some guidelines for Pacific Island States to refer to when they look to 
enter multilateral negotiations. More specifically, it underscores the ongoing importance of 
regional cooperation and regionalism in the Pacific. 
 
The diplomatic and political implications of the Treaty in terms of relations between Pacific 
Island nations and the United States are also examined. Pacific Island - United States ties 
improved dramatically after the Treaty was signed and as more development assistance was 
directed to the region. With this in mind, the thesis will also examine the conclusion of the 
                                                          
7
 Document A/CONF.62/121 – consists of 320 Articles and 9 Annexes.   
8
 Gillett, R.D. Tuna: A Key Economic Resource in the Pacific Island, Report prepared for the Asian 
Development Bank and South Forum Fisheries Agency (2001). 
financial package in the Treaty. It analyzes how the distribution formula for the access fee 
was negotiated. Fisheries resources are a major potential source of economic development in 
the Pacific. Further extension of the Pacific Island States’ control could enhance economic 
self-reliance, unlike the current situation where the Pacific Island States remain strongly 
dependent on foreign remittances, foreign aid, and other forms of financial and technical 
assistance. In closing, the thesis outlines how Pacific Island States might be able to secure 
maximum benefit from their fishing resources in a sustainable manner and briefly discusses 
some of the related environmental issues the region is facing.   
 
The Structure  
 
The thesis is organized into six chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter Two outlines 
the two key issues that directly (or otherwise) prompted the establishment of the Treaty: first, 
fishing disputes between the Pacific Island States and the US; and second, the growing 
interest of the Soviet Union in the South Pacific. The first section provides two examples of 
fishing disputes, namely those between the Solomon Islands and PNG on one hand and the 
US on the other. These presented a direct challenge to US fisheries operations and policy in 
the region. As I will show, they also provided a learning experience for the parties involved, 
especially for the US, as it became increasingly aware of the strength of Pacific concerns and 
the importance of interacting constructively with Pacific governments. The second section 
examines US concerns about the growing presence of the Soviet Union in the South Pacific. I 
argue that these twin overlapping issues were instrumental in leading the US to consider a 
multilateral treaty with the Pacific Island States. 
 
Chapter Three is the first of four chapters providing a detailed examination of the Treaty’s 
content and implications. It offers a legal analysis, particularly in relation to the consistency 
(or otherwise) of United States fisheries policy as it relates to international and regional 
fisheries instruments, and how the Treaty attempted to reconcile these differences. United 
States fisheries policy does not recognize Pacific Island States’ sovereign rights over 200 
EEZ and it is vital to understand how they negotiated this key issue. This also highlighted a 
future challenge for the Pacific Island States with reference to the EEZ regime—future deep-
mining arrangement.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9
 Preamble of the Treaty. 
 Chapter Four examines the political implications of the Treaty by addressing its most 
innovative aspects, including how it required the United States to fulfill certain obligations 
under its terms. The Treaty gave Washington the responsibility of ensuring that US fishing 
vessels observed the conditions and terms outlined by the Treaty. From an environmental 
conservation point of view, this was an effective and inexpensive way of policing and 
monitoring the American fishing fleet in the region, something that small island states with 
limited resources simply could not do.  
 
Chapter Five offers a detailed discussion of the financial arrangements related to the Treaty 
access fee and its distributional formulae. It also explores how relevant provisions of the 
Treaty were negotiated by the Pacific Island States and the US—what was offered by whom 
during the negotiation process and how the parties came to understand the financial 
arrangements themselves. 
 
Chapter Six examines the key provisions within the Treaty for dealing with environmental 
conservation and the management of the tuna resources in the region. It also looks at an 
indigenous environmental conservation framework and considers how it might be 
incorporated into a regional environmental conservation and management regime.  
 
Finally, Chapter Seven closes the thesis by exploring some possible future outcomes of the 
Treaty and challenges that it may encounter. These include potential changes in the 
geopolitics of whole region, and the nature of future political relations between the Pacific 
Island States and the United States. The presence and growing interests of China, Japan and 
Taiwan in the South Pacific region will undoubtedly impact not only the relationships 
between Pacific Island States and the United States, but also the relationships among Pacific 
Island States themselves, and with Australia and New Zealand.  
 
Methodology 
 
A detailed single-case study like this presents both empirical and methodological challenges. 
From an empirical point of view, published sources on the Treaty are limited, and no 
thorough or detailed study of the Treaty currently exists. There has been no historical work 
on the negotiation process and little of the work on the Treaty outcomes is framed in terms of 
the relevant political science literature. Few of the participants in the negotiations were 
available for interviews and none have left memoirs detailing their experiences. Accordingly, 
the analysis offered here draws heavily on documentary sources. Primary sources, including 
diplomatic cables, drafts of the Treaty and other correspondence were accessed from the 
National Archives of New Zealand. More recent—and in some cases still restricted—files 
were obtained from the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). Many 
of these have sources that have not been accessed before and their crucial scrutiny and use 
marks one of the major original contributions of this thesis. Secondary sources, drawing 
heavily from the literature on regionalism, came from the Central and Law libraries of 
Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington.  
A second challenge with a thesis of this type is methodological. Single-case studies are 
frowned on by methodological purists in quantitative social science. Scholars argue that they 
are at risk of selection bias or the over generalization of results.
10
 The greater the number of 
observations, argue King, Keohane and Verba, the greater the analytic leverage over the 
research problem.
11
 While acknowledging that these are valid points, this thesis draws on a 
single case for two reasons. First, from an empirical point of view, a single case study it 
permits a detailed scrutiny of the Pacific experience in a way that would not be possible in a 
multiple case study. By focusing on the Treaty negotiation experience and its outcomes, the 
thesis provides greater empirical rewards. I argue that the price paid in terms of the 
generalizability (or lack thereof) of the findings is worth paying for detailed analytic work on 
what is often a marginalized region of the world, the South Pacific.   
Second, the analysis here relies on process-tracing to explore the intersection between 
strategic concerns (such as American concerns about the potential influence of the Soviet 
Union), economic incentives and the influence of lobby groups like the American Tunaboat 
Association (ATA). Although not framed explicitly in these terms, the analysis adopts within-
case methods that have found increasing favour among qualitative social scientists.
12
 Third, 
this case is arguably a “least likely” case when it comes to assessing the role of power in 
international negotiations. The power asymmetries between the Pacific nations and the 
United States were enormous. If power were the key determinant of the outcome of 
                                                          
10
 See for example, Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1994) 208-212. 
11
 Ibid 208. 
12
 See for example, David Laitlin, “Disciplining Political Science” American Political Science Review, vol. 89, 
no. 2 (June 1995) 454-456.  
negotiations, as realists would expect, then something less than a win-win result should have 
been expected. The thesis’s close scrutiny of a “least likely” case therefore permits others to 
use it as a source for critical comparison with other cases in the wider literature, an approach 
endorsed by scholars such as Arend Lijphart and Peter Gourevitch.
13
 
Theoretical work on negotiation is another key influence on the research here. Negotiation 
can be a long and laborious exercise and, in scholarly terms, there are still significant gaps in 
our understanding of the bargaining process.
14
 Understanding the complex management of 
the treaty negotiation process is vital to understanding the outcome of the process itself.
15
 In 
this case, interactions between local and international politics significantly influenced the 
negotiation process. The Pacific Island States’ negotiation strategies were shaped not only by 
individual national interests, but also other Pacific countries’ interests. This required 
compromises, even before engaging in negotiations with the United States. In the chapters 
that follow, I explore the strategies employed by the Pacific Island States and the United 
States and to try and discern a pattern from the whole negotiation process. For example, some 
negotiation theorists expect one party to start by making high demands, refusing all 
concessions, exaggerating its bottom line position and making threats.
16
 Is that what 
happened here? Why were particular strategies used with certain issues and at specific times 
by the various parties?  The role of culture in negotiation is also addressed in order to 
examine the difficulties experienced by the parties involved, especially the Pacific Island 
States’ representatives.17 As will become apparent, at times it seemed as if there were two 
different negotiations happening simultaneously. First, negotiations among the Pacific Island 
States themselves and second between Pacific nations and the United States.  
The first set of negotiations involved three main groups: Micronesia, Melanesia and 
Polynesian states. Each group had its own interests, and within each group individual states 
                                                          
13
 Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1968); Peter Gourevitch, “The International System and Regime Formation: A 
Critical Review of Anderson and Wallerstein,” Comparative Politics, vol. 10, no. 3 (April 1978) 419-438. 
14
 Gilligan, M.J. and Simonelli, N. “International Multilateral Agreement Negotiations”, paper prepared for the 
2006 Shambaugh Conference, “Building Synergies: Institutions and Cooperation in World Politics”, October 
12-14, 2006, University of Iowa (p.4).  
15
 Crump, L. and Zartman, William T., 2003 “Multilateral Negotiation and the Management of Complexity”, 
International Negotiation, 8, 1-5. 
16
 Downie, Christian “Managing Complexity in International Negotiations: Is there a role for treaty secretariats”, 
Regulatory Institutions Network, Australian National University (n.d). See also Odell, J. 2006 “Introduction”, In 
Odell, J. (ed.) Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; Odell, J. and Mena, A.O. 2004 How to Negotiate Over Trade: A Summary of New Research 
for Developing Countries, Geneva International Academic Network. 
had differences ranging from socio-political, cultural and economic circumstances to foreign 
policy preferences. This was further complicated by the fact that in some cases, some 
countries from the same group had different degrees of association with foreign powers 
(particularly the United States and the Soviet Union) and with international organizations. 
Hence, a ‘United Nations’ negotiation was almost required among Pacific Island States 
before they could begin the second stage, putting forward collective demands to their 
American counterparts.  
 
My interest in this Treaty can be traced back to my graduate years at The University of 
Auckland when I first heard about an agreement between small island nations and the mighty 
United States. Concerned about the future of the Pacific, its people and its resources I found 
myself increasingly moved by personal and professional convictions to study and learn from 
this negotiation process. As a Pacific Islander and a Tongan, I felt an increasing sense of 
obligation to assist in the call for the effective conservation, proper management and the 
sustainable development of the South Pacific islands’ fisheries resources. I hope that by 
providing a better understanding of one important international instrument, this thesis 
contributes to that end in some small way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
17
 See for example the comments in Kimura, Hiroshi, “Russian Way of Negotiation”, (pp.63-89), in Berton, P., 
Kimura, H. and Zartman, I.W. (eds.) 1999 International Negotiation, New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 Chapter Two 
 
Historical Background of the Treaty 
 
Introduction 
  
This chapter discusses the key events that led to the conclusion of the Treaty on Fisheries 
between Pacific Island States and the United States. It explores why the treaty was deemed 
necessary through posing certain questions, such as: Why it was adopted? What sort of 
compromises were made by the parties? These questions are explored here in the context of 
two key issues: first, fishing disputes between the Pacific Island States and American fishers 
and second, the growing interest shown by the Soviet Union in the South Pacific. The United 
States (US) has one of the highest canned tuna consumptions per capita in the world and the 
tuna resources of the South Pacific were a reliable source that could not be dismissed 
lightly.
18
  As we will see, the US was also sufficiently worried about Moscow’s ambitions 
and the risk of the Pacific Island States drifting beyond American influence that it suggested 
a treaty response. The US realized that resolving the fisheries dispute and establishing some 
form of resource arrangement with the Pacific Island States would ensure American fishing 
fleets had access to the region’s tuna resources, while at the same time keeping Moscow out 
the region.  
 
 
Regionalism in the South Pacific  
 
South Pacific regional organizations are generally respected and supported by foreign 
governments and international agencies. They help create an international political 
environment upon which political and economic policy cooperation can be based.
19
 
                                                          
18
 The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, FAO Fisheries Department, Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, Rome (2000); Estimated Per Capita Fish Consumption in the United States, 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Washington DC, August (2002).  
19
 See Fry, G.E. “The Politics of South Pacific Regional Cooperation”, in Thakur, R. (ed.) The South Pacific 
Problems and Prospects, St. Martin, New York (1991); Hallux, A.C. and Osgood, RE “New Era of Ocean 
Politics”, Studies in International Affairs 22 (1974); Hollick, A.L. and Robert, E.O. “New Era of Ocean 
Politics”, Studies in International Affairs, No. 22 (1974); Hviding, E. “Fisheries and Coastal Resources: 
Knowledge and Development”, in Burt, B. and Clerk, C. (eds.) Environment and Development in the Pacific 
Islands, The University of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby (1997). 
Historically, the Pacific Island States have generally been considered strong allies of the 
west, due to—amongst other things—the legacy of colonization and their continuing 
economic dependency.
20
  
 
Regionalism and regional organizations in the South Pacific serve a number of purposes, one 
of which is establishing the profile and relevance of regional states. Over time they have 
helped Pacific Island nations maintain and develop their political relationships with the 
United States and other foreign powers with a presence in the region.
21
 Regional modalities 
further highlight how Pacific Island States have cooperated in order to address and advance 
their shared interests. There are three regional organizations that deserve mention in this 
chapter: the South Pacific Commission (Commission); the Pacific Islands Forum (Forum); 
and the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA).  
 
The concept of regionalism was introduced in the South Pacific by foreign powers to assist 
Pacific Island States’ needs.22 The colonial powers introduced modern political systems based 
on their respective domestic models.
23
 Even though Pacific Island States have gained 
independence, the colonial powers retain some influence over the politics of the region 
through foreign aid and other arrangements. Foreign aid and financial and technical 
arrangements have provided mechanisms that have helped to maintain external power 
influences in the region.  
 
Regional organizations in the South Pacific vary in terms of affiliation and association, and 
according to their political status. At some point, most of the Pacific Island States have had 
some form of affiliation or association with colonial powers, including Australia, France, 
New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Some Pacific Island States 
maintain political ties with their former colonial rulers. New Zealand, for instance, has 
                                                          
20
 Kelly, C.R. “Law of the Sea: The Jurisdictional Dispute over Highly Migratory Species of Tuna”, Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 26, Chicago (1988:509-510).  
21
 See Fry, G.E. “Regionalism and International Politics of the South Pacific”, Pacific Affairs 54, University of 
British Columbia, British Columbia (1981); Alexander, L.M. “Regionalism and the Law of the Sea: The Case of 
Semi-enclosed Seas”, Ocean Development and International Law Review 17(1), February (1987); Marshall, 
C.L. “Regional Implementation of Alternative Entry Control Policies and their Role in Fisheries Management”, 
Ocean Development and International Law 5, Taylor & Francis, Philadelphia (1978); Carew-Reid, J. 
Environment, Aid and Regionalism in the South Pacific,  (1989); Haas, M. The Pacific Way: Regional 
Cooperation in the South Pacific, Praeger, New York (1989). .  
22
 Fry, G.E. “Regionalism and International olitics of the South Pacific”, Pacific Affairs, University of British 
Columbia, Vol. 54, No.3, Autumn (1981:455-484). 
23
 In particular, France, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States.  
constitutional obligations of free association with the Cook Islands and Niue and retains 
direct responsibility for Tokelau.  
 
Modern regional organizations have emerged in the South Pacific and have replaced 
traditional and cultural alliances and groupings. In 1947, the South Pacific Commission (the 
Commission) was established as the first modern regional organization in the region;
24
 it is 
located in Noumea, New Caledonia. This was formalized by the adoption of the Agreement 
Establishing the South Pacific Commission (SPC Agreement). In 1999, the South Pacific 
Commission was renamed the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (the Community). The 
SPC Agreement stated that, among other things, “the Commission shall be a consultative and 
advisory body to the participating Governments … particularly in respect of agriculture 
(including animal husbandry), communications, transport, fisheries, forestry, industry, labour, 
marketing, production, trade and finance, public works, education, health, housing and social 
welfare.”25   
 
The same provision required the Commission to provide and facilitate research in technical, 
economic, scientific and social areas, to ensure cooperation and to ensure the coordination of 
research activities and bodies. The annual budget of the Commission was supported by 
Australia, France, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the US.
26
 The Pacific Island States 
were for a lengthy period absent from the key budgetary allocation decisions of the 
Commission; this meant they had little say into the Commission’s affairs.27  
 
Interestingly, at first political issues were excluded from the Commission’s agenda – a fact 
that was regarded negatively by Pacific Island States. Their leaders suspected that this was a 
deliberate attempt by the metropolitan powers to sustain their presence in the region and 
prevent the push towards independence spreading across the South Pacific. Pacific leaders 
increasingly began to question the role of the Commission, asking whose interests it served. 
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This stemmed in part from its failure to address political issues.
28
 Pacific leaders began to 
rethink their options and increasingly sought to press their interests, either collectively or 
through small group activities. This often involved ties between states that identified as 
having a shared culture.  
 
In 1965, Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa founded the Pacific Islands Producers Association 
(Association), which was the region’s first indigenous organization. Its main purpose was to 
secure a better price for banana exports to the New Zealand market.
29
 This initiative was 
important in that it demonstrated the advantages of acting collectively to strengthen trading 
positions and other arrangements with metropolitan states.    
 
In 1971, the South Pacific Forum was formed. Its founding members were Australia, the 
Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, 
New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu (New Caledonia gained observer status in 1999). The organization aimed to promote 
the region’s common interests and create policies that served its members. The South Pacific 
Bureau for Economic Development Co-operation (SPEC) was soon established as the 
Forum’s Secretariat and was located in Suva, Fiji. The Forum’s administrative arm 
subsequently became the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), undertaking programmes 
to support and implement decisions made by the Forum.  
 
Unlike the South Pacific Commission, the Forum openly discussed political issues, and was 
soon regarded as the most important regional organization in the South Pacific. Pacific Island 
States believed that the new organization sent a clear signal to the metropolitan powers that 
their presence in the region was unsustainable. The establishment of the Forum thus marked a 
shift for the Pacific Island States from control by foreign powers under the South Pacific 
Commission towards a more genuine independence as a region.  
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The establishment of the Forum led to greater interaction between Pacific Island States. It 
also helped address frictions in relations between the Pacific Island States and foreign 
powers—particularly the US. For example, it was here that the Forum States explicitly 
declared that membership would be restricted to countries that recognized their sovereign 
rights over fisheries resources within their EEZ regime.  
 
This constituted a major and direct challenge to the US and its fisheries policy, which did not 
recognize any form of sovereign rights over HMS.
30
 By contrast the EEZ regime was seen by 
the Forum as a major opportunity to secure economic benefits by claiming sovereign rights 
over resources within the 200 nautical mile EEZ. This substantial difference marked the 
beginning of a decade of complicated political and diplomatic negotiation between Forum 
States and the US.  
 
At the eighth Forum meeting in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea (August 29-31, 1977), the 
Forum decided that a proposed regional fishery agency would be open to all Forum countries, 
and to all countries that supported the sovereign rights of coastal States over the EEZ regime. 
The Fijian Prime Minister, Ratu Mara, initiated an attempt to establish a regional fisheries 
organization and cooperation among countries for the surveillance and exploitation of tuna 
resources in the region.
31
 It was further decided that consultation should continue among 
member countries over the principles and measures that would apply for the establishment of 
newly extended maritime boundaries.
32
 This would include some form of a consistent 
negotiating model employed in fishing arrangements to ensure that specific Forum national 
interests were met. This differed from the previous fishing arrangements that were 
predominantly decided by Deep Water Fishing Nations (DWFN).  
 
However, before long major differences emerged between the Pacific Island States and the 
US. This occurred during the 1978 Forum Heads of Government meeting held in Niue which, 
among other things, considered the establishment of a regional fisheries organization.
33
 The 
need for a regional fisheries organization arose, as the Pacific Island States started to claim 
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200 nautical miles of exclusive economic jurisdiction under the United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III). Also evident was the need to establish an 
organization specifically dealing with fisheries issues on behalf of the Forum member states 
as well as American and DWFN fishing vessels’ illegal fishing activities in Pacific Island 
States’ waters.  
 
From the Pacific Island States’ perspective, the establishment of an EEZ regime would be 
meaningless if the DWFN—particularly the US—did not recognize their claims of sovereign 
rights over fisheries resources (and other resources) within their respective EEZs. A real and 
sustainable economic benefit for the region was at stake in controlling fisheries (particularly 
tuna exploitation) within these new and larger maritime boundaries. The economic 
significance of the EEZ regime for the Forum member States was highlighted by their firm 
stance in rejecting any opposition to the recognition of their sovereign rights over their EEZs. 
Forum member states also realized that the potential economic benefits of these newly 
claimed resources would only materialize if they had the power to regulate their exploitation. 
They also saw the EEZ regime as a potential major economic opportunity—one that was 
unlikely to recur in the region.  
 
However at the 1978 Niue Forum meeting, the most sensitive issue discussed was the US 
delegation’s demand that the US become a member of the proposed regional fisheries 
organization. This would prove almost impossible for the Pacific Island States to consider 
due to potential enormous economic benefits on offer. Forum countries were reluctant to give 
up the potential valuable resources that could make them economically independent for the 
first time. By contrast, the US sought membership in alignment with Article 64 of the 
UNCLOS III. Robust debates on the US membership issue saw Forum countries pushed into 
difficult situations. Not only did their individual relationships with the US vary along with 
very different trading relations, (for instance, Australia and New Zealand), but so did 
relationships among the Forum Pacific Island States (for instance, Polynesian and 
Melanesian). This was a defining moment for the Forum in testing its diplomatic and 
dialogue capabilities.  
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Forum states were sharply divided over the US request. Fiji even threatened to pull out of the 
proposed organization should the US gain full membership.
34
 The US argued that under 
international law, coastal states and other states fishing in the region should form regional 
organizations for the conservation and management of the fisheries resources therein. But at 
the same time, the US failed to recognize those same coastal states’ sovereign rights over 
HMS within their EEZ. The US position was based on the Article 64 of UNCLOS III. 
  
In the end, the Forum agreed that membership to the proposed organization would remain 
restricted to Forum state members; the possibility of US participation was rejected.
35
 The 
Forum countries’ reliance on migratory tuna to assist economic survival was reflected in the 
Preamble of the FFA Convention. This stated:  
 
Recognizing their common interest in the conservation and optimum 
utilization of the living marine resources of the South Pacific region 
and in particular of the highly migratory species … to promote 
regional co-ordination in respect of fisheries policies … Concerned to 
secure the maximum benefits from the living marine resources of the 
region for their peoples and for the region as a whole and in particular 
the development countries …  
 
Rejection of US membership to the proposed regional fishery organization was disappointing 
for Washington, but for the Pacific Island States it reflected a determination to secure 
economic independence through the control and regulation of tuna resources (and mineral 
resources) within their newly extended EEZs.  
 
The US responded by withholding funds previously promised to assist the proposed regional 
fisheries organization.
36
 Fiji, PNG and the Solomon Islands retaliated by suggesting that they 
might set up their own sub-regional fisheries organization. The US then backed down 
regarding membership, as it did not want to see the formation of multiple sub-regional 
                                                          
34
 “Stirring Up the Pacific”, Asiaweek, January 19, Asia Limited, Hong Kong (1979:35). Nauru, PNG, Solomon 
and Tonga supported Fiji, while, Australia, Cooks, New Zealand, Niue and Samoa supported the United States 
membership. See also “SPF: Fiji Threats to Pull Out”, Papua New Guinea Post Courier, September 29, Port 
Moresby (1978:3). 
35
 See Woodworth, D.C. “U.S. Tuna: A Proposal for Resource Management in the American Pacific Islands”, 
University of Hawaii Law Review 10, Honolulu (1988:171); Gubon, F. “History and Role of the Forum 
Fisheries Agency”, in Doulman, D.J. (ed.) Tuna Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region, East-
West Center, Honolulu (1987); Harrison, C.S. “Costs to the United States in Fisheries by not Joining the Law of 
the Sea Convention”, in Van Dyke, J.M. (ed.) Consensus and Confrontation: The United States and the Law of 
the Sea Convention, University of Hawaii, Honolulu (1985). 
fisheries organizations: PNG and Solomon Islands waters contained the most abundant and 
potentially lucrative tuna fishing grounds in the Pacific. US officials worried that new sub-
regional systems might destabilize the Forum, which could in turn disadvantage its existing 
fishing fleet arrangements. A potential break-away-group comprised of Melanesian nations 
would further complicate the American stance in the region; some countries concerned were 
not regarded as particularly good friends of the US.  
 
Why were Pacific Island States reluctant to accept America’s membership to the proposed 
regional fisheries organization? Understanding the answer to this question requires an 
understanding of US fisheries policy and foreign policy more generally within the Pacific. It 
also necessitates an appreciation of the US image in the region. The Pacific Island States 
harboured suspicions that the US would use its dominance to manipulate the region’s affairs 
to suit its own interests.
37
 In addition, they were distressed by the US unwillingness to 
challenge France’s nuclear testing in French Polynesia, as well as its inability to stop its 
vessels from fishing illegally in Pacific Island States’ waters.38 Pacific Island States feared 
that the US, like other DWFN, would unduly interfere with and over exploit the region’s 
fisheries resources.
39
 These attitudes signaled that, for the Islands’ governments, the Pacific 
was no longer an ‘American Lake’.  
 
In 1979, the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) was established under the umbrella 
of the Forum.
40
 It was located in Honiara, Solomon Islands and was designed to deal 
specifically with all fisheries issues.
41
 The establishment of the Agency recognized the 
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economic significance of member states’ fisheries resources, and the need to control and 
regulate them collectively.
42
 In May of the same year at the 10
th
 Forum meeting, the Agency 
Convention was adopted. This came into force on 10 July 1979. It stated that parties to the 
Convention would prioritize:    
[c]o-operation for the conservation and optimum utilization of the 
highly migratory species of the region will require the establishment 
of additional international machinery to provide for co-operation 
between all coastal states in the region and all states involved in the 
harvesting of such resources.    
 
This was important because effective conservation and management of HMS can be achieved 
only through regional and international co-operation.  
 
As a regional fisheries agency, the FFA works well and weakens the almost absolute freedom 
of the DWFN fleets in the region. At the same time, it secures not only economic revenue 
from tuna resources, but also the long term sustainable development of tuna. The US’s 
persistent demands to become a member of the proposed regional fisheries organization was 
to avoid any major constraints on its fishing fleet’s fishing access to the region’s tuna 
resources.  
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Pacific Island States-United States Fishing Disputes  
 
As indicated, the US faced criticism in the Pacific for its consistent silence over France’s 
nuclear testing and for its destabilizing fisheries policy.
43
 In addition, US limitations over its 
bilateral aid, the inflexibility of its trade quotas and its market access restrictions were 
considered harmful to the American image in the region.  
 
Among the reasons for the American purse seine fleet moving to the Pacific was the 
abundance of tuna stocks in Western and Central Pacific waters; the restructuring of the 
American tuna industry where major cannery operators were moving off-shores for tax 
advantages; cheap local; flexible industrial regulation; and availability of raw materials.
44
 In 
addition, South American waters had started to become difficult to access for the US.
45
 
Tensions flared when Latin American coastal states began to unilaterally extend their 
sovereign rights from 200 to 400 nautical miles from their coasts in order to control and 
regulate their tuna resources.
46
 Obviously this created problems for the US, since it did not 
recognize any sovereign rights over tuna beyond the 12 nautical mile territorial water limit.  
 
The influential American Tunaboat Association (ATA) negotiated fishing agreements 
between foreign countries and American fishing vessels. This non-profit organization 
negotiated with foreign countries over matters regarding fishing agreements made on behalf 
of American tuna fleet and fisheries industries.
47
 In representing American tuna fleets in 
negotiations and other fisheries matters, the ATA played a role similar to that of the South 
Pacific Fisheries Agency. 
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 In the fishing disputes between the Pacific Island States and American fishermen that helped 
to shape the Treaty negotiated between the Pacific Island States and the US, two major events 
stand out—the arrest of two American purse seine vessels, first the Danica by the PNG 
government in 1982, and second the Jeannette Diana by Solomon Island authorities in 1984. 
The Danica and the Jeannette Diana were arrested for illegal fishing within the 200 nautical 
mile exclusive economic zones of PNG and Solomon, respectively. Other, more minor 
disputes are also addressed, demonstrating how the American fishing fleet operated and the 
attitude of the US towards the Pacific Island States more generally. 
 
Why did the American fishing fleet violate Pacific Island States’ fisheries laws and 
regulations? In brief, because US fisheries policy did not recognize any national jurisdiction 
claimed over tuna resources beyond 12 nautical miles of territorial waters. In addition, 
American fishermen were fully aware that US fisheries policy would protect them against 
claims of illegal fishing activities elsewhere in the world. Yet the US government did not 
overtly take responsibility for the actions of its fishing vessels outside territorial waters. 
Hence, the possibility of a fishing dispute was substantial.
48
 When this subsequently 
occurred, a significant deterioration in government to government relations followed.
49
  
 
In February 1982, the PNG Government seized the Danica, an American registered fishing 
vessel, for illegal fishing. The cost of this seizure, with its illegal catch, amounted to a sum 
$US13 million.
50
 The US responded with a trade embargo on any fish and fish products from 
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PNG bound for American markets. In addition, PNG was warned by the US that unless the 
boat was released, foreign aid and other financial arrangements could be affected.  
 
Eventually, the Danica was released after a temporary nine months access license of 
$194,000 was agreed, the fine paid and the embargo lifted.
51
 As part of the arrangement, the 
Danica was sold back to its owner for $US 267,000, which was just a fraction of its market 
value
52
 of $US 10 million.
53
  
 
The Danica incident saw PNG forced to enter into an interim accord with the ATA in order 
for the US government to lift its trade embargo.
54
 This interim license fee access was more 
generous than any other granted to a DWFN currently fishing in PNG waters.
55
 The initial 
reaction by the Forum was to call for the US to amend its existing policy. A May 1984 South 
Pacific Forum Fisheries Committee meeting then directed the Agency’s Director to write to 
the United States State Department, on behalf of the Pacific Island States, proposing a 
negotiated settlement over the Danica.
56
 Following the Danica incident, the US Congress for 
the first time voiced its concern about the United States’ relations with the Pacific Island 
States.
57
  
 
A second dispute of major relevance occurred on 20 June 1984, when the Jeannette Diana, 
an American vessel employing purse seiner catch netting, was arrested just 40 miles north of 
Santa Ysabel and charged by the Solomon government for fishing without a license in its 
waters.
58
 Its 500 tonnes of fish (worth $SBD 250,000) was confiscated.
59
 The Solomon High 
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Court then fined the owners $SBD 72,000.
60
 The US again imposed a trade embargo on 
Solomon’s fish and fish product exports to the US.61 This was a harsh penalty for the small 
Solomon Islands economy, given its $SBD 12 million per annum export of fish and fish 
products to the US alone.
62
  
 
Despite the economic repercussions involved, the Solomon government decided to put the 
vessel up for sale at a reserved price of $SBD 3.9 million.
63
 The US then responded by 
warning potential buyers that the Jeannette Diana would become subject to seize and 
forfeiture by the US. In turn, the Solomon government retaliated by banning fishing vessels 
owned by American citizens and began to consider inviting the Soviet Union to discuss 
fishing agreements to fish in its EEZ.
64
  
 
The Solomon Islands government sought support from its regional neighbours during the 
Fifteenth South Pacific Forum meeting, held in Funafuti, Tuvalu on August 27-28, 1984. 
They called for a ban on all American fishing vessels in Pacific Island States’ ports and a 
withdrawal of all the licenses of American fishing vessels currently operating in the region. 
However this approach did not gain much support. Those in attendance did not want to 
inflame the situation any further and in the end only a general statement of concern about US 
fisheries policy was issued.
65
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In February 1985, the Solomon government resold the Jeanette Diana to its owners for $SBD 
770,000—again, a fraction of its $SBD 3.9 million price tag—but vowed the same treatment 
would be given in future.
66
 In June 1985, the Solomon government protested to the US 
regarding the American fishing vessels Lone Wolf and Bold Adventurer, which were both 
spotted illegally fishing within Solomon Island waters.
67
 The US responded by saying that it 
was not responsible for the actions of individual fishing vessels.
68
 The Solomon government 
expressed its concern that such incidents were not unusual. The American tuna fleet, they 
claimed, was constantly poaching their local tuna (as well as that of other Pacific Island 
nations) and sending it for processing in canneries in American Samoa. 
 
The embargo over the Jeanette Diana incident was not lifted for two months and only then 
following threats by Pacific leaders to boycott a third round of talks to discuss a multilateral 
fisheries treaty.
69
 The US responded that the delay was because it took time to complete all 
relevant paper work before the embargo could be lifted.
70
  
 
These actions were interpreted negatively in the region. The delay was seen as typical of 
American tactical and strategic maneuvers where, by manipulating and dictating the situation, 
pressure was applied to the unity of the Pacific Island States. It could also have indicated that 
the US did not want to show its hand too readily, or to concede in ways that might reveal 
policy weakness. Interestingly, a lifting of the embargo was announced just before the third 
round of talks between the Pacific Island States and the American delegations to consider 
multilateral fisheries treaty started.
71
 The US, it seemed, now wanted to speed up the 
negotiations to avoid any further complications.  
 
Other disputes were reported throughout the Pacific over the inability of the US to control its 
fishing fleet in the region. For instance, the master of the Jeanette Diana, previously arrested 
by the Solomon Island authorities, months later became the skipper of the Carol Linder. This 
American purse seiner ran aground within Kiribati waters but was then re-floated. In 1986, 
the Priscilla M, an American fishing vessel pulled into Pohnpei in the Federated States of 
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Micronesia (FSM) seeking medical attention for one of its crew.
72
 After inspecting the 
logbook, local authorities discovered evidence that the vessel had been illegally fishing in 
FSM waters and ordered it to pay $US400, 000 in fines.
73
 
 
Moreover illegal operations by American vessels in the Pacific Island States’ waters 
continued even after the Treaty was signed. In May 1987, the Kiribati government seized and 
fined the Tradition, an American fishing vessel, for operating without license.
74
 In the 
process of arresting the Tradition, at least ten other illegal American vessels escaped.
75
 The 
United States’ reaction was muted; unlike previous incidents these events were not reported 
by the American news media.
76
 A formal complaint lodged by the Kiribati government to the 
American Embassy in Suva over the Tradition received no response.
77
 Later both the Lone 
Wolf and the Bold Adventurer were photographed fishing illegally in Solomon’s waters.78  
 
These incidents further affected US-Pacific ties. Even when a Treaty has yet to be ratified, it 
is customary practice for parties that have signed it not to undermine the terms of that 
Treaty.
79
 These incidents created strains between Washington and its Pacific counterparts. 
They also demonstrated the effectiveness and power of the US fisheries policy and its 
inflexible enforcement. Pacific Island States had to devise strategies to approach US fisheries 
policy to try to find productive and positive outcomes.  
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The Fishermen’s Protective Act 
 
In the 1940s, the US Congress was pressured by ATA lobbying groups for American 
fishermen to fish anywhere they wish.
80
 The American purse seine fleet started fishing for 
tuna in the South Pacific in the 1970s and negotiations for fishing agreements with Pacific 
Island States were carried out by the American Tunaboat Association (ATA) on behalf of US 
fishers.  
 
The Fishermen’s Protective Act (FPA) was controversial legislation in that it encouraged 
American fishermen to fish anywhere deemed legal by the US fisheries policy. This directly 
contradicted other coastal states’ fisheries policies. Under the FPA, the US government could 
compensate the losses and damages incurred by vessels prosecuted and fined for illegal 
fishing in foreign waters. This was seen as an American government subsidy for tuna fishing 
boat owners and secured a constant flow of tuna to canneries.  
However, the FPA was purposely designed and adopted as a response at the time to certain 
South American coastal States who had unilaterally extended their national jurisdictions 
beyond 12 nautical miles territorial waters from their coasts. As a result, the American 
government intervened to adopt the Fishermen’s Protective Act (FPA), primarily to protect 
the interests of American fishermen. This intervention demonstrated the strength of the 
American resolve to gain access at any price to tuna resources able to serve market and 
commercial interests.  
  
The FPA was adopted by the United States Congress on August 27, 1954, and protected the 
rights of US registered fishing vessels both on the high seas and on seas where the US did not 
recognize the operation of any territorial jurisdiction.
81
 The US did not recognize jurisdiction 
beyond 12 nautical miles territorial sea; thus they did not recognize the Latin American 
coastal States’ then newly declared 200 nautical miles maritime extensions. The FPA 
formalized this refusal to recognize any jurisdictional claim extending beyond the 12 nautical 
miles territorial seas. The FPA was seen as a solution to US fears that such claims could 
critically affect its tuna industry and associated domestic interests.  
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 The FPA was also designed to protect American fishermen fishing in areas beyond 12 
nautical miles territorial sea of foreign countries. The US regarded these areas as high seas in 
the event of fishing for HMS. The extension of the US maritime boundary was also believed 
to have resulted from pressure by ATA lobbing groups. 
 
Under the FPA, the US government could compensate loss and damage incurred by 
American fishing vessels in the event of their arrest or seizure by foreign countries for illegal 
fishing.
82
 The amount would be paid by the Secretary of Treasury following verification by 
the Secretary of State. The amount concerned was liable for deduction from the foreign 
assistance granted by the US to any country concerned, although this was not mandatory.
 83 
Such compensation arrangements did not discourage illegal fishing operations in disputed 
waters.
84
  
 
As Meron notes: 
The idea of the US Government's compensating US flag vessels 
operating off the coasts of foreign countries arose out of the desire of 
that government to encourage owners of such vessels (and 
particularly fishing vessels) to continue to operate in waters 
considered by the United States to be high seas, but regarded by the 
countries concerned (particularly certain Latin American countries) as 
territorial waters or as fishing zones. This has brought about the 
development of government programmes of compensation and 
insurance of the US fishing vessels for losses to the fishing industry 
resulting from seizures, penalties, and confiscation by the coastal 
states, acts which in the view of the United States amounted to 
violations of international law.
85
  
 
The US government compensating its fishermen for fishing illegally in another country’s 
national jurisdiction could be construed as encouraging such activities. American fishing 
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vessels were well equipped with the latest technologies—many more advanced than those of 
the patrol boats of coastal States. A willingness to compensate American fishers for their 
losses incurred, if caught, was not legal under international law.  
 
For Meron,   
The operation of the principle of subrogation, and, in the case of the 
Fishermen's Protective Act, the statutory obligation of the US 
Government to take some action in order to collect certain claims 
have the potential of automatically elevating cases of injuries to 
nationals abroad, normally handled through the process of diplomatic 
protection, to cases of direct international confrontation. There is 
however no evidence to suggest that the Fishermen's Protective Act 
has had such an effect. The provision regarding deduction from 
foreign aid could potentially exacerbate, but this provision is now 
discretionary, not mandatory.
86
 
 
American fishers were significant in that they acted as agents of the US government in 
protesting against the legality of maritime jurisdictional extension.
87
 Because it encouraged 
American fishers to operate without licenses in foreign jurisdictions, the relevant Act 
continued to cause confrontations between coastal States and the US. The US appeared to 
feel it was above international law, free to interpret the rule of law in ways that it suited its 
policy. The only practical solution was to amend the FPA, leaving the US to take full 
responsibility for its fishing vessels, regardless of their non-recognition of the sovereign 
rights exercised over the 200 nautical miles EEZ.  
 
The Cold War in the South Pacific  
 
These disputes about resources unfolded against a backdrop of growing superpower tensions. 
Toward the end of 1970s, the political and ideological rivalry between the US and the Soviet 
Union took center stage in the South Pacific. Historically, Soviet interests in the South Pacific 
had been largely commercial and scientific.
88
 Crocombe argues that, 
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 After the Islands nations became independent, Russia […] attempted 
a presence in the Islands, as it was involved in a global competition 
with the USA and its allies. It had a rare experience – Islands 
governments declined its offers to lever even more from its 
competitors, as the USA and its allies would pay a high price to block 
Russian involvement. Tonga implied in the mid 1970s that it was 
about to accept Russian aid, but it was merely a ploy to persuade the 
West and Japan to give more – which they did.89  
 
Washington’s decision to open the Treaty talks was basically promoted by concern over the 
fishing incidents between PNG and the US and Solomons and the US in an attempt to protect 
local livelihoods. These had led to anti-American feelings at a time that Soviet diplomatic 
activity stepped up in the region.
90
 
 
Crossett states, 
Indonesia’s Foreign Minister says Moscow’s efforts to extend its 
influence into the South Pacific may have been set back by the 
Reagan Administration’s decision to ease a conflict with island 
nations over fishing rights by negotiation a treaty on the issue … said 
in an interview … that the American action should be regarded as 
only the first step in a Western campaign to insure the friendship and 
stability of the region.
91
  
  
Fiji and the Soviet Union agreed to establish a diplomatic relationship a few years after Fiji’s 
independence. The Soviet also agreed to establish relations with Tonga in October 1975. In 
April of the following year, Soviet Ambassador Mr. Selanior presented his credentials to the 
King of Tonga.
92
 On 19 May 1976, Papua New Guinea’s Foreign Minister, Sir Maori Kiki, 
visited Moscow and in July of the same year the Samoan Foreign Minister visited Moscow.
93
 
Nauru was the only sovereign State in the region that did not express any interest in the 
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Soviet Union, which may reflect that economic interests were key issues for the other Pacific 
Island States. At the same time, the Soviet Union raised the issue of having a fishing 
agreement with other countries in the region. 
 
In the late 1980s, it was estimated that the Soviet Union had some 3,500 fishing vessels, 
making it the biggest fishing fleet in the world with 6.5 million dead-weight tons.
94
 These 
vessels were owned and operated by the Soviet government and, it was argued by various 
quarters, equipped with intelligence gathering devices that could monitor American and its 
allies’ naval fleet movements. It was assumed that Soviet fishing activity in the Pacific was a 
cover to help counter the political and diplomatic influence of US and the West in the region 
as whole. As Crocombe described it, 
 
In 1985, in another surge of fear of Russian involvement, Australia 
increased its aid by 400%, in return for the Islands governments not 
dealing with Russia. Islands governments’ main interest in the USSR 
was to offset US hegemony. The USA refused to recognize Islands 
nations rights to tuna in their EEZs (while defending tuna in the US 
EEZ), but changed course when Islands nations began leasing fishing 
rights to the USSR. Japan doubled its aid, gave to the Forum for the 
first time, and gave UNDP a development fund for the Islands. That 
was a response to US pressure, not to needs in the Islands. New 
Zealand, Australia, Britain, Japan and Korea set up a Trust Fund for 
Tuvalu in 1987 in return for Tuvalu not leasing fishing right to 
Russians.
95
   
     
The Soviet Union seemed determined to establish diplomatic missions in the Pacific; 
something highlighted by the establishment of a South Pacific branch in the Foreign Ministry 
in Moscow.
96
 This was the foundation for reinserting the Cold War and the most powerful 
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countries of the world into the Pacific through a more aggressive posture than previously. 
The US did not take chances when the Soviets shifted their interest to the Pacific during the 
Cold War. The Soviet Union had established some military servicing facilities in Cam Ranh 
Bay, a former American facility in Vietnam that had accommodated ships of the US Pacific 
fleet.
97
 The South Pacific could thus be seen as a last frontier of global competition between 
the two superpowers.
98
 The two countries’ military bases in Asia were becoming more visible 
and active, which also raised anxiety in the region. Others saw this as an opportunity to take 
advantage of major power ideological rivalry.  
 
Financial and technical assistance started to flow into the region, directly from the US and its 
allies, as well as from Australia, New Zealand and international and regional organizations. 
This reinforced the alliance and support provided by the US and its Pacific allies in the region 
during WW II. Japan had been replaced by the Soviet Union as a threat—although an 
ideological rather than a physical one.  
 
In the 1980s, the Reagan administration launched a crusade against communism in the South 
Pacific.
99
 Strategies developed by the US to counter the Soviet threat included continuing 
close policy coordination with Japan and developing political relations with China.
100
 To the 
south, the US continued to rely on Australia to help protect its regional interests and monitor 
the Pacific Island States.
101
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 The growing trade union movements in the South Pacific benefited from the Soviet position 
in the region. The pursuit of fishing arrangements was another feature of the competition for 
political domination between Soviet Union and the US and its allies.
102
 The Soviet Union 
established contacts with trade union elements in Fiji, providing aid and advice for trade 
union seminars and often sending trade union delegations in an attempt to increase the 
Russian influence in the union movement.
103
 The human rights movement gained 
momentum and began to affect the thinking of the ordinary people in the region.
104
 
However, there were no political communist parties in the region and no media propaganda 
regarding Soviet influence or presence. 
 
These movements were labeled by Western states as communist movements designed to 
undermine the freedom of the people in the region. This was designed to scare the Pacific 
Island States off communism. At the same time, unionism has benefited ordinary workers 
throughout the Western world through the promotion of deregulation and better conditions 
for workers. Ironically, the Soviet Union pushed and supported trade unions and human 
rights movements that did not exist in the Soviet Union itself. This demonstrates how 
international politics and diplomacy force countries to operate in such a way as to take 
advantage of or capitalize on any circumstances that undermine their rivals.
105
  
 
Theanti-nuclear sentiment in the region weakened some Western strategic interests, 
particularly those of the United States.
106
 The nuclear issue was a major problem for the 
United States because it seemed to give an upper hand to the Soviet Union. France’s 
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continued nuclear weapons testing and the persistent silence of the United States over these 
activities frustrated the Pacific Island States.
107
  
 
Frustration with and distrust of the US facilitated the adoption of the South Pacific nuclear 
weapons free zone Treaty. This was a regional and international measure taken to protect the 
region from the harmful effects of nuclear weapons and radioactive materials. The nuclear-
free issue deepened the concerns of the Pacific Island States that their interests were being 
deliberately ignored; they were regarded as unimportant in the context of key international 
political and trade deliberations. US allies were also part of the problem from a Pacific 
Island States’ perspective. For instance, Japan’s proposal to dump nuclear waste on 
Ogasawara Island met no resistance from Western allies. This lack of opposition annoyed 
the Pacific Island States.  
 
However, policies designed to make the South Pacific nuclear free were of major concern to 
the US. At the same time, it interpreted growing Soviet interest in this region as an attempt by 
the Soviet Union to sustain their ideological rivalry and global competition with the US in the 
South Pacific. The Soviet Union supported the nuclear-free policy.
108
  
 
This support was designed to encourage the Pacific Island States to ban American nuclear 
armed vessels from the region, which would undoubtedly disrupt United States military 
capability and mobility.
109
 Denying port access to American nuclear vessels would further 
Soviet interests, as it would allow them to push to establish resident diplomatic missions.
110
  
 
In 1986, Edward Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, was on an official tour of the 
Pacific and assured the Pacific Island States that the Soviet Union respect the Pacific nuclear-
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free policy and ratify the protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.
111
 Mr. 
Shevardnadze also challenged other nuclear weapons powers to follow suit. New Zealand 
welcomed this position and supported the Soviet response. Theoretically, it seems that the 
Soviet Union propaganda was mainly aimed to undermine the position of the US and its allies 
in the region; it also aimed to destroy the ANZUS treaty—New Zealand was a member of 
ANZUS and had taken a stance against nuclear vessels.   
 
In the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ brief of the Prime Minister regarding the 
growing Soviet interest in the South Pacific, he was cautioned that, 
… there is no way the Soviet Union is completely shut out from the 
region and they have legitimate reason to be here just like everybody 
else. From a practical point of view, it is important for the region as 
whole to deal with the Russians collectively and ensure their activities 
should be in the region’s interests. Such an approach would reflect to 
the Forum that New Zealand is not over-reacting, but dealing with the 
issue rationally and professionally. Yet the New Zealand approach to 
the Russians is subtle, but it indicated to the rest of the Pacific Island 
States that the presence of the Soviet Union in the region is not a 
laughing matter either.
112
 
 
The Soviet Union’s attempt to build relationship with the newly independent Pacific Island 
States can be viewed as a normal development in the world of diplomacy and international 
relations, as well as being a part of the struggle between powerful nations. This diplomatic 
development in the region was very noticeable and garnered a quick reaction from the Pacific 
Island States. The Soviet approach involved establishing a fishing agreement and fishing 
bases in the region. It is suspected that the Soviet Union’s intention was very much fishing 
and diplomatic in nature; it is unlikely that they wished to have a military base in the 
region.
113
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The timing of the Russian interest in the South Pacific coincided with the Pacific Island 
States’ establishment of the EEZ regime. That is, the Soviet interest (and that of other 
DWFN) in fishing in the South Pacific region was linked to the forthcoming extension of 
coastal sovereign rights to 200 nautical miles. This provided an economic opportunity from 
the Soviet Union’s perspective; fishing bases for its fishing fleet (supplies) would maximize 
these potential economic benefits. 
 
New Zealand was very pragmatic in its approach to the Russian issue and it was influenced 
by the United States and allies. It carefully watched the Russian activities and New Zealand 
officials privately argued that any unwelcome tendencies would need to be  dealt with 
accordingly.
114
 In practice, New Zealand police sought to contain the spread of Soviet 
influence and to discourage Pacific states from providing on-shore facilities, regardless of 
their ostensible purposes.
115
 It was feared that a prominent Russian presence in the region 
would not only would bring about major change to the geopolitical characteristics of the 
region, but it would also create complex challenges for the Pacific Island States in the long 
term.  
 
New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon argued that a Soviet presence cost the Pacific 
Island States that permitted it and that it was against the interests of the region as a whole.
116
 
On the other hand, his Samoan counterpart was of the firm belief that Russian aid would 
improve the living standards of Samoan people and was welcome given that traditional aid 
sources were not expanding as hoped.
117
 As a result, Muldoon proposed that New Zealand 
should provide more aid and also urged Australia to do more than it had in the past.  
 
This discussion raises two points: First, it demonstrates that the Pacific Island States relied 
heavily on foreign aid. Second, it shows that the Soviet Union was seen by the Pacific Island 
States as major player in the region and an actor that could stimulate other traditional donors. 
It also suggests that New Zealand (and Australia) struggled to comprehend the Pacific Island 
States desperation for any form of assistance and vulnerability to new relationships with 
potential donors.  
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 Another issue attracting Soviet fishing interest to the region was that its enormous fishing 
fleet needed new profitable fishing grounds. In 1967, the Soviet Union possessed the world’s 
largest national fishing fleet and fishing related vessels and 25% of these were involved in 
high-seas fisheries. 99% of the living resources exploited on a commercial basis are confined 
to the 200 EEZ.
118
  
 
Kiribati was the first Pacific Island State to formalize fishing relations with the Soviet Union 
as a result of the US failure to agree to a 1983 fishing agreement with other Pacific Island 
States. It helped that the Soviet offer was also much higher than the ATA licensing fee.
119
 
The Kiribati-Soviet fishing agreement of October 1985 is a classic example of how local, 
regional and international factors interacted to shape fisheries policy.  
 
The rationale behind the agreement was economic in nature. Since its independence in 1979, 
Kiribati had heavily relied on its former colonial master, the United Kingdom, for financial 
grants. Initially, Kiribati was criticized for the fishing deal with the Soviet Union. Teiwaki 
argues that the US, New Zealand, Australia and Fiji have commercial and fishing relations 
with the Russians and that their being critical of Kiribati-Soviet fishing arrangements is 
hypocritical and cynical; if it was good for those countries, it would be good for Kiribati.
120
 
Kiribati was not exceptional when it came to a need for foreign currency and it was offered a 
much better deal by the Soviets than it had been in any previous fishing arrangements. The 
Kiribati-Soviet fishing agreement was signed with an annual price of tag of $US 1.5 
million..
121
 Previously, Kiribati had a fishing arrangement with the American Tunaboat 
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Association (ATA) at a cost of US$200,000 for a period of 12 months.
122
 Not surprisingly 
Kiribati accepted the highest bidder.   
 
Following the Kiribati deal, the Soviet Union also approached other Pacific Island States 
including Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu and Vanuatu,
123
 with offers ranging from fishing 
arrangements to port access and airline landing rights. Again, these initiatives were of 
concern to the United States.  
 
During the Kiribati fishing negotiations, some Pacific Island States raised concerns, although 
the Kiribati government insisted that this was a purely commercial operation, forecasting at 
least a $US1 million access fee.
124
 But influencing this fishing accord was previous US 
conduct, including the poor reputation of its fishermen and America’s refusal to renew its 
fishing agreement with the ATA.
125
  
 
Kiribati (as well as other Pacific Island States dealing with the ATA) had become 
increasingly disappointed and frustrated with the poor reputation of American fishers, which 
led to the non-renewal of existing fishing accords.
126
 If American fishers were unpopular in 
Pacific Island States’ waters, why had the US not done anything about this problem? The US 
had not intervened to take over from the ATA as negotiator on behalf of the American tuna 
fleet to renew the fishing agreement. By not renewing the fishing accord, the US forced 
Kiribati (and some other Pacific countries) to look elsewhere. 
 
Under the Kiribati-Soviet agreement, port access was banned, except in an emergency.
127
 The 
Soviet Union recognized Kiribati’s sovereign rights over fisheries resources within its 
national jurisdiction, as well as fishing activities conducted outside the 12 nautical miles 
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territorial limit. This was a major blow for the US given its policy of not recognizing any 
coastal States’ claim of sovereign right over HMS tuna within their EEZ. The US was now 
alone in its position. At the same time, Soviet support had started to gain momentum in some 
quarters of the Pacific community.
128
 Additionally, the Soviet Union took full responsibility 
for the actions of its fishing vessels and their crews.
129
 Ultimately, the US had underestimated 
the capacity of the Kiribati government to negotiate independently. 
 
Not surprisingly, the US suspected that the Soviet Union’s interests in the region included far 
more than just fishing.
130
 Washington believed that Russian fishing vessels were equipped 
with intelligence gathering equipment used to monitor US military activities throughout the 
region.
131
 The American military were concerned about a Soviet presence in Micronesia and 
the region as a whole.
132
 Kelly pointed out that their activities could include:  
 
… surveillance of U.S. military activities on Kwajalein, the 
enhancement of Soviet space and satellite operations, and of Soviet 
military communications capabilities; the potential establishment of 
support facilities for deep-seabed mining activities; and the attainment 
of air access and landing rights.
133
 
 
The access fee paid by the Soviet Union was generous in comparison to any pre-existing 
fishing arrangement in the region. However the Soviet-Kiribati agreement was not renewed 
due to a $US13 million being lost in operational costs.
134
 Those losses raised issues as to the 
professional capability of Soviet fishing operations. At any rate, the agreement did not deliver 
for the Soviet Union either economically or politically. Overall, it was a failure.  
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There may have been intelligence or military benefits for the Soviet Union in instigating the 
fishing arrangement. It would not have been wise for them to take such an uncalculated risk 
otherwise. Whatever Moscow’s motives, the US launched a counter attack to reclaim its 
political superiority in the region through the adoption of the 1987 Treaty.  
 
Another issue that arose as a result of the inconsistency of the Soviet fishing arrangement was 
that fish species taken in the Pacific did not necessarily end up in Moscow, but were instead 
sold to Asia and some South American countries. It seemed economically more viable to sell 
catch to countries other than the Soviet Union. This supports the argument stated above that 
the Soviet military activities were predominantly behind fishing agreements and the 
geographical positions of the parties to the Soviet fishing arrangements were of significance 
in terms of monitoring US navy movements.
135
  
 
During a June 1986 visit by the United States Secretary of State George Shultz, Palau warned 
that the growing Soviet presence in the region was now everyone’s problem. However, 
followed the Shultz visit, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
was directed to produce a fisheries aid programme for the region with $US6.5 million 
promptly earmarked for spending over a period of four years.
136
 This was the largest aid 
package for the Pacific community ever recorded in the history of US aid programmes in the 
region. It could be seen as an act of desperation, designed to keep the Pacific communist-free.  
 
The ideological rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union reached a critical point when 
the two powerful states visited the Pacific region to win support. This was unprecedented. It 
suggested that Pacific was not only an important source of tuna, but also a region with 
significant political, diplomatic and military advantages.
137
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Generally, the growing interest of the Soviet Union in the South Pacific brought the region 
some economic benefits, either directly or indirectly.
138
 The Soviet card was played by a 
number of Pacific Island States in order to boost aid receipts from the west.  
 
A widely held belief among the Pacific Island States was that the US was more worried about 
its policy and interests in the Pacific than it was about Pacific islanders. This reflected 
regional discontent with American fisheries policy and the behavior of American fishermen. 
The Pacific Island States were also suspicious of American attempts to dictate the tuna price 
by discouraging fishing arrangements with the Soviet Union, whose fishing agreements were 
more generous than any other DWFN offers.   
 
 
The Treaty Negotiation Process   
 
Having outlined the two main factors that gave rise to the idea of the treaty, it is now 
important to explore the negotiation process. The idea of a multilateral fisheries agreement 
with the United States first emerged at the 1982 South Pacific Form Fisheries Agency 
meeting, where options designed to prevent disputes, such as that involving the Danica 
incident, were considered. That meeting directed the Agency Secretariat to formulate a 
collective approach and common position among member States.
139
 At the same time, PNG 
indicated its interest in negotiating a government-to-government fishing arrangement with the 
US after the expiry of the nine month interim agreement reached following the Danica 
incident. This was the first indication of a government-to-government fishing agreement 
being reached.  
 
At the beginning of 1983, an American team from the American State Department had visited 
PNG to discuss the possibility of a government-to-government fishing agreement.
140
 The 
American team then proceeded to the Solomon Islands with the intention of enlisting support, 
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but the Solomons refused.
141
 PNG then asked the FFA to publicize a call for any Pacific 
Island States interested to consider joining a multilateral fishing treaty with the US.  
 
At this stage, the US seemed to want a multilateral fishing arrangement with all the Pacific 
Island States, but they did not want to initiate such an agreement. To do so could have 
affected its bargaining influence in any subsequent negotiation process. Hence, PNG was 
instructed by the US to recruit other interested Pacific Island States for inclusion in the 
proposed fishing agreement. The US was seeking an intergovernmental multilateral 
agreement covering as many Pacific Island States as possible.  
 
By late 1983, the interested States included Australia, New Zealand, PNG, Solomons, 
Kiribati and Tuvalu. They attended a meeting at which they agreed to the request of the 
Agency Secretariat to prepare relevant background papers for distribution prior to the 9
th
 
Forum Fisheries Committee meeting.
142
 It was agreed that the Agency should inform the 
American government and other Pacific Island States about the need to discuss a possible 
multilateral fisheries arrangement. The Agency would organize the date and venue for 
relevant negotiations with the US. This was the first indication that a multilateral fisheries 
agreement between the Pacific Island States and the US government was now a distinct 
possibility.  
 
US intervention in the negotiation of a multilateral fisheries treaty was designed to prevent 
the ATA from dominating its South Pacific fisheries policy. Clearly the ATA’s poor record 
and unpopularity, accumulated over the Danica and Jeanette Diana incidents, helped end its 
dominance over US fisheries policy towards the Pacific Island States.  
 
In September 1982, the first formal meeting between the Agency and the American 
delegation to discuss the multilateral treaty took place in Suva.
143
 The American delegation 
openly indicated that a commitment by the US to a multilateral treaty would include the 
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payment of access fees and would override the sovereign rights and embargo provisions of 
existing US fisheries policy. In addition, the Americans acknowledged their desire to rebuild 
friendship ties in the region by officially accepting responsibility for American fishing 
vessels. The direct involvement of the US government would help to ensure that the proposed 
multilateral agreement would not have problems in gaining ratification by the US Congress.  
 
An October 1985 meeting between the Agency and American delegations was complicated 
by the Kiribati-Soviet fishing accord, which put pressure on the United States. Added efforts 
exerted by the US, including that by Senior Counselor Derwinski (who was especially sent to 
facilitate the negotiation process), were intended to prevent any further fishing agreements 
with the Soviet Union and avoid further embarrassment for the US.  
 
Theoretically, the negotiation would not have taken too long if the United States had started 
off by negotiating with the Nauru Group
144
 before everyone else. The rationale behind this 
argument was that the Nauru Group had the richest tuna fishing grounds in the entire Pacific 
Ocean.
145
 Also the Nauru Group had a reputation of working together effectively and 
efficiently compared to other sub-regional or regional organizations in the region.
146
  
 
Negotiation is a process of bringing together different positions and interests to negotiate and 
trade-off and to produce a compromise outcome that all parties can agree to. Ikle defines 
negotiation as “a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the 
purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest 
where conflicting interests are present.”147 It may seem that, at the onset of the Treaty 
negotiation, the Pacific Island States had the upper hand in terms of bargaining power. This is 
based on two main issues. First, the US were fully aware of the degree of unease within the 
Pacific Island States camp caused by the fishing disputes with PNG and Solomons. Second, 
the US needed to secure access to the region’s tuna resources. At the same time, the Pacific 
Island States really need a better price for their tuna resources. Hence, they were on equal 
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bargaining footing, where Pacific Island States had the biggest tuna resources in the region 
and the US had the biggest tuna market.
148
 
 
Hopmann states that, “negotiations are one of the most important levers used by states to 
achieve their foreign policy objectives. Thus, an analysis of the bureaucratic politics approach 
to negotiations is inseparable from the bureaucratic politics framework for the analysis 
mechanism to resolve common and international problems.”149 This was very much the case 
for the US foreign policy, particularly fisheries policy regarding HMS, as it sought to bring 
an end to fishing disputes with the Pacific Island States. Negotiation itself was seen not just 
as a mechanism to resolve common and international problems
150
, but also as the best tool 
available to resolve conflicts and tensions and benefits all the parties involved.
151
 
 
Negotiations are a way for parties to trade off and compromise their interests.
152
 Odell argues 
that the negotiation process is a sequence of actions where two or more States exchange and 
compromise demands and proposals, with each expecting a fair result in the form of a 
treaty.
153
 The outcome of the negotiation process can be a balanced compromise between the 
parties’ interests. In many cases, the negotiation process can be delayed and further 
complicated by the complex combination of local politics, international diplomacy and other 
exogenous factors.
154
 
 
Negotiations between weak and strong states always challenge the parties to recognize their 
differences and how these may affect the negotiation processes.
155
 For the Pacific Island 
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States to come as a single entity to the Treaty negotiation would increase their bargaining 
power. The global hierarchy of parties in terms of military capability and economic position 
also influences the international negotiation process. The Pacific Island States may not have a 
large military capability and economic capacity, but they have tuna resources and this gives 
them bargaining leverage to negotiate with the powerful US.  
 
The timeline and duration of negotiations, in most cases, is determined by the degree of 
flexibility and seriousness of the issues discussed and the willingness and commitment of the 
parties to cooperate regardless of their individual positions.
156
 National interests are the basic 
foundation for international negotiation process and progress is determined by parties’ 
willingness to prioritize their interests and discuss options with the other party.  
 
Hopmann asserts that,  
… all states are guided in their negotiating behaviour by some 
overriding notion of the national interests, all are also divided 
internally to a greater or lesser degree by different interpretations of 
the national interests or other ideological guide posts, different 
political interests on the domestic scene, and conflicts of bureaucratic 
interest among the agents who must formulate specific negotiating 
positions and carry out the actual task of negotiating with other 
countries.
157
  
 
From the outset the negotiations were expected to be challenging, primarily because of the 
asymmetry between the Pacific Island nations and the US and the Pacific Island States 
regarding the two key issues. First, there was the matter of the economic benefits that would 
be generated from any agreement; and second, the issue of access to the US marine 
technologies.
158
  
 
Constant communication and information sharing is a vital component to the negotiation 
process, from the initial exchanging of papers to the finalizing of the agreement. Susskind et 
al. argued that,  
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… negotiation includes cooperation and competition, common and 
conflicting interests, is nothing new. In fact, it is typically understood 
that these elements are both present and can be disentangled … A 
deeper analysis shows that the competitive and cooperative elements 
are inextricable entwined. In practice, they cannot be separated. This 
bonding is fundamentally important to the analysis, structuring, and 
conduct of negotiation … There is a central, inescapable tension 
between cooperative moves to create value jointly and strategic 
choice. Analysts must come to grips with it; negotiators must manage 
it. Neither denial nor discomfort will make it disappear.
159
  
 
The Pacific Island States believed that they had the upper hand in the negotiations and felt 
that the US would not be too difficult to negotiate with.
160
 It is always difficult to know 
which bargaining issues are discussed during the negotiation because of the strict no-access 
policies that exist for outsiders.  
 
International negotiations became easier in some ways due to the changes to geopolitical 
arrangements around the world after the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Negotiation predominantly became more economic in orientation.
161
 The negotiations 
between the Pacific Island States and the US over their Treaty towards the end of the Cold 
War was no exception to any other international negotiation in terms of process involved. 
The only difference was the fact that the negotiation comprised of 16 Pacific Island States
162
 
on one side and the US as one state on the other.  
 
Negotiation can be a tricky exercise in terms of levels of concession and the desire of both 
parties for successful outcome. The negotiation process can be challenging and time 
consuming because of the political complexity of the parties involved and their individual 
circumstances. The Pacific Island parties were comprised of different cultures, something that 
was in itself challenging. For them to negotiate with the US, which had its own interests and 
negotiating style, was another challenge.    
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Negotiations between weak and strong States will always be mismatched and other 
influencing factors such as foreign aid tend to be influential depending on the degree of 
difficulty involved in reaching a compromise. The US had different degrees of political 
relations with different Pacific Island States; these made it very challenging to have a 
collective response. Obviously, the Pacific Island States with close ties to Washington wanted 
to see the negotiation conducted in a favorable manner. The assumption is that the strong 
nations can do what they like and the weak nations suffer accordingly.
163
 However, here 
Treaty negotiation process indicated that the US did not dictate how the negotiation process 
was conducted and that there was an equal exchange of concessions between the two parties.  
 
Both parties shared some common basic interests, which really helped the Treaty negotiation 
process. To a certain extent, the Pacific Island States and the US each knew the others’ 
bottom line issues and how far each would compromise.   
 
The Treaty negotiation was no exception to any multilateral treaty negotiation. It was 
determined by underpinning factors that included local political situations and international 
relations on one hand, and the political relations between the potential treaty partners on the 
other. Powerful companies and lobby groups were influential in the international treaty 
negotiation process—not only shaping the outcome of the treaty, but also formulating the 
foreign policy.  
 
A high level American delegation visited Wellington in 1976 and indicated that the US is no 
longer in a position to allow multinational companies to determine its foreign policy.
164
 This 
shift indicated that the US was attempting to maintain its reputation in the South Pacific, 
particularly with regards to American fishing practices. 
 
The negotiation flowed smoothly in the early stages as the US made major concessions. For 
instance, the US agreed to take responsibility for enforcing the terms and conditions of the 
Treaty on its fishing fleet and the relevant national laws of the Pacific Island States; they also 
agreed to ensure there were no fishing activities in the closed area under the Treaty.  
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 The FFA (as one party to the Treaty) really helped to minimize the degree of complexity 
involved in negotiating with the US. It would have been more difficult if the Pacific Island 
States individually negotiated with the US—it may have even been impossible for a treaty to 
materialize. The other advantage of the Pacific Island States negotiating as group was that it 
was less expensive to work collectively, which increased their bargaining power. 
 
The Pacific Island States’ delegation may have held a position of strength at the negotiation 
table, but the US team would have matched their experience and expertise. Voting by 
consensus was also another advantage for the Pacific Island States, because the US had to 
take into consideration that they were dealing with 16 different countries.  
 
Both the Pacific Island States and the US sought advice during the negotiation regarding 
specific, relevant issues to ensure they maintained their interests at large. Finding common 
interests that represented and reflected the whole region would have been a challenge for the 
FFA delegation. As a single entity representing the Pacific Island States in the Treaty 
negotiation with the US, the FFA increased its bargaining power when dealing with one 
country with one market. 
 
The US has other institutions that may have influenced the negotiation due to financial and 
technical arrangements.
165
 This was due to the fact that the US hosts a wide range of 
organizations and institutions and influences in almost everything that Pacific Island States 
may have related to in general. 
 
The bottom line goal for both the Pacific Island States and the U S was to achieve economic 
benefits and an excellent political relationship.
166
 These two issues are inseparable 
(economics/tuna resources on one hand and the politics/control of tuna exploitation on the 
other). The US interests in this context provided its international institutions with directions 
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in terms of where the negotiation should have been headed in terms of what could be 
negotiated.
167
 
 
The FFA team deemed that New Zealand and Australia should take the leadership role given 
the complex economic and political agenda.
168
 The team seemed to be divided into two 
invisible groups, New Zealand, Australia and others on one hand, and the rest of the Pacific 
Island States on the other.
169
 This was an advantage and disadvantage for both groups and for 
the whole negotiation process as a whole. This kind of leadership role is the reality of politics 
and diplomacy in the region, where New Zealand and Australia play a very significant role.
170
 
The Pacific Island States commonly go with the flow in order to avoid political and economic 
fallout. The Pacific Island States basically rely on New Zealand for advice.
171
 In this context, 
their leadership really helped the negotiation process, as did the way key issues were 
negotiated (not only within the FFA team, but also with the American delegation).  
 
The US also seemed to prefer dealing with Forum States as a unit or one entity, rather than 
individual States.
172
 This made it easier to achieve its bottom line. That is, it was easier to 
achieve common ground with the Pacific Island States under the direction and guidance of 
the FFA, than it would have been trying to find common grounds through negotiations with 
individual States.
173
 Negotiation in a big group would have been very complicated due to the 
fact that the individual states do not share the same institutional processes of integration and 
that they have different socio-economic interests.
174
  
 
The Pacific Island States’ delegation may have seemed smooth on the surface, however 
certain subtle but challenging differences lay underneath their generic stance on certain 
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issues.
175
 The situation was challenging and competitive and political tensions were created 
in bringing about a collective position.  
 
The advantage for the Pacific Island States was the fact that individuals had the freedom to 
highlight specific issues.
176
 There was also an opportunity for the each to voice and clearly 
outline issues of concern for others and how important these issues would be in the 
negotiation process. On the other hand, the US would decide how far it would go beyond its 
targeted bottom line.
177
 A multilateral treaty negotiation process can be very competitive and 
can create great conflict; at times, it can be impossible to bring about a common stance.
178
 
Fortunately, this Treaty negotiation process was facilitated by the good will of both sides and 
the timing of when certain issues were put forward—and also how both parties dealt with 
these.   
 
The other challenging aspect of this fisheries Treaty negotiation was the fact that the Pacific 
Island States had had a similar experience in previous individual and group negotiations.
179
 
The Treaty can be seen as a reference point for future fishing arrangements—one from which 
lessons can be learnt in the future. The nature of the Treaty and its negotiation process were 
different from any other form of diplomatic arrangement with any Pacific Island States and 
the US.
180
  
 
The other issue arising from the negotiation among the Pacific Island States themselves was a 
lack of secrecy; the negotiation prioritized accountability and transparency, particularly with 
regards to the issues that would impact the region as a whole.  
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Even though the negotiations moved from one issue to another, it seemed that Australia, New 
Zealand and the US had some sort of ‘pre-cooperative’ understanding in terms of some key 
issues.
181
 This is quite common practice when allied countries at the negotiation table have 
similar positions and wish to maintain their international and regional socio-economic and 
political relationships.
182
 An example of these interests is the ANZUS treaty.  
 
It was believed that the party submitting the initial proposal for the Treaty would play an 
important role in setting the agenda for the negotiation process; after this bargaining and 
counter-offering could start.
183
 This actor would also be acknowledging that they really 
needed the Treaty to happen. Other potential parties would then have the opportunity to 
identify the scope and depth of the proposal, which would be a reflection of the actor’s 
concerns.
184
 In this case, this actor was a major power—the US. For a super power to initiate 
a multilateral treaty negotiation process is not an unusual exercise, because powerful actors 
become more powerful (politically and economically) as a result of cooperation.
185
 Also they 
see cooperation as an opportunity to push their interests further (they only push something of 
great interest to them). In hegemonic stability theory the structures of the international system 
are hierarchical in essence and dominant actors control the rules for others to follow.
186
 
 
The nature of international multilateral negotiation is that parties want to know the positions 
of the other parties involved and to identify realistic avenue(s) that could be used as leverage 
for the negotiation.
187
 Counter-offers are expected and are part of the whole process. 
Avoiding major conflict is the best approach. Within this Treaty negotiation both the Pacific 
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Island States and the US consistently avoided major disagreements that would delay and 
create obstacles to the negotiation process. 
 
During the negotiation process, the US deliberately avoided using threats. Hopmann argues 
that, “agreements that are essentially one-sided cannot endure indefinitely. This is due to the 
fact that parties that have been coerced into accepting agreements that do not serve their 
interest will invariably resent those agreements and the parties that imposed them.”188 The US 
desperately tried to avoid creating any negative feelings during the negotiation that could 
cause tension and jeopardize their access to the region’s tuna resources.   
 
At the Forum meeting, the discussion of a regional fishery organization was the main 
agenda.
189
 The US threatened to suspend the funds earmarked for the organization discussed, 
if its membership was rejected.
190
 Fiji responded by saying that if US membership was 
accepted, then it would withdraw from the proposed regional organization.
191
 The US 
membership was rejected and the threat was played down.
192
 This was a major victory for the 
Pacific Island States in terms of keeping the most powerful country in the world out of the 
region’s fisheries organization. The US would be very influential in the regional organization 
and its advanced fishing technologies would cause environmental concern for the tuna 
resources of the region.
193
 This refusal and the exclusion of any DWFN from the FFA 
demonstrated the ability of the Pacific Island States to negotiate with powerful countries.
194
 
This was an important lesson learnt from the Pacific Island States’ perspective—they 
increased their bargaining power and positioned themselves better during the Treaty 
negotiation process by avoiding any negative elements that could have arisen.
195
  
                                                          
188
 Hopmann, P.T. The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflict, University of South 
Carolina Press, Columbia (1996:27). 
189
 Boer, B., Ramsay, R., Rothwell, D. Environmental Law in the Asia Pacific, Kluwer Law International Ltd, 
London (1998). 
190
 Crawford, J. (ed.) The Law of the Sea in the Asian Pacific Region: Developments and Prospects, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands (1995); Dallek, R. The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics 
and Foreign Affairs, Alfred & Kempt, New York (2008). 
191
 Palmer, N.D. Westward Watch: The United States and the Changing Western Pacific, International Defense 
Publishers, New York (1987), http://www.spc.int/coastfish/countries/fiji/fiji.c.ffa.html. 
192
 Crawford J. (ed.) The Law of the Sea in the Asian Pacific Region: Developments and Prospects, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands (1995). 
193
 Smith, A.R., and Valdenmarsen, J.W. Papers presented at the Expert Consultation on Sustainable Fishing, 
FAO Fisheries Report No. 588, Supplement, FAO, Rome (2000).   
194
 “Food Security and Climate Change in the South Pacific”, Pacific Ecologist, Writer – 36 (2007), 
www.pacificecologist.org/archive/.../food-security-climate-change.pdf. 
195
 Bryant-Takelau, J. and Fraser, I. Redefining the Pacific, A World Bank Country Study, Pacific Island 
Economies: Building a Resilient Economic Base for the Twenty-First Century, The World Bank, Washington 
DC (1996); Maidment, R. and Mackerras, C. Culture and Society in Asian-Pacific, Routledge, London (1998). 
 The FFA States were facing complex scenarios in terms of the existence of individualistic 
socio-political, cultural, national and tribal affiliations; it was difficult to bring about 
significant consensus.
196
 For any decision to be effective, effective processes and operations 
are required at all levels of the community. On the other hand, the US government did not 
have any tribal and cultural complications when it came to its international treaty negotiation 
process. Hence, the American delegation’s major challenge was to ensure that American 
interests were maintained national and internationally.  
 
The negotiation process was also an opportunity for the Pacific Island States to discuss their 
major differences, not only regarding fishery issues, but also in other areas and to attempt to 
resolve them.
197
 The negotiation process was carried out in good faith, which led to a positive 
result.   
 
The national and international affairs of the Pacific Island States and the US also influenced 
the establishment of their objectives and during the negotiation.
198
 They influenced the 
shaping up of offers and counter-offers and how far certain issues would go. A negotiation 
process allows one party to convince others that their offer is better than any possible 
counter-offer. The nature of the relations between the Pacific Island States and the US 
determined the outcome of the Treaty negotiation.   
 
During the Treaty negotiation the emphasis was very much on substance and content; new 
issues were carefully timed.
199
 It is also suspected that there were other issues involved 
directly (or otherwise) in the negotiation process—for instance, the nuclear testing in the 
Pacific. Hopmann argued that, “it has not yet identified any clear and unambiguous criteria 
for determining precisely when flexibility or fairness, reciprocity or unconditional 
constructive behavior, are like to be more appropriate in producing mutually beneficial and 
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relatively optimal outcomes”.200 At the same time, it may seem that the Pacific Island States 
had a strong bargaining position that they did not use aggressively. 
 
Compromise is always necessary as a by-product of trading and exchanging concessions 
between parties for the fair and honest progress of the negotiation. That is, progress is made 
when two parties move away from their original positions as a result of balanced exchanges. 
During the Treaty negotiation process, there were no major unrealistic demands made. These 
not only slow down the process, but they are a waste of time and are self-defeating—
demands of this type would have changed the whole negotiation process. 
 
Both parties had long term interests in the economics of the tuna resources in the region and 
wanted to make an agreement that would not only serve their interests, but that would also be 
worth it. As Hopmann put forward, “an agreement is worth preserving only if it serves the 
long-term interests … specific agreements be based upon mutual interests, but there must 
help to create a mutually beneficial relationship among parties that will assure their long-term 
adherence.”201  
 
The basic understanding between and common interests of the Pacific Island States and the 
US served as leverage during the negotiation process; realistic and generous concessions and 
trade-offs were made as a result. Otherwise, they would go through a trial and error 
negotiation process that may not expect to be fair and achieve best interests for both sides.    
 
During the Treaty negotiation, each party negotiated their willingness and commitment to 
cooperating with the other based on the seriousness of the issues and their degree of 
flexibility.
202
 The Pacific Island States were faced with complex challenges in terms of their 
complex political and cultural affiliations on one hand and their socio-political relationships 
on the other. In this context, a ‘middle ground’ position was needed to serve as a 
compromise; this was found with the strong support of New Zealand and Australia.
203
 The 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements between Australia, New Zealand and the US (one 
                                                          
200
 Hopmann, P.T. The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflict, University of South 
Carolina Press, Columbia (1996:194). 
201
 Hopmann, P.T. The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflict, University of South 
Carolina Press, Columbia (1996:27). 
202
 Scarr, D. A History of the Pacific Islands: Passage Through Tropical Time, Curzon Press, Surrey (2001). 
203
 U.S. Policy Toward South Pacific Island Nations, Including Australia and New Zealand, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington (2007). 
example of this being the ANZUS Treaty) may have been influential during the 
negotiation.
204
  
The weak economic and political capabilities of the Pacific Island States in a global context 
seemingly put them at a disadvantage during the Treaty negotiation. It is quite natural in a 
multilateral treaty negotiation for a party’s global position to be used as a bargaining tool. 205 
However, the Pacific Island States and the US were on equal footing in the negotiation 
process due the benefits they would each obtain from the Treaty. That is, both parties would 
benefit economically from the region’s fisheries as whole. It is always challenging to 
establish a collective agreement in a multilateral international treaty due to varying socio-
economic and cultural advantages and disadvantages. As one group, the Pacific Island States 
had an advantage in terms of concession negotiation—the US potentially had less room to 
maneuver. Drahos argues that “developing countries need groups that encourage 
communication among themselves, especially in the hard bargaining stages … Better 
communication among developing countries is the basis for making calculative trust more 
robust and allows for the possibility of forming some level of social identity trust.”206 In this 
context, the Pacific Island States came together as a group to give themselves more political 
weight in the Treaty negotiation.  
 
The Pacific Island States’ advantage at the beginning of the negotiation process lay in that 
there were lots of fishing arrangements existing in parallel—this increased their bargaining 
power. Previously, when the Pacific Island States were dealing with the American Tunaboat 
Association (ATA), their bargaining power was weak simply because there was no 
competition at all. The Pacific Island States had had disappointing past experiences when 
negotiating with powerful countries or organizations, regardless of the issue—often feeling 
bullied and dictated to.  
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Major concessions by powerful States forced by unexpected major international political 
developments would increase weak countries’ leverage.207 Developing countries can, by 
chance, benefit from major political developments. The Soviet fishing interest in the South 
Pacific contributed to the Pacific Island States’ bargaining power, which led to successful 
negotiation.
208
 Another unexpected advantage for the Pacific Island States came in the form 
of the length of the negotiation—this resulted in more balanced concessions. 
 
Negotiation is often characterized by key issues rarely mentioned early on,
209
 because they 
are very difficult to negotiate. The general pattern of negotiating major issues toward the end 
of the negotiation may have to do with both parties wanting a chance to gain an 
understanding of the other’s basic position. Access fee payments proved a difficult issue for 
the two sides to compromise on. Frustration over this issue in particular, and the treaty 
negotiations more generally, led the American delegation to hint that, should the talks fail, an 
interim agreement with the Micronesian islands would then be an option. This highlighted 
American concerns regarding Soviet influence over Micronesia and its military facilities.   
 
The Pacific Island States in some cases, especially negotiation with organizations are more 
favourable for the terms and conditions, but with the US, they took a totally different 
approach altogether. The Pacific Island States became responsive to any tough stance by the 
US, including the threat of pulling out from the negotiation—something the US was not keen 
on in reality. Inequality of bargaining power could be challenging for both parties and would 
undermine the level of good will and fair outcome. The Treaty established a deep, basic 
understanding between the two parties in terms of how issues would be negotiated. Hence, 
they were no major problems encountered during the negotiation process. 
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The Pacific Island States would learn from this exercise and put it to good use in future 
negotiations at both regional and international levels.
210
 They realized how significant it was 
for them to conduct trade negotiation or any regional or international arrangement as a unit, 
rather than individually. Weaker States were better able to negotiate a ‘fair deal’ if they co-
operated in forming an organization to represent common interests. This is due in most cases 
to the inequality of bargaining power between the Pacific Island States and the US in 
particular, and also between developing and developed countries at large. 
 
From a US perspective, a regional fisheries agreement with all the Pacific Island States would 
provide unlimited access to the region’s tuna resources, while also denying Soviet influence. 
A compromise position was reached over the issue of sovereign rights that would alleviate 
fishing tensions. However, these objectives could not have been achieved using the bilateral 
fishing arrangements commonly practiced by the American tuna fleet. Even though reaching 
a multilateral arrangement involved time-consuming and difficult negotiations, this would 
prove more effective into the longer term.  
 
In October 1986, both delegations reached an agreement comprising a $US60 million 
payment over a five year period.
211
 This access fee package included a cash payment, an 
industry fee and charges for other services. After the agreement was reached, a White House 
press release summarized it in the terms below.   
 
On October 2, 1986, negotiators from the U.S. and 16 Pacific island 
nations reached agreement on a regional fisheries treaty that will give 
American tuna vessels access to some 10 million square miles of rich 
fishing grounds in the South Pacific Ocean. The agreement provides 
first and fair compensation to the islands for the resource, and offers 
the parties to the Treaty a substantial development assistance package 
that will continue the long tradition of close and productive relations 
between the U.S. and the island states.
212
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Conclusion 
 
The Treaty was primarily designed to resolve the disputes between the Pacific Island States 
and the US. The US sought to improve its political and diplomatic relations with Pacific 
Island States. 
However, as we have seen, the former Soviet Union’s fishing agreements with the Pacific 
Island States (and their own fishing disputes with the Pacific Island States) were of major 
concern to the US government. The growth of Soviet fishing interests in the South Pacific 
had injected Cold War considerations into the region. However US Pacific policies reduced 
the capacity of the Soviet Union to establish a credible presence in the Pacific Island 
States.
213
 This saw the establishment of American non-resident diplomatic relations within a 
number of Pacific Island States, following approaches by the Soviet Union. The decline of 
Moscow’s influence as the Cold War ended, and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, 
also signaled changes for America’s future position in the region.214  
 
American allies and friends in the South Pacific stressed the consequences that the US might 
face should existing tensions with the Pacific Island States over fisheries remain 
unresolved.
215
 The 1986 Treaty aimed to resolve key differences through concessions,
216
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while offering to minimize illegal American fishing operations in the region. However that 
achieved very little so long as the ATA treated the Treaty with contempt.
217
 This was not 
surprising: throughout the treaty negotiations, the US delegation had been pressured by 
American fisheries industry groups determined not to include the sovereign rights issue over 
tuna in the Treaty.  
 
The negotiation process ultimately provided the Forum Fisheries Agency with the training 
and experience required to negotiate future fisheries arrangements with DWFN. The Treaty 
was a significant goodwill gesture on the part of the US government under the Reagan 
administration, in its acknowledgement of the interests of the Pacific Island States.  
 
On June 18, 1987, President Ronald Reagan wrote to the United States Senate about the 
Treaty, stating that: 
I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to 
ratification, the Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments 
of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the 
United States of America, with annexes and agreed statement, 
which has been signed by the United States and twelve Pacific 
Island states.
218
 
 
On November 6, 1987,
219
 the US Senate approved the Treaty with a 89-0 vote,
220
 
subsequently ratifying it on December 20, 1987. This was a satisfactory outcome, as will be 
highlighted in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 in terms of the issues negotiated. It benefited both the US 
and its longer term fisheries interests in the South Pacific and the Pacific Island States as 
well.  
 
The formula of the Treaty itself was appealing to both the Pacific Island States and the US 
parties, which may have to do with how the negotiation was carried out. Also the Pacific 
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communities do have relatively good relations with the American people and that helped for 
the negotiation process. For instance, there are significant Pacific Island States’ communities 
throughout the US. However, it was the common interests of both parties that brought them 
together to the negotiation table.
221
  
 
Individual government governing styles would also affect their approach from issue to issue 
and the different degrees of debate and discussion.
222
 The Treaty seemed to be based on 
mutual agreements, with both parties’ interests fairly compromised. The outcome of the 
negotiation process would also be influenced by the capabilities of the experts from both 
parties involved in the process. The Treaty itself can also be seen as a means for the Pacific 
Island States and the US to sustain a long term political and economic relationships.  
 
Reciprocity and bargaining have similar capacities to resolve disputes during negotiation 
process; both seek to establish a compromise stance for parties involved.
223
 It may seem that 
trade-offs between the Pacific Island States and the US were fair with reference to what was 
achieved by both sides. Hopmann argued that the “principle required for this process to work 
effectively is that all group members must defer judgment about ideas and about the 
individuals who suggest ideas; ideas should not be criticized at the outset of the process, and 
individuals should feel free to suggest any ideas, no matter how crazy they may at first 
appear, without fearing that either they or their ideas will be criticized.”224 The fact that both 
parties went in open minded and listened to each other’s proposals and views also helped the 
negotiation process.  
 
The US had a reality check during the negotiation of its fisheries policy and fishing disputes. 
As Crossett stated that,  
For decades, Congress protected the tuna boat owners by enacting 
measures retaliating against governments that seized American 
fishing boats. But when the Pacific treaty was concluded in Tonga in 
October, American negotiators were optimistic that it would meet no 
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major resistance in Congress because the tuna industry was 
represented on the negotiation team.
225
   
 
The US needed to secure access to the Pacific Island States’ tuna resources and in order to do 
this it needed the Treaty to be comprehensive. It also needed to restore its relationship with 
the Pacific Island States, which had been tarnished by the ATA fishing practices in the 
region. The Treaty also blocked the former Soviet Union from having permanent access to 
the region’s tuna resources and establishing military base.  
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Chapter Three  
 
A Legal Analysis of the Fisheries Treaty  
 
Introduction  
 
The previous chapter outlined the historical background of the Treaty and the causes of the 
fishing disputes that occurred between the Pacific Island States and the US. These disputes 
arose primarily because US fisheries policy did not recognize Pacific Island States’ sovereign 
rights over highly migratory species (HMS).226 By contrast, the Pacific Island States claimed 
sovereign rights over living resources (including HMS) present within their national 
jurisdictions. As result, the Treaty was deliberately designed to resolve not just fishing 
disputes, but to help facilitate a compromise between the different positions on the sovereign 
rights issue.  
 
This chapter analyzes the concept of sovereign rights under the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea 1982 (1982 Convention), not only with regard to its consistency (or 
otherwise) with the Treaty, but also taking into account the contrasting positions of Pacific 
Island States and the US. It discusses the access provision of the Treaty in relation to how 
both parties negotiated and settled. It also addresses the manner in which the Treaty was used 
to actually manage these different positions and other national, regional and international 
legal issues related to the Treaty itself.   
 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
  
Under the 1982 Convention, the Pacific Island States have the discretion to determine an 
allowable catch as best satisfies their interests. The law of the sea had been among the most 
debated and deliberated of treaty conventions in the history of international law.
227
 Different 
influences on the international law of the sea include the practice of Coastal States, the 
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unilateral extension of maritime boundaries, the related development and improvement of 
marine technology and the growing demand for fisheries (tuna) in world markets.
228
 These 
were all key factors. They presented difficult choices for the future development of the law of 
the sea and were as much political and economic as they were legal in orientation. That is, 
coastal States wanted to expand their national jurisdiction over their coasts so they could 
politically control the economics of marine resources and other minerals therein.
229
 
International law, then, emerges as a legal means allowing countries to control and regulate 
exploration and exploitation, and to develop marine resources for the benefit of all parties 
concerned, while also conserving and managing the natural environment.
230
   
 
The United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I
231
, II
232
 & III
233
) was an 
arena in which the international community discussed and then negotiated law of the sea 
outcomes. Of significance here was a rapid growth in the number of fishing disputes between 
coastal States and distant-water fishing nations (DWFN).
234
 These provided an opportunity 
for the international community to come together to try and develop a set of common rules 
and norms. Having these rules in place helps to avoid future disputes between states, however 
developing them can prove time consuming and expensive due to countries’ different socio-
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political and economic circumstances. Therefore, establishing a set of rules collectively 
agreed upon by the international community is an inherently difficult task.  
 
Throughout the UNCLOS III negotiations, rights over highly migratory species were 
controversial.
235
 The subsequent adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 1982 (1982 Convention) went some way towards resolving these disputed 
issues.
236
  
 
In attempting to resolve major law of the sea issues,
237
 the 1982 Convention brought a 
completely new perspective to the issue of coastal States’ control over marine resources. 
More ocean space was coming under national jurisdiction than previously, with a consequent 
need for greater cooperation among fishing nations.
238
 Under the 1982 Convention, coastal 
States could now claim some 35 per cent of the ocean surface through exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) provisions, and some 95 per cent of marine resources therein under commercial 
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exploitation.
239
 This was a huge development for the law of the sea, bringing with it the 
possibility of major economic benefits for coastal States, but also possibly detrimental effects 
to marine resources and environments.  
 
The advancement of marine technologies that allowed more extensive exploitation was seen 
by coastal States as a direct threat to their adjacent resources and, therefore, made effective 
control over those resources necessary.
240
 Dahmani argues that the “Exclusive Economic 
Zone is a reflection of their aspirations to economic development, not an action of economic 
warfare in this context of the developing world’s strategy of development that one should 
look for the motivations and objectives of its international ocean policy.”241   
 
The push for control of off-shore fisheries resources was very much economic in essence, 
particularly for the developing coastal States. However, in order to generate revenue from 
these resources, first and foremost they needed to legally claim and control the exploitation, 
management and exploitation process. This led to coastal States extending their jurisdictional 
boundaries. Dahmani states that the:  
… extension of national jurisdiction to extensive areas of the high 
seas adjacent to their coasts, in order to exclude or control foreign 
fishermen, mainly from the developed countries, well before the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea started 
reformulating the rules and structures of the law of the sea. The 
rationale for such action derives from the desire to guarantee that the 
resources of the adjacent sea areas are part of the coastal state’s 
national resources. In this respect, sovereignty over adjacent sea 
resources was conceived as being indispensable for the development 
of the new states of the developing world. This link between 
sovereignty and economic development, it must be mentioned, 
counted for much of their extremism voiced at the law of the sea 
negotiations ... EEZ concept, as far as the fishery resources are 
concerned, and cannot be expected to redress this balance to a great 
extent. In reality the main beneficiaries are the rich and developed 
states like the USA, Australia, Canada, Japan, the USSR, New 
Zealand, Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil, Norway and Chile.
242
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 At the UNCLOS III, Pacific Island States highlighted the special needs of their region,
243
 
including support for the EEZ regime, as a significant component of the new law of the 
sea.
244
 Certain provisions of the 1982 Convention (such as Part IV, Part V and Part VIII) 
reflected the legitimate interests of the South Pacific Forum States.
245
  
 
The EEZ regime was seen as a compromise between countries with different interests in 
relation to the exploration, exploitation and management of resources. Dahmani argues that: 
The Exclusive Economic Zone was introduced as a compromise to 
accommodate the interests of states claiming a territorial sea of more 
than 12 miles. Such claims were often motivated by economic 
considerations, so it was hoped to find a compromise solution by 
providing an Economic Zone beyond a territorial sea of 12 miles 
which seemed to be generally acceptable.
246
 
The EEZ concept also provided conservation measures that all States in question as their 
responsibilities toward resources within.   
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 In 1977, and in anticipation of the conclusion of the 1982 Convention, Forum member States 
agreed to declare 200 nautical miles EEZ no later than March 31, 1978.
247
 This meant that 
some six million square miles of waters would come under the new form of jurisdiction.
248
 In 
that year, 27 coastal States worldwide had claimed 200 nautical miles EEZ and fishing 
zones.
249
  
 
In 1979, the Forum member States adopted the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency 
Convention (FFA Convention) and declared sovereign rights over all living resources within 
their newly established 200 nautical miles national jurisdiction.
250
 The Forum’s goal in 
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requiring such a declaration was to bring marine resources and natural resources under their 
control for both exploitation and development. Therefore, in order to control their potential 
resources, the Pacific Island States were required to legally claim sovereign rights over their 
newly established national jurisdictions.  
 
The EEZ gave both coastal and non-coastal States some sense of responsibility for resources 
within and beyond through cooperation to benefit all parties. Dahmani argues that:  
… the issue involved in the EEZ is not one of excluding the 
developed states from access to the fishery resources of the seas, but 
one of giving to all states, developed as well as developing, real 
access to these resources. In other words, changing the existing 
situation in which the great powers manage the seas, to a situation in 
which an important share may go to developing states. The EEZ will 
not make all states equal, but it would allow developing states to gain 
control over whatever resources they might have within the areas 
adjacent to their coasts that were previously subject to the freedom of 
fishing. The real beneficiaries of these resources were the developed 
states.
251
 
 
That is, the EEZ regime seemed a ‘calculated move’ for the international community in order 
to create a common position for all States’ interests, especially the socio-political and 
economic ones. Even though the coastal States initially pushed the concept, in the end it 
brought about a compromise stance on behalf of all States as a result of difficult negotiations. 
 
The Concept of Sovereign Rights  
 
New Zealand indicated to the Pacific Island States that unilateral action on the issue of 200 
EEZ was preferred and ultimately more advantageous than multilateral action.
252
 Again, New 
Zealand took charge in its advisory role for the Pacific Island States and was more active than 
any of the other countries. “… the New Zealand delegation will be pleased to assist you in 
any way it can, we are very happy to have you here …”253  
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The brief for the New Zealand delegation to the Suva meeting in October 1976 indicated that 
it should be made known to the international community—particularly the DWFN—that the 
Forum and its members were preparing to take advantage of the EEZ in a serious and 
coordinated way, and the willingness to work cooperatively with other interested institutions 
and countries.
254
  
 
The New Zealand delegation sought to press ahead. It wanted to avoid any unnecessary 
complications and focus on practical cooperation by:  
… keeping clear of any extensive debate about whether or not there 
should be unilateral declaration of a 200 mile zone. Each Forum 
country has the right to take such a decision at the time of its own 
choosing. But it is also the responsibility of each member to take 
account of the consequences that such a decision could have for 
others in the region. It would be useful to have the Forum reaffirm 
this principle and, if possible, the more positive notion that there is 
value in coordinated regional action within the region.
255
  
 
The close relationship between New Zealand and the Pacific Island States became even 
closer as a result of the Law of the Sea developments, especially the 200 EEZ. New Zealand 
(not Australia) expectged to take the leadership role, because it had similar issues to the 
Pacific Island States with the EEZ.
256
  
  
In a memo, the New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon insisted to Cabinet that the 
Declaration of 200 EEZ was the single most important topic the Forum dealing with and all 
the members had exactly the same level of interest in the issue.
257
 The Prime Minister, 
reassured by the sense of common purpose among Forum members in obtaining the new Law 
of the Sea Convention and protecting the region’s special interests, “made the point which 
others endorsed that we need not feel undue pessimism about the slow pace of the 
Conference in New York. The issues were complex. They were also of such importance to us 
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that we would do our best to move cautiously and concentrate on having the negotiations 
advance our interests.”258  
 
At the Forum meeting in Suva on 13-14 October 1976, key issues were discussed and 
agreements made to secure the adoption of the new and comprehensive Conference on the 
Law of the Sea and their sovereign rights over resources in their 200 mile exclusive economic 
zones.
259
 The Forum should also ensure that the Law of the Sea provides maximum benefits 
to the people of the region and declare their intentions to establish the EEZ regime after 
consulting with one another and to harmonize fisheries policies in the region. Also aimed to 
adopt a more collective approach in their negotiations with DWFN. It was also decided, in 
principle, to establish a regional fisheries organization to promote the conservation and 
rational utilization of the fish stocks of the region. Two tasks were given to the SPEC—
firstly, to consult with the Secretary-General of the SPC and prepare proposals for the 
establishment of a regional fisheries organization (to be considered during the meeting). 
Secondly, to look at ways to co-operate in the surveillance and policing of DWFN fishing 
vessels and their activities in the region.  
 
The major problem associated with the establishment of 200 EEZ and shared by all Forum 
States was the surveillance and policing of the DWFN fishing fleets conducting fishing 
activities in the region. The cooperation of all the countries involved in fishing in the region 
was essential for the conservation and management of the fisheries in the region.  
 
Mr. David McDonald, Assistant Secretary of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
addressed the Forum leaders at the opening of the seventh meeting (Wellington, New 
Zealand, New Zealand, 10-21 June 1976), encouraging them to consider a fisheries treaty 
with the United States. He reminded those present that, “Our sovereignty is now assured, 
however, by the Law of the Sea Convention and by international recognition, and we need 
have no such fears. Moreover, what the Americans are proposing to do through these 
negotiations is pay fees to fish in our waters. That is inescapable, however it is dressed up. It 
is consistent with our position on sovereign rights and totally inconsistent with theirs.”260  
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Part V of the 1982 Convention outlined specific legal regime of the 
EEZ and the rights, duties and jurisdiction of the coastal States to 
exercise and are specifically dictated in Articles 55 and 56. Dahmani 
argues that, Articles 55 and 56, seems to suggest that the EEZ exists 
ipso facto … Thus reading the two articles together, one may draw 
the conclusion that the Convention will eventually claim an EEZ or 
that the Convention casts an obligation upon states to claim an EEZ. 
However, both interpretations would seem unreasonable for the 
following reasons. First, there is no reason for the Convention to 
place an obligation upon the coastal state to establish an EEZ, if that 
state does not wish to have such zone. Secondly, Article 57 provides 
that the EEZ shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. This leaves the 
discretion to the coastal state to decide the breadth of its EEZ from 1 
mile up to 200 miles, whatever breadth it thinks best suits its needs 
and interests. It would seem, therefore, unreasonable to say that the 
coastal state may choose any breadth up to 200 miles and at the same 
time say that it cannot decide to have no zone at all. Moreover, the 
EEZ would have no real meaning in practice unless the coastal state is 
prepared to exercise its rights and implement its laws and regulations 
in the zone. Thirdly, while in the case of the continental shelf, the 
Convention expressly provides that the coastal state’s rights do not 
depend on occupation or proclamation, there is no such provision in 
Part V, The Exclusive Economic Zone. This is because, in the case of 
the continental shelf, the sovereign rights of the coastal state flow 
from its sovereignty over the land.
261
  
 
The adoption of EEZ regimes by the Pacific Island States could be perceived as means of 
exercising sovereign rights over fisheries resources within individual 200 nautical mile zones 
and any profits to be made from these.
262
 A legal order was being created that permitted 
claims to sovereign rights in order to control and regulate the exploitation of fisheries 
resources.  
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The EEZ regime contains an integral body of rules governing the rights, duties, obligations, 
and responsibilities of coastal States and other States.
263
 Those rules cannot operate 
effectively without the cooperation of all the States concerned.
264
 That is, these rights are not 
absolute—the obligations and duties of coastal States are shared with other States.265  
 
Dixon argues that, 
The coastal state has … sovereign rights over all the natural resources 
… up to 200 miles. The EEZ provides the coastal state with an 
exclusive share of the wealth of the sea and it is not surprising that it 
has found favour with so many states. What coastal states do not have 
is ‘sovereignty’, as witnessed by the preservation in the LOS legal 
regime of other states’ dominium over the EEZ. Consequently, it has 
only those rights given by the Convention and cannot interfere with 
commercial activity by other states in the EEZ unless such activity 
directly challenges the coastal state’s sovereign rights.266 
Coastal states cannot claim sovereignty over the waters in the EEZ. Their rights are limited. 
For example, they must conserve resources (Article 61), they must determine the allowable 
catch of resources and they must give access to other states if they do not have the capacity to 
met this catch allowance themselves (Article 62(2)).   
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 The Agency Convention provided a collective instrument binding Pacific Island States to 
secure their fisheries resources, including HMS, and ensuring sovereign rights over their 
fisheries resources. Article III (1) of this Convention stated that: 
The parties to this Convention recognize that the coastal state has 
sovereign rights, for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the living marine resources, including 
highly migratory species, within its exclusive economic zone or 
fishing zone which may extend 200 nautical miles from the baseline 
from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured.  
 
This Article undoubtedly established the Forum member States’ stance on sovereign rights in 
relation to living resources within the EEZ. It was also consistent with the 1982 
Convention.
267
  
 
However, it is important to note that the Agency Convention was primarily restricted to a 
protection of sovereign rights over fisheries resources, with non-living resources excluded. 
This latter exclusion was a shortcoming of the Agency Convention, because sovereign rights 
over EEZ locations do include non-living resources. Thus Article 56(1) (a) of the 1982 
Convention indicates that a coastal State has:  
… sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or 
non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed 
and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic 
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of 
energy from water, currents and winds.  
 
This Article supported the Pacific Islands States’ claims of sovereign rights over marine 
resources within the EEZ subject to the limitations of a coastal State’s due regard to the rights 
and duties of other States. Article 56(2) of the Law of the Sea Convention states that:  
In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this 
Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall 
have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in 
a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention. 
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In Article 62 of the 1982 Convention, it is further stipulated that the coastal State’s sovereign 
rights are subject to certain limitations. Article 62(2) states that:  
The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living 
resources of the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State 
does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it 
shall, through agreements or other arrangements and pursuant to the 
terms, conditions, laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 4, 
give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch, having 
particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 and 70, especially in 
relation to the developing States mentioned therein. 
 
While this Article reaffirmed the sovereign right of coastal States to determine the capacity of 
an allowable catch, it limited that sovereign right by permitting any surplus of allowable 
catch to be allocated to other States.  
 
Coastal States do have responsibilities to ensure living resources within their respective EEZ 
are exploited sustainably and are not endangered. Article 62 states that the coastal States shall 
take into account all relevant factors include the significance of the living resources of the 
area to the economy of the coastal State concerned and its other national interests. It may also 
indicate that the coastal State is not legally bound by the relevant factors indicated and also 
no distributing system on how the surplus is allocated to interested States. It also provides 
coastal States with power to determine harvesting capacity. That is, the coastal States shall 
determine how much allowable catch can be given to other States. The 1982 Convention does 
not provide guidelines on how harvesting capacity should be determined and it is solely up to 
the coastal States to do so. The surplus can be used by coastal States to their advantage 
through negotiation for things like technologies and other technical and financial resources.  
 
Fisher and Ury argue that the negotiations dealt with realities that are hard to change; they 
argue that such realities should be protected and if trade-offs are required they should be kept 
to an absolute minimum.
268
 For the Pacific Island States, the sovereign rights regime over 
HMS within their respective EEZs was a non-negotiable issue, even before the idea of having 
a fishing arrangement with the United States was raised. This reflects on the seriousness of 
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the Forum by meetings in a regular basis specifically aimed to discuss the EEZ regime during 
the UNCLOS III negotiation.  
 
The Pacific Island States needed to secure full control of the tuna resources within their EEZ 
in order to make financial gains. The US knew that the concept of sovereign rights would be 
a very difficult one to negotiate and had to seriously reconsider its position.  
 
The US did well at the beginning of the Treaty negotiation by deliberately leaving the issue 
of sovereign rights out of the negotiation, however tension did build between the Pacific 
Island States and the US over this issue. The Pacific Island States were also cautious and 
agreed to the US suggestion that the Preamble be discussed at a later stage. The outcome (and 
even the negotiation process) of the Treaty would have been different, if the sovereign rights 
issue had been negotiated at the beginning, because it was the most difficult issue. At the 
same time, the US did not try to change the Pacific Island States’ view on the sovereign right 
issue, not only to avoid further tension, but also had the sense that Pacific Island States would 
be convinced to change their position on the issue at all, so as the US. As a result, the Pacific 
Island States’ sovereign rights were acknowledged in the Treaty; giving in on this issue 
would be regarded as a major compromise.  
  
In this context, the sovereign right issue as a very important one and Pacific Island States and 
the US agreed on ambiguous terms and general principles. Because of the seriousness of the 
issue, further debate would not have helped to settle their differences. Smooth negotiation 
was needed to achieve a fair and balance outcome. The Treaty was necessary for both parties 
to bridge their major differences, particularly on the sovereign rights issue as it related to tuna 
resources within the EEZ. It would also benefit both parties. The Pacific Island States need to 
secure control of the exploitation of tuna within their national jurisdictions and the Treaty 
would be an ideal mechanism. On the other hand, the US also needed the Treaty to secure its 
access to the region’s tuna resources. Both parties got a little less than they originally wanted 
out of the Treaty.  
 
The first obstacle for both parties was the Preamble of the Treaty. This was vital for both 
parties in terms of outlining the basic objectives of what the Treaty would be all about. Both 
parties came at the issue of sovereign rights head on. The Pacific Island States’ delegation 
was up front about their desire for recognition of the Pacific Island States’ sovereign rights 
for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources of 
the waters in their exclusive economic zones, and jurisdiction with regard to marine scientific 
research within their said zones under the concept of EEZ stated in the international laws. 
However, Pacific Island States subsequently agreed to these falling under Acknowledgement 
rather than under Recognition.  
 
The most important aspects of this Acknowledgement for the Pacific Island States were the 
power and control of their resources within their EEZ and their economics. ‘Recalling’ the 
rational management of fisheries resources highlighted the economic component of the 
Treaty—the Pacific Island States saw this arrangement as beneficial. This was a very sticky 
issue with the US however, because they do not recognize sovereign rights over the EEZ and 
during this negotiation was no exception. This is reflected in their proposal that the 
recognition of Pacific Island States’ sovereign rights over their EEZ should be deleted from 
the Preamble. This was a direct blow to the Pacific Island States’ potential to control and 
manage their fisheries resources post declaring their 200 n.m. EEZ. Without the Pacific 
Island States having sovereign rights over the fisheries resources within their EEZ, there 
would be no point in having any form of fishing arrangement with the US.  
 
Also, for a fishing arrangement of this capacity to be addressed in only one paragraph in the 
Preamble would be unacceptable by any international standard. The Pacific Island States 
should be credited for being persistent throughout the negotiation, not only in pushing for two 
paragraphs to be discussed further, but also for considering further discussion on a more 
efficient approach to covering the many of the original objectives of the intended agreement. 
This led to the acceptance of a further two paragraphs (bearing in mind that there are species 
that can be found within and outside the region) designed to maximize benefits from the 
development of the Pacific Island States parties’ fisheries resources within their EEZ. 
However, the Preamble does not specifically indicate that the benefits should be economic 
and/or technical in nature. A Preamble that does not cover the intent of the fishing 
arrangement is better off not existing at all. The US was probably to blame due to its 
reluctance to compromise over Pacific Island States’ sovereign rights within their respective 
EEZ.   
 
A reading of the Preamble of the Treaty gives a sense of the Pacific Island States parties’ 
sovereign rights over the fisheries resources within their EEZ. This states that, 
Acknowledging that in accordance with international law, coastal 
States have sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing the fisheries resources of their 
exclusive economic zones or fisheries zones. 
 
However, the sovereign rights this describes are those of a custodian rather than that of a 
proprietor exercising exclusive control over the resources concerned. The term “exclusive” in 
the exclusive economic zone regime of 1982 Convention is not absolute, causing there to be 
some inaccuracy in this term’s application and interpretation.  
 
The wording of the treaty Preamble reflects the US agreement to recognize the Pacific Island 
States parties’ sovereign rights over living resources within their national jurisdictions. The 
relevant wording did not specifically include HMS, meaning that the interpretation made by 
both parties could differ and thus it could be seen as a “win-win” for both parties. From the 
Pacific Island States’ perspective, it did include HMS because it clearly stated ‘fisheries 
resources’. On the other hand, the US was free to argue that HMS was not included because 
Washington did not recognize any national jurisdictional claims over HMS.  
 
The Treaty and the Agency Convention thus shared common shortcomings in that they did 
not specifically include non-living resources. It was suspected that this issue was among the 
trade-offs made by the parties during the Treaty negotiation process. That process was 
restricted to living resources, avoiding the complication of including non-living resource 
issues. The US originally refused to sign the 1982 Convention; one reason for this was that it 
did not want to give coastal states’ sovereign rights over 200 nautical miles, or the 
establishment of a deep-sea mining authority. The South Pacific Treaty negotiation would 
have been longer and more difficult had the non-living issue been included in negotiations.
269
  
 
 
  The Position of the United States  
 
                                                          
269
 Generally, see Jones, W.B. “The International Sea-Bed Authority Without U.S. Participation”, Ocean 
Development and International Law 12(3-4) (1983). 
When the Reagan administration took office in early 1981, the Department of States 
announced that a negotiation review of the law of the sea treaty was needed. Washington was 
not happy with the direction of the negotiation and vowed not only to revisit the negotiation, 
but also improve on it. As Caron puts it,  
The president stated that the U.S. would return to the negotiations and 
work with other countries to achieve an acceptable treaty. The 
president’s statement went on to outline six objectives that the U.S. 
delegation would seek in the eleventh session, objectives generally 
addressing the precedents described above. Although changes to the 
draft convention were agreed to at the eleventh session, the United 
States concluded that it would not join in the general adoption of the 
text.
270
   
 
The progress and development of the negotiation were slow and 
difficult due to major differences between the two main groups, the 
developed countries on one hand, and the developing countries on the 
other. Pardo argues that, There were two general points of view that 
emerged in the review process. The first was advocated by the deputy 
assistant secretary of state for ocean and fisheries affairs, the most 
senior official responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the review. In 
essence, this point of view held that the treaty was flawed because it 
created adverse precedents for other negotiations on economic issues 
between developed and developing nations (the North South 
dialogue); subjugated American industry to an international 
regulatory and management system; and was incompatible with 
President Reagan’s apparent desire to return the United States to a 
period of power and influence in world affairs in which its policies 
would simply be enunciated rather than sold to others through a 
process of diplomacy and negotiation.
271
  
 
It seemed that the new Administration’s foreign policy was very much based on defense and 
the Soviet Union.    
   
The official opening of the Law of the Sea treaty took place in Jamaica. The majority of the 
signatories were developing States, in addition to the US. Some European countries did not 
sign the treaty due to concerns over the provisions relating to the deep seabed mining.
272
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 The US was not willing to make exceptions on this issue and therefore the Reagan 
Administration did not have any room to maneuver (regarding the exclusion of the mineral 
resources and the fisheries resources (HMS)). Caron argues that, 
The United States did not sign the Law of the Sea Convention 
because the treaty was perceived as a threat to basic principles of 
Western economic and political philosophy. Tragically, the treaty 
could not simply be renegotiated, because the concerns of the United 
States went to the basic premises upon which years of compromise 
and negotiation had been built. Whether the U.S. negotiators had 
gained a treaty satisfying the immediate and direct American interests 
in fisheries or commercial and military navigation was not the 
decisive question for the Reagan administration. Rather, the symbolic 
and long-term implications of the precedents set by the treaty were 
the major forces shaping U.S. policy. These concerns will dominate 
American policy toward the law of the sea for many years to come.
273
    
 
For although the US was not happy with the outcome of the Convention, that did not mean 
that the US was disadvantaged in any way. Caron argues that the, 
American rejection of the Law of the Sea Convention has grave 
implications that should not be easily discounted. The treaty contains 
innovative provisions long sought by the U.S. for compulsory 
international settlement of disputes. It also, through its promotion of 
common expectations as to the rights of nations, offers the possibility 
of reducing needless conflicts and tensions at sea. The decision 
nonetheless to reject the treaty flowed from the perception that it was 
contrary to basic American beliefs. That such a fundamental 
disagreement could exist after the most extensive negotiations in 
history suggests more than a mere failure of the conference. It 
suggests institutional problems in the formation of American policy 
and an underlying division of opinion within the United States as to 
the most appropriate policy. Most significantly, such a fundamental 
disagreement suggests a tremendous rift in the international 
community itself in the area of international economic relations.
274
 
 
Pardo argues that the 1982 Convention’s “major concern must be whether the present 
convention adequately serves the functions that all international law must serve, i.e., (a)  
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accommodation of interests, (b) prevention of conflict, (c) predictability, and (d) promotion 
of common or community objectives.”275 
 
The law of the sea regime was arguably one of the most time consuming and expansive 
exercises under the UN law of the sea. This was mainly due to vast differences in the issues 
important to and socio-political and economic circumstances of the members of the UN with 
reference to natural resources. Pardo asserts that: 
 
Article 74 on the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone 
between states with opposite or adjacent coasts is another example of 
a formula designed to satisfy the requirements of states with 
diametrically opposed views. A further example is the phrase 
“exclusively for peaceful purposes,” which recurs with a certain 
frequency in the convention. The meaning of the phrase is nowhere 
defined, but the words convey the vague, misleading, but useful 
impression that somehow the ongoing intensive militarization of 
ocean space is being reversed. Those states that wish strictly to limit 
the military uses of ocean space can claim that the arms race in the 
seas has been significantly limited, while those states that consider 
extensive military use of the sea a regrettable necessity are not 
incommodated.
276
 
 
The US fisheries policy argued that tuna is a highly migratory species and should not belong 
to a particular coastal State. This was a nuisance from the Pacific Island States’ point of view. 
That it may have conservation and management elements and at the same time showed its 
cynicism by denying other States access to the migratory Pacific salmon.
277
  
 
Teiwaki argues that,  
 
The real motivation behind United States tuna policy is the need to 
protect United States economic interests, especially those of the 
members of the American Tunaboat Association (ATA), which is a 
strong lobby comprising a group of purse-seining interests with 
headquarters in San Diego, California. It was on the strength of the 
ATA lobby and influence that the USA fought at the LOSC for 
special provisions for highly migratory species. The LOSC is, 
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however, very lucid that the sovereignty and ownership of highly 
migratory species, including tuna, are vested in the coastal state.
278
 
 
The fact that the ATA directly represented US Tuna Industry interests would have been part 
of the reason the US did not accept the 1982 Convention.      
  
American fisheries policy has developed dramatically over the last 50 years, as it has been 
subject to political, economic and military influence. In addition, it has been shaped by the 
advancement of the marine technology utilized for the research and exploration of marine 
resources.  
 
The US was the first country to unilaterally declare national jurisdiction over the resources of 
the seabed and subsoil. This occurred in 1945 under the Truman Administration.
279
 Lowe 
asserts that: 
The legal validity of the claim to jurisdiction over the shelf resources 
was established only when the claim was recognized according to the 
normal processes of assent and acquiescence which constitute the 
mechanism for the establishment of rights and duties in customary 
international law. But the fact remains that the basis of the claim was 
appurtenance and appropriateness, and not the historic display of 
control.
280
 
 
The Truman Proclamation of 1945 initiated the race for the extension of maritime boundaries 
and the concept of EEZ was founded by Latin American countries eager to have some form 
of control over their coastal resources. The 1952 Santiago Declaration on the Maritime Zone 
was signed to re-enforce and gain political recognition for their claims.
281
 The Declaration 
granted sole sovereignty over an extension of not less than 200 nautical miles from their 
coasts for their people’s food supplies and economic development. “On June 7th 1971, 13 
Latin American states bordering the Caribbean Sea (plus Guyana and El Salvator) held a 
meeting at Santo Domingo to formulate their policy on the law of the sea questions. There, in 
forging the concept of the patrimonial sea, the defined for the first time the confines of 
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genuine zone of economic jurisdiction over the renewable and non-renewable natural 
resources of adjacent sea areas.”282 The sovereign rights over resources under the EEZ 
remained the same as they were under the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention.
283
  
 
During the UNCLOS III negotiations, the US extended its fisheries jurisdiction to 200 
nautical miles and claimed sovereign rights over the living and non-living resources 
therein,
284
 excluding HMS.
285
 The American agenda here was strongly oriented towards long-
term commercial objectives, particularly prospective mining of the deep seabed. But what of 
the US domestic legislation concerned?  
 
The United States’ fail to recognize national jurisdiction over tuna was backed by a highly 
punitive fisheries policy.
286
 This policy was governed by two controversial pieces of 
legislation, the Fishermen’s Protective Act of 1954 (FPA) (previously discussed in Chapter 
Two) and the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA). Both were 
formulated under the guidance of the American Tunaboat Association (ATA), a powerful 
lobbying group promoting the interests of the local fisheries industry. Both retain political 
access to the highest levels of the US government. 
 
 
  Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 
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The adoption of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA) was an 
additional chapter in US efforts to protect its fisheries policy.
287
 This asserted that HMS 
should be managed internationally through regional cooperation.
288
  
 
The FCMA unilaterally claimed authority to exercise management over HMS species within 
and beyond the EEZ. The FCMA did provide a comprehensive management system 
governing the harvesting of tuna in areas claimed as adjacent to US coasts.
289
 It also 
encouraged the negotiation and implementation of the international agreements for the 
conservation and management of HMS.
290
 The Act further mandated that any surplus should 
be directly allocated according to rules devised under a cooperative trade policy and 
reciprocal scheme.  
 
However this contradicted international law as it was emerging under UNCLOS III by 
requiring coastal States to give particular regard to the rights of land-locked States (LLS); it 
also geographically disadvantaged certain States (GDS) through the equitable share of the 
allowable catch. The US forced its own way on this issue, dictating the distribution of 
allowable catch, regardless of any inconsistencies with international law. 
 
The FCMA outlined US sovereign rights over living and non-living resources within the 200 
nautical miles fishing zone and enforced jurisdiction over fisheries resources therein. The 
FCMA allowed foreign fishers to fish within its 200 nautical mile fishing zones. This was 
because they took no more than one per cent of the total HMS catch under US jurisdiction.
291
 
Other coastal States, including the Pacific Island States, found that fishing within US fishing 
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zones was near impossible because of a lack of tuna stocks and the substantial costs 
entailed.
292
  
 
Another controversial provision of the FCMA was its authorization of imprisonment for 
violations of national fisheries laws and regulations.
293
 This provision was inconsistent with 
international law, which does not endorse imprisonment of foreign fishermen as a penalty for 
violation of national fisheries laws and regulations.   
 
The embargo provision of the FCMA was purposely designed to cover American fishers 
operating in the EEZ of foreign countries and was available as a retaliatory measure—one 
which further underlined their (the US) non-recognition of coastal State EEZ sovereign rights 
over HMS. This provision banned the importation of fish and fish products from countries 
that may have arrested and seized American fishing vessels.
294
 This embargo provision 
constituted an economic constraint of substance for any coastal States concerned. This was a 
harsh but effective penalty, given the dominance of the US in the world tuna market.  
 
The implementation and enforcement of the embargo provision of the FCMA of the US 
legislation made no legal difference to PNG and Solomons when they enforced their national 
law by arresting Danica and Janette Diana for illegal fishing in their waters. All three 
countries had acted legally and legitimately. However, trade embargos can prove effective 
when the major export of a country is sanctioned.  
 
The US made some contributions to the development of international law and, 
subsequently, the law of the sea. However it lost standing in the international community 
by not upholding international law in some instances and by remaining a non-signatory to 
the 1982 Convention.
295
 For Meron, the position taken by the US was one where: 
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The first policy objective was to reserve the legal position of the 
United States with regard to the questions in dispute and to prevent 
"atrophy" of American rights under international law. The second 
policy objective was to maintain and to advance the position of the 
United States on the law of the sea, in view of the rapid formulation 
by states of claims and counterclaims and the vivid interest of the 
organized international community in the process of codification and 
progressive development of the law of the sea. 
 
The US refusal to recognize Pacific Island States’ sovereign rights over HMS was based on 
economic and political (rather than legal) arguments found in Article 64 of the 1982 
Convention. As previously stated, this Article urged coastal and other States to cooperate 
through appropriate international organizations to ensure the conservation and optimum 
utilization of HMS and, where necessary, develop the organizational means needed to do so. 
 
Yet this Article was not in accord with the position taken by the US. As indicated, this 
provided procedures that allowed the States concerned to institutionalize the cooperation that 
was required to manage HMS. From a HMS management perspective, the US had a case in 
seeking FFA membership. However, the debate on US membership was dominated by 
political and economic issues, rather than environmental conservation and management 
imperatives.  
 
While Article 64 required cooperation among coastal States and other States, this did not 
preclude coastal States from claiming jurisdiction over living resources (including HMS) 
within their EEZ zones. 
 
The US argued that international management of HMS was the most practical management 
mechanism. Since they traversed numerous jurisdictions, tuna could not logically come under 
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any one single jurisdiction.
296
 Interestingly, however, the US argument did not include all 
HMS species found within the EEZ of coastal States.
297
  
 
The Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs outlined the US position on 
HMS by stating that,  
The rationale behind the United States approach is straightforward. 
Tuna are not a resident resource of the EEZ. They are only found 
within any EEZ temporarily and may migrate far out into the ocean 
waters beyond. Therefore, the coastal state does not have the ability to 
manage and conserve tuna, nor does it have a paramount interest in 
their development. Although many coastal states claim jurisdiction 
over tuna within 200 nautical miles, none exercise conservation and 
management authority through purely domestic measures. Only 
through international agreements have states actually managed 
effectively the highly migratory tuna species … Accordingly 
customary international law precludes the coastal state from 
establishing sovereign rights over tuna. In the US view this is 
evidenced by Article 64 of the Law of the Sea Convention, which 
requires cooperation between coastal states and distant-water fishing 
nations to manage tuna, both within and outside the EEZ, on a 
regional basis, through an international organization. It is the view of 
the United States that Article 64 precludes the coastal state from 
establishing sovereign rights over tuna.
298
  
 
This statement endorsed the need for cooperation in the conservation and management of 
HMS, as outlined in Article 64, which covered all species. However, the US position 
maintained that only certain species were not subject to sovereign rights claims within the 
EEZ and this selectivity was inconsistent with the 1982 Convention. It also came from the 
only country attempting to exclude certain HMS species covered by that Convention.
299
 The 
Convention does not seek to distinguish certain species from other fish species so far as the 
issue of sovereign rights is concerned. Nor is that distinction evident in the sovereign rights 
as practiced by coastal States. Here, measures embraced in the fisheries laws and regulations 
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of coastal States can prove sufficient for the conservation and management of the HMS. Both 
the 1982 Convention and existing national state practice left the US and DWFN exposed as 
the real threats to tuna species.  
 
From a commercial perspective, a US recognition of coastal States’ sovereign rights over 
tuna, or an amendment of the existing fisheries policy, undoubtedly stood to adversely affect 
the supply of tuna resources to American cannery plants, and subsequently the domestic tuna 
market.
300
  
 
On the other hand, Pacific Island States argued that tuna was among the few valuable 
resources available to them and thus they wanted to control and regulate its exploitation. 
However, effective management required collective action, which was beyond the 
responsibility or capacity of the Pacific Island States acting alone. One interpretation 
suggested that if the US and other DWFN did not conduct illegal fishing activities or violated 
the laws of Pacific Island States, then scope existed to exploit HMS on a sustainable basis. 
This would not require additional institutional machinery in the form of an international 
organization. It would be the most convenient way for the Pacific Island States and the 
DWFN to cooperate for the conservation and management of the HMS in the Pacific region.  
 
Access Provision of the Treaty  
 
The Treaty designed to provide the American tuna fleet access to the Pacific Island States’ 
waters included some important policy concessions. Some regarded the Treaty as largely an 
access agreement and little more. However Article 3, Access to the Treaty Area, did provide 
conditions and terms requiring the compliance of American fishing fleet. In this way it broke 
some new ground in fisheries access treaty-making.  
 
The US gained another concession from the Pacific Island States when they allowed US 
fishing fleets to fish for albacore tuna in the high seas of the Treaty Area. It is challenging to 
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determine allowable catch for the Pacific Island States, because it requires not only lots of 
work, but also the collecting of a lot of information and data about the region’s living 
resources.  
  
Burke argues that  
… to be more than prudent policy would dictate with regard to any 
policy matter. Whether a particular undertaking or initiative is 
appropriate is for the entities involved to decide i.e. the coastal state 
and the organizations concerned. It seems highly doubtful if this 
places any significant legal constraint on the coastal state. Judgement 
would be based on an assessment of factors pertinent to all the 
interests at stake, including certainly the exclusive interests of the 
coastal state.
301
  
 
Article 3 permitted the American tuna fleet, pursuant to the Treaty, to engage in fishing in the 
areas designated and under the terms, conditions and licensing procedures provided in Annex 
I and Annex II, respectively.
302
 The obtaining of licenses by the US prior to fishing in areas 
designated under the Treaty reflected their recognized subordination to the Pacific Island 
States parties’ sovereign rights over tuna resources within their EEZ. Article 3 stipulated:  
3.1 Fishing vessels of the United States shall be permitted to engage in 
fishing in the Licensing Area in accordance with the terms and 
conditions referred to in Annex I and licenses issued in accordance 
with the procedures set out in Annex II. 
 
3.2 It shall be a condition of any license issued pursuant to this Treaty 
that the vessel is respect of which the license is issued is operated in 
accordance with the requirements of Annex I. No fishing vessel of the 
United States shall be used for fishing in the Licensing Area without a 
license issued in accordance with Annex II or in waters closed to 
fishing pursuant to Annex I, except in accordance with paragraph 3 of 
this Article, or unless the vessel is used for fishing albacore tuna by the 
trolling method in high seas areas of the Treaty Area. 
 
3.3 A Pacific Island party may permit fishing vessels of the United 
States to engage in fishing in waters under the jurisdiction of that party 
which are: 
 
(a) within the Treaty but outside the Licensing Area; 
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(b) except for purse seine vessels, within the Licensing Area 
but otherwise than in accordance with the terms and 
conditions referred to in Annex I, in accordance with such 
terms and conditions as may be agreed from time to time 
with owners of the said vessels or their representative. In 
such a case, if the Pacific Island party gives notice to the 
Government of the United States of such arrangements, and 
if the Government of the United States concurs, the 
procedures of Article 4 and 5.6 shall be applicable to such 
arrangements.  
 
In the fourth round of negotiations, both parties decided that fishing vessels of the US would 
be permitted to engage in fishing in the Licensing Area in accordance with the terms and 
conditions referred to in Annex I and licenses would be issued in accordance with the 
procedures set out in Annex II.
303
 That is, the Pacific Island States permitted the US vessels 
to fish in the Agreement Area with reference to the terms and conditions outlined in the 
Annex III of the Treaty. This was based on the sovereign rights of the Pacific States over 
their respective 200 n.m EEZ under the 1982 Convention; as the US refused to recognize this, 
permission was required under the Treaty.
304
 There was some indication that Pacific Island 
States pushed to include the High Seas in the Access Agreement.
305
 
 
The term ‘Agreement’ was replaced by ‘Treaty’ and the Pacific Island States required all 
licensed US fishing vessels to comply with the terms and conditions outlined in the license 
application form. The US added that to ban any vessel from fishing without license.
306
 That 
is, it should be a condition of any license issued under the Treaty in accordance to the 
requirements of Annex I and no US fishing vessels are to be used for fishing in the Licensing 
Area without a license issued in accordance with annex II.
307
 The US put forward an 
exception—that this be the case unless the vessel is used for fishing albacore tuna by the 
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trolling method in high seas areas of the Treaty Area. This was another important trade-off 
for the US delegation. The Pacific Island States accepted the trolling method, not only 
because it happens on the high seas, but also in acknowledgement of the conservation 
measures for the exploitation of HMS.   
 
During the 4
th
 round of negotiations, the Pacific Island States suggested that the US should 
extend its responsibilities to the actual activities of American fishing vessels fishing the 
Pacific States parties’ waters. The US was reluctant to accept this responsibility and was only 
willing to discuss fishing arrangements that the government gets involved in directly. The 
Pacific Island States were really determined for the US to take responsibility for its fishing 
fleets under the Treaty. The US suggested that if Pacific States have separate fishing 
arrangements with owners, then the US would need to be informed and Article 4 would be 
applicable, but the Pacific States added Articles 5 and 6.
308
 The Pacific Island States raised 
the significance of ensuring the US fishing vessels operate in areas outlined by the Treaty as 
an issue. The other terms and conditions were also highlighted as being important to respect, 
not only to avoid arrest and seizure by the Pacific Island States, but also to avoid the 
economic ramifications of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (FCMA).  
 
Apart from some changes in Annex I, this Article remained unchanged when the Treaty’s 
term was extended.
309
 It thus permitted the American tuna fleet, pursuant to the Treaty, to 
operate in the Licensing Area subject to their full compliance with the requirements as 
outlined in Annexes I and II.
310
 To a certain extent the US ceded to the Pacific islands’ 
sovereign rights over the tuna resources within their jurisdiction by complying with these 
requirements. At the same time, however, Part 1(3) of Annex I stated this differently. This is 
quoted in full below:  
Nothing in this Annex and its Schedules, nor acts or activities taking 
place thereunder, shall constitute recognition of the claims or the 
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positions of any of the parties concerning the legal status and extent 
of waters and zones claimed by any party. In the claimed waters and 
zones, the freedoms of navigation and overflight and other uses of the 
sea related to such freedoms are to be exercised in accordance with 
international law. 
 
This provision indicated that the Pacific Island States and the US agreed to insert these 
competing views over sovereign rights in this carefully worded in an attempt to avoid further 
complications. But by omitting the sovereign rights issue, this provision created a difficult 
precedent for the future. Conceivably, if the Pacific Island States pushed to include 
jurisdiction over non-living resources in the Treaty, then the US would have to agree to 
explicitly acknowledge the Pacific Island States’ sovereign rights over HMS.  
 
This could occur because the US agenda did not exclude future deep-sea mining operations in 
the region. Alternatively, the US could secure the tuna resources that it sought under the 
fisheries Treaty, but then negotiate a separate agreement for future deep-sea mining. Here, a 
future sea-bed mining agreement could see the US concede the Pacific Island States’ 
sovereign rights over HMS as, by then, tuna access would be less of a priority in terms of its 
overall national interests. However, the inclusion of both living and non-living resources in 
the Treaty would not leave the US with enough room to maneuver.  
 
US fishing vessels found it necessary to comply with the applicable Pacific Island States’ 
national laws as depicted in Schedule 1.
311
 This requirement assisted in the monitoring of the 
American fleet.  
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 Article 58(3) of the 1982 Convention obligated States fishing in the region to comply with 
the national laws and regulations of the coastal States. Hence:  
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this 
Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due 
regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply 
with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of 
international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. 
 
However, American fishing operators were debarred from using methods other than purse 
seining and were not permitted to fish for Southern Bluefin Tuna, or to fish in the designated 
Closed Areas. Vessels could only conduct fishing in the Limited Areas subject to 
requirements outlined in Schedule 2 of Annex I. They could not use aircraft in support of 
fishing operations. The transshipment of catch was not permitted at sea, nor was the 
unloading of fish apart from that conducted within designated areas mutually agreed upon by 
the operators and the Pacific Island States’ authorities.312 Reports of catch details from 
transshipment and unloading had to be sent to the Administrator, as stipulated under Schedule 
6.
313
  
 
Each Wednesday, operators of American fishing vessels had to report the details of their 
vessels’ position, the catch on board and their port departure and entry times to the 
Administrator when in Licensed or Closed Areas.
314
 A similar weekly report had to be sent to 
the Pacific Island States concerned and the US government regarding departures, giving entry 
times into Pacific Island States’ jurisdictions.315 A daily entry of catch from Licensing Areas, 
as provided under Schedule 5, had to be posted to the Administrator. This information had to 
be accurate, complete and correct.
316
 This information was required so that the Administrator 
could calculate the distribution of the 85 per cent of access fee based on catch ratio. It was 
considered important to systematically monitor the American tuna fleet from a surveillance 
and policing point of view.  
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 Part 6 of Annex I outlined an enforcement mechanism for American fishing vessel 
compliance. The master and crew of the vessel were required to immediately comply with 
instructions and directions given by an authorized officer of a Pacific Island State: 
… including to stop, to move to a specified location and to facilitate 
safe boarding and inspection of the vessel, its license, gear, 
equipment, records, facilities, fish and fish products. Such boarding 
and inspection shall be conducted as much as possible in a manner so 
as not to interfere unduly with the lawful operation of the vessel. The 
operator and each member of the crew shall facilitate and assist in any 
action by an authorised officer of a Pacific Island party and shall not 
assault, obstruct, resist, delay, refuse boarding to, intimidate or 
interfere with an authorised officer in the performance of his or her 
duty.  
 
The authorised officer would assist and enforce the terms and conditions of the Treaty, 
ensuring compliance with the requirements stated in Annex I.  
 
Operators had to communicate with parties’ fisheries management, surveillance and 
enforcement authorities through specified radio frequencies.
317
 Technical requirements, 
including 1989 FAO standard specifications for marking and identification of vessel, had to 
be fully complied with.
318
 The license issued by the Administrator had to be carried by the 
fishing vessel at all times.
319
  
 
The operator and crew of a vessel had to allow and assist an observer of Pacific Island State 
parties to: 
… board the vessel for scientific, compliance, monitoring and other 
functions at the point and time notified by the Pacific Island parties to 
the Government of the United States.
320
 
 
The observer also had to be able to/have access to facilities and equipment including:  
… fish on board and areas which may be used to hold, process, weigh 
and store fish; remove samples; have full access to the vessel’s 
records, including its logs and documentation for the purpose of 
inspection and copying; reasonable access to navigation equipment, 
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charts, and radios; and gather any other information relating to 
fisheries in the Licensing Area; without interfering unduly with the 
lawful operation of the vessel.
321
 
 
The costs of observers remained the responsibility of the US. The lump sum payment was 
calculated according to a specified formula.
322
  
 
The fishing vessel had to stow its fishing equipment while in the Closed Area and refrain 
from operating in ways that could disrupt traditional and local based fishing activities.
323
 This 
provision was designed to protect the local fishermen and fisheries industries.  
 
Part 8(20) of Annex I added to the extended Treaty, providing a vessel tracking system that 
could be installed on American fishing vessels pursuant to the Treaty.   
 
Annex II of the Treaty outlined license issuing procedures for the US government to follow:  
The Government of the United States shall make application for a 
license in respect of any fishing vessel of the United States intended 
by the operator to be used for purse seine fishing in the Licensing 
Area at any time in the Licensing Period by providing to the 
Administrator a complete application form as set out in Schedule 1.
324
 
 
This indicated a commitment and willingness on the part of the US government to support the 
Treaty. The license issued is not effective until the license fee had been received by the 
Administrator with amounts set out in Schedule 2.
325
  
 
Annex II (4) gave the Administrator the power to suspend the good standing of any US 
fishing vessel on the Regional Register of Foreign Fishing Vessels (Regional Register) for 
violation of the terms and conditions provided in Annex I.
326
 The Regional Register is among 
the conservation measures used by the Pacific Island States. However, the Administrator had 
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discretionary power to revoke the good standing of any vessel on the Regional Register. This 
could happen in the event that such a vessel violated the terms and conditions of access 
outlined in Annex I.
327
 This seemed inconsistent with in that the Administrator lacked such 
power in relation to general infringement of the Treaty.  
 
However, the Administrator is required to notify the US government 30 days in advance of a 
suspension and to provide a statement on the violation concerned. A vessel could be 
reinstated upon completion of the required action; otherwise it would not be eligible to 
receive a new license after the current license had expired. The Administrator should suspend 
the vessel immediately. However, the Administrator was also given discretion to reinstate any 
vessel once satisfied of its good standing.
328
  
 
Furthermore, a license could be denied should an owner or charterer face proceedings under 
bankruptcy laws in the US, or if the vessel was not on the Regional Register.
329
 Annex II (5) 
(c) explicitly stated rules leading to the withdrawal of a vessel from the Regional Register 
under the Treaty.  
 
Conclusions  
 
From a legal perspective, the Treaty was a major achievement for the Pacific Island States in 
terms of the regulation and control of tuna resources, and for the US in terms of the 
concessions gained. In addition, it represented a major achievement for the South Pacific 
Forum Fisheries Agency (Agency).  The Agency could now face the challenge of advancing 
regional cooperation in order to develop consistent and common national legislation among 
Pacific Island States in order to advance cohesive cooperation.  
 
The involvement of the American government in the Treaty negotiation was inconsistent with 
its official legal position that Pacific Island States could not claim any national jurisdiction 
over tuna.
330
 This resulted in a Treaty that may not provide a long-term solution to Pacific 
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Island States-US fishing disputes, as it did not fully resolve the sovereign rights issue. Rather, 
the issue of sovereign rights was carefully worded in a way that tried to, but only partly 
managed to, harmonize the contrasting positions of the Treaty parties.  
 
The willingness of the US to the accept terms, conditions and requirements of Annex I and 
other related provisions of the Treaty, including the omission of a trade embargo provision, 
de facto acknowledged the Pacific Island States’ sovereign rights over tuna resources within 
their jurisdiction. A letter by the US Secretary of State to the President in May 1987 stated 
that the Treaty would eliminate fishing disputes with Pacific Island States over tuna 
jurisdiction and end the embargo provision of the US fisheries policy.331 This offered to set a 
potentially important precedent for both parties regarding any future fishing arrangements.  
 
The Forum States’ position over sovereign rights remained consistent with the 1982 
Convention.  By contrast, the US used the conservation issue as a political facade to justify its 
stance on refusing to recognize sovereign rights over HMS. In sum, certain features of the US 
fisheries policy were generally inconsistent with the 1982 Convention.  
 
Article 61 of the 1982 Convention indicated that the available information and data shall be 
exchanged regularly among the States concerned through sub-regional, regional and 
international organizations. The Pacific Island States really need this cooperation, particularly 
from a conservation and management perspective, for the living resources within their EEZ 
and the region as a whole. However, cooperation can at times be tricky due to hidden political 
agendas. This difficulties have caused some Pacific Island States to shy away from certain 
countries and organizations. Technology is also a key component to the data and information 
gathering exercise; this again comes with a political element attached, which again creates 
uneasy relationships between Pacific Island States and the DWFN with fishing interests in the 
region. Susskind argues that:  
Much of the debate about how best to bring about compliance with 
international treaties revolves around the advantages and 
disadvantages of direct techniques for deterring noncompliance 
versus indirect techniques for encouraging adherence to the rules ... 
countries will inevitably act in their own self-interest, and that 
enlightened self-interest encompasses an awareness that every nation 
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is part of the web on international economic and political 
relationships … All countries understand, therefore, that their best 
interests are almost always served by living up to their treaty 
obligations.
332
 
 
For the US to recognize the Pacific Island States’ sovereign rights over the HMS within their 
EEZ was a major victory for the Pacific Island States and among the key contributors to the 
success of the Treaty negotiation. As Mr. David McDowell stated:  
We can be confident in our approach to these negotiations. We know 
that our position on highly migratory species is the right one. We 
know that it is shared by the international community at large. We 
know that it is not susceptible to being undermined by our work here. 
Our confidence in approaching these negotiations is also justified by 
other consideration. It is justified by the great strides which have been 
taken in regional fisheries matters over recent years ... The distant 
water fishing nations were clearly right in apprehending that the 
creation of the Agency would weaken their positions. That was an 
object of the exercise. But even there they have had come to terms 
with the new reality. A few years ago the distant water fishing nations 
refused to acknowledge the Agency’s existence. Today the Agency is 
participating actively in the negotiations with the American 
Government, and is playing a vital role … Clearly the tide has turned. 
We welcome that …333       
 
The US commitment to the Treaty was reflected in many genuine trade-offs, including their 
acknowledgement of the Pacific Island States’ sovereign rights over HMS within their EEZ. 
Other key issues resolved in subtle ways throughout the negotiation process were beneficial 
for both sides.         
 
For the US to accept the Pacific Island States’ proposal, which required all licensed US 
fishing vessels to comply with the terms and conditions outlined in the license, was a key 
victory. The victory was not only in the fact that the US would pay the access fee, but also 
that they had in some way recognized the Pacific Island States’ sovereign rights over HMS 
within their EEZ. The US proposal to ban vessels from fishing without a licence was another 
significant bonus from the Pacific Island States’ perspective.   
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Chapter Four  
 
The Political Implications of the Treaty 
 
Introduction 
 
A major barrier for international cooperation in the South Pacific was the US fisheries policy, 
which refused to recognize Pacific Island States’ sovereign rights on HMS within their 
respective EEZ jurisdictions.
334
 The US position over HMS undermined the Pacific Island 
States’ approaches to the management and conservation of tuna, including the South Pacific 
Forum Fisheries Agency Convention 1979 (Agency Convention) and the Nauru Agreement 
Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common Interest 1982 (Nauru 
Agreement). These agreements provided conservation and management measures. To have 
effective management and conservation of the HMS in the Pacific region, all States and 
territories in the region were required to cooperate to implement this objective. The Treaty 
was the ideal mechanism to bring the two opposing policies into some form of a common 
position.    
 
The Pacific Island States have maintained generally good political and diplomatic relations 
with the US. Some Pacific Island States have formed friendship treaties with the US. The 
development of these ties has been assisted by the fishing agreements negotiated between 
individual Pacific Island States and the American tuna fleet represented by the American 
Tunaboat Association (ATA).
335
 These fishing agreements have provided a further chapter in 
the story of the region’s political relations. As indicated in previous chapters, the fisheries 
issue generated political tensions between the Pacific Island States and the US over the 
sovereign rights regime question. The subsequent fishing dispute led to the adoption of the 
Treaty, which was in part motivated by an intention to resolve these political tensions.  
 
From an American perspective, there were two main objectives. First, the Treaty on Fisheries 
Between Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the United States of America 
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(Treaty) would help maintain good relations with the Pacific Island States, and second the 
American tuna fleet could maintain access to the region’s rich tuna resources. As well, this 
would help avoid any Soviet influence in the Pacific. For the Pacific Island States, the Treaty 
would provide the mechanism needed to control and regulate their fisheries resources.  
 
The Pacific Island States possess some military, strategic, economic and political significance 
for the US. Political tensions in the South Pacific could jeopardize American dominance in 
the region. As discussed in Chapter One, two main issues played a fundamental role in the 
establishment of the Treaty: the fishing disputes between the Pacific Islands and American 
fishers, and the growing interest of the Soviet Union in the region. The South Pacific became 
of vital interest to the US for these reasons.   
 
This chapter examines the political implications of the Treaty for the Pacific Island States and 
the US. Two main provisions of the Treaty are particularly relevant and will be addressed 
here:  Article 4 - Flag State Responsibility; and Article 5 - Compliance Powers. 
 
Articles 4 and 5 of the Treaty broke new ground in treaty making by spelling out explicit 
steps that the US had to follow in order to enforce the provisions of the Treaty. They included 
management responsibilities in terms of the actions of its fishing vessels and gave Pacific 
Island States parties’ the power to enforce compliance.   
 
 
Flag States Responsibility  
 
Goodman points out that while “the principle of flag State jurisdiction is one of the most 
widely acknowledged in international maritime law,” it is also “one of the most contentious.”  
As he explains, 
 
The rights of flag States have remained largely unchanged since the 
original evolution of the concept. But the list of their responsibilities 
has grown exponentially, in areas ranging from ship safety standards 
and crew training to marine pollution, maritime security, and seafarer 
welfare ... While the topic of flag State jurisdiction is still the subject 
of significant discussion in the general maritime context, the principal 
focus is now on implementing internationally agreed rules and 
requirements, rather than developing significant new areas of flag 
State responsibility.
336
 
 
Article 4 of the Treaty outlined the responsibilities of the US government towards its licensed 
fishing vessels operating in areas covered by the Treaty, as well as license conditions and 
terms: 
The Government of the United States shall enforce the provisons of 
this Treaty and licences issues thereunder. The Government of the 
United States shall take the necessary steps to ensure that nationals 
and fishing vessels of the United States refrain from fishing in the 
Licensing Area and in waters closed to fishing pursuant to Annex I, 
except as authorized in accordance with Article 3.
337
  
 
Even though this provision allocated the responsibility for ensuring that its fishermen and 
fishing vessels complied with the Treaty to the US, it was insufficient to guarantee full 
compliance. While allocating enforcement and surveillance tasks to the US, assistance was 
also required in terms of Pacific Island States’ efforts to control and regulate illegal fishing 
activities within their waters. While the US had to assume responsibility for ensuring that its 
fishing vessels did not breach treaty requirements, there was also a requirement that it assist 
investigations into any alleged breaches of the Treaty.
338
 The flag-state provision was 
designed to help safeguard Pacific Island States’ EEZs from illegal fishing by American 
operators and appears in both the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
(1982 Convention) and the actual Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain 
Pacific Islands States and the Government of the United States of America 1987.  
 
This was needed because of the enormous size of the EEZs of Pacific States, which are 
virtually impossible to police unassisted. It was clear that the Pacific Island States lacked the 
financial capacity and technology to provide effective surveillance to control illegal fishing 
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within their EEZs.
339
 Aerial and sea surveillance, moreover, are expensive operations that 
Pacific Island States cannot afford, even collectively.  
 
In shouldering the responsibility of police its fishing vessels, the US ostensibly reduced the 
physical and cost burden on the Pacific Island States’ enforcement and surveillance services. 
However, getting the US to accept these responsibilities in reality was not always 
straightforward; for instance, shortly after the Treaty was signed, Kiribati arrested American 
fishing vessels for fishing without a license.
340
  
 
The US were given significant responsibility under the terms of the Treaty and thus had an 
important role in compliance control in the South Pacific.
341
 This responsibility helped to 
ensure that American fishing vessels and nationals did not violate the provisions of the 
Treaty.
342
  
 
Goodman argues that: 
 
… flag State responsibility is the subject of an almost entirely 
different regime. Attention is centred on the responsible flag State as 
the key panacea for combating illegal, unreported and unregulated 
(IUU) fishing, and the concept of flag State responsibility itself is still 
evolving. As fish stocks around the world reach the point of collapse, 
and IUU fishing continues to undermine international management 
efforts, issues such as the need for a ‘genuine link’ between the vessel 
and its flag State, what action could be taken against ‘flags of non-
compliance’, and the criteria for a responsible flag State are front and 
centre in international discussions ... flag State responsibility is an 
effective approach, or whether we should be concentrating our efforts 
on the development of complementary controls to assist where flag 
State jurisdiction fails.
343
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Giving the US responsibility for policing its own fishing fleet served two purposes. First, it 
provided the Pacific Island States with financial gain through access fee arrangements, and 
second, it encouraged US fishing vessels to curb illegal fishing activities.  
 
However this provision did not include all American fishing vessels in the South Pacific, 
instead applying only to those operating pursuant to the Treaty. Fishing vessels operating 
through interests not party to the Treaty provided the opportunity to fish without license. In 
this context, the Treaty seemed to fail to take full precautionary measures by not including all 
registered American fishing vessels.  
 
This created a loophole that allowed non-party American registered fishing vessels to violate 
Pacific Island States’ national fisheries laws and regulations. By failing to include all 
American fishing vessels under US responsibility, this provision was deficient. It did not 
fully guarantee that the US and all its fishing vessels would comply with the provisions 
outlined in Article 4(4.2). This stated: 
The Government of the United States shall, at the request of the 
Government of a Pacific Island party, take all reasonable measures to 
assist that party in the investigation of an alleged breach of this Treaty 
by a fishing vessel of the United States and promptly communicate all 
the requested information to that party. 
 
This wording implicitly recognized the impossibility of the US ensuring that all its fishing 
vessels had fully complied with the provisions of the Treaty. The US could only take 
“reasonable measures” to assist the Pacific government concerned in any investigation 
following a request by a Pacific Island authority.  
 
This Article acknowledged that the US could not fully ensure that its vessels were compliant 
with the provisions of the Treaty. A key question here was why the onus was placed on the 
Pacific Island States to assert that an alleged violation of the Treaty had occurred. In 
particular, why was this needed when it was the responsibility of the US to ensure that its 
fishing vessels’ activities conformed to the provisions of the Treaty?  
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Under the Treaty, the US was required to fully investigate and penalize fishing vessels 
violating the provisions of the Treaty, in the same way it would violations occurring in US 
territorial waters.
344
 The US and its judicial system acted as agents of the Pacific Island States 
pursuant to the Treaty. However, any such alleged infringement required full investigation 
and reporting as soon as practical to the Pacific Island State concerned.
345
 This included any 
action taken or proposed by the US in respect of the alleged infringement, but this again was 
based upon the request of the Pacific Island State concerned.
346
  
 
The Treaty provided a range of measures should a report show that Treaty provisions had 
been violated.
347
 Violations included fishing in a Licensed Area without a license; fishing in a 
Limited Area using methods other than purse seining; fishing for Southern Bluefin Tuna; 
using aircraft to support fishing; destroying evidence of material relevant to legal 
proceedings; or where the vessel concerned had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
Pacific Island State concerned. Accordingly:  
In the event that a report provided pursuant to paragraph 4 of this 
Article shows that a fishing vessel of the United States: 
 
(a) while fishing in the Licensing Area did not have a licence to fish 
in the Licensing Area, except in accordance with paragraph 3; or 
(b) was involved in any incident in which an authorized officer or 
observer was allegedly assaulted with resultant bodily harm, 
physically threatened, forcefully resisted, refused boarding or 
subjected top physical intimidation or physical interference in the 
performance of this or her duties as authorized pursuant to this 
Treaty; or that there probable cause to believe that a fishing vessel 
of the United States: 
(c) was used for fishing in waters closed to fishing pursuant to Annex 
I, except as authorized in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 
3; 
(d) was used for fishing by any method other than the purse seine 
method, except in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3; 
(e) was used for directed fishing for Southern Bluefin Tuna or fishing 
for any kinds of fish other than tunas, except that other kinds of 
fish may be caught as an incidental by-catch; 
(f) used an aircraft for fishing which was not identified on a form 
provided pursuant to Schedule 1 of Annex II in relation to that 
vessel; or 
                                                          
344
 Article 4 of the Treaty. See Gubon, F. “The Southwest Pacific Multilateral Fisheries: Some Possible 
Implications for Fisheries Development, Management and Conservation in the Pacific Island Region”, 
Melanesian Law Journal 22 (1994). 
345
 Article 4 of the Treaty.  
346
 Article 4(4.4) of the Treaty. 
347
 Articles 4 of the Treaty.  
(g) was involved in an incident in which evidence which otherwise 
could have been used in proceedings concerning the vessel has 
been intentionally destroyed; 
and that such vessel has not submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
Pacific party concerned, the Government of the United States 
shall, at the request of that party, take all necessary measures to 
ensure that the vessel concerned leaves the Licensing Area and 
waters closed to fishing pursuant to Annex I immediately and 
does not return except for the purpose of submitting to the 
jurisdiction of the party, or after action has been taken by the 
Government of the United States shall to the satisfaction of that 
party.
348
  
 
During the Treaty negotiation process on this provision—specifically Articles 4(4.4) and 
4(4.5)—questions of clarification were raised about certain issues regarding Article 4(4.4).349 
These included the following: What is meant by ‘proper infringement’? What standard and 
who determines it? Is the vessel entitled to a day in court? Why should a license be denied if 
the US Government is proceeding against? Article 4(4.5) raised similar concerns during the 
same session—for instance, should the vessel be compelled to leave the Licensing Area after 
the necessary steps are taken regarding the ‘probable infringement’ of a minor stipulation?  
 
In relation to investigation of an alleged violation of the Treaty, during the negotiation 
process the US insisted that it would conduct such an investigation of the vessel concerned. 
The US claimed they would ensure a legal process was put in place and they would take 
responsibility for the necessary payments.
350
 The Pacific Island States’ position was that, in 
the case of an alleged infringement, if the fishing vessel concerned did not submit to the 
jurisdiction of the Pacific Island State party concerned upon request, the US should keep the 
said vessel out of the Agreement Area including internal waters, archipelagic waters and 
territorial seas, until the matter was resolved. The US wanted infringements to be treated 
differently based on their degree of severity, ranging from fishing without a licence to minor 
infringments. They also did not want to exclude vessels from any closed areas within the 
Agreement Area.
351
 The Pacific Island States suggested that an investigation should be 
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conducted into any ‘alleged’ infringement.352 The bottom line of this debate was the fact that 
the US wanted to ensure that the fines imposed would be related to the degree of the 
infringement, while the Pacific Island States insisted that alleged violations of the Treaty 
must be dealt with accordingly.   
 
As Aqorau writes, important innovations of the Treaty were “the detailed procedures for the 
investigation by the United States of offenses against the Treaty and Pacific Island State’s 
laws, the imposition of penalties and the payment of fines, forfeitures and penalties 
collected.” 353 Aqorau also points to the way it incorporates “some of the more elaborate 
principles of flag States, including  
 Full investigation of any alleged breach of the fisheries laws of the 
coastal State with a report to be submitted within two months of the 
investigations to the coastal State;  
 Ensuring that vessels that are found to have violated the coastal 
State’s laws submit to the jurisdiction of the coastal State or take 
measures to ensure the vessel leaves the area;  
 Penalizing the vessel at similar levels for like violations by foreign 
fishing vessels operating in the waters of the flag State;  
 Assisting in the enforcement of a judgment taken by the courts in the 
coastal State and the collection of sums equivalent to the value of the 
forfeiture, fine, penalty or other judicial sanctions.
354
  
 
To treat all alleged infringements the same way would be a form of deterrence and the Pacific 
Island States suggested that until the infringed vessel was submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
Pacific Island States party concerned and a fine paid according to the party’s applicable laws, 
the alleged vessel should not be granted a fishing licence under the Treaty.
355
 The amount 
suggested by the US was not more than US$250,000 and was regarded to be quite generous. 
This could be seen as a strategic move to prevent further debate on penalties, such as 
imprisonment and corporal punishment. Also, the Pacific Island States specifically required 
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that the US to apply appropriate penalties under their own laws for American fishing vessels 
that breached the Treaty and this was accepted by the US.
356
  
 
The US suggested that the fines should correspond to US law and existing fisheries 
arrangements. The Pacific Island States agreed to this, stipulating that forfeiture of American 
fishing vessels would not be required for minor violations.  
 
 
Article 4(4.6) of the Treaty states that,  
In the event that a report provided pursuant to paragraph 4 of this 
Article shows that a fishing vessel of the United States has been 
involved in a probable infringement of this Treaty, including an 
infringement of the kind described in paragraph 5 of this Article, and 
that the vessel has not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Pacific 
Island party concerned, the Government of the United States shall, at 
the request of that party, take all necessary measures to ensure that the 
vessel concerned: 
 
(a) Submits to the jurisdiction of that party; or 
(b) is penalized by the Government of the United States at such level 
as may be provided for like violations in United States law 
relating to foreign fishing vessels licensed to fish in the exclusive 
economic zone of the United States but not to exceed the sum of 
US$250,000.
357
   
 
In the event of a report showing that a fishing vessel had violated the applicable national 
laws, or had infringed on the Treaty in some other way, what remedies were provided? For 
these purposes the US, on the request of the Pacific Island States concerned, took the 
necessary measures to ensure that the fishing vessel involved submitted to the jurisdiction of 
the Pacific Island State concerned. Failure to do so rendered the vessel liable for prosecution 
under US laws relating to foreign fishing operations licensed to fish in the US EEZ, facing a 
fine not exceeding US$250,000.
358
 This was an interesting provision: it clearly indicated that 
violations committed by American registered fishing vessels faced prosecution under 
American law, but this was subject to the prior request of an individual Pacific Island State. 
That is, American vessels remained liable for prosecution if they had committed an 
infringement within the US EEZ.   
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 According to the Treaty, prior to any legal proceeding pursuant to Article 4(4.8), in reference 
to an alleged infringement of the Treaty provisions:  
the Government of the United States shall notify the Government of 
that Pacific Island party that such proceedings shall be instituted. 
Such notice shall include a statement of the facts believed to show an 
infringement of this Treaty and the nature of the proposed 
proceedings, including the proposed charges and the proposed 
penalties to be sought. The Government of the United States shall not 
institute such proceedings if the Government of that Pacific Island 
party objects within 30 days of the effective date of such notice.
359
 
 
In these circumstances, the US could appoint an agent located in Port Moresby, PNG. That 
agent had the authority to receive and respond to any legal action instigated by a Pacific 
Island States’ authority against the operator of any American fishing vessel.360 Any such 
proceedings required 21 days notification. 
 
Other responsibilities of the US included ensuring that all American licensed fishing vessels, 
pursuant to the Treaty, were fully insured against risks and liabilities, and ensuring that “each 
fishing vessel of the US licensed pursuant to this Treaty is fully insured against all risks and 
liability.”361 Even though the US assumed responsibility for the activities of American fishing 
vessels, this did not mean that they were not liable for any infringement committed. 
 
At the negotiation, both parties agreed to make sure that all American vessels fishing in the 
Agreement Area carried insurance relating to collision, protection and indemnity and to take 
all necessary measures to facilitate any claim against such vessels and prompt compensation 
for any loss or damage caused.
362
 This was another major victory for the Pacific Island States. 
The flag state responsibility would be a key issue pushed by Pacific Island States and one 
which the US would reluctantly take on board. At the same time, the US could carry out this 
task more efficiently than the FFA from a financial and technical perspective. However, the 
US was keen to take all reasonable measures to investigate a breach of the Treaty.
363
 This 
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investigation provision may indicate that both parties were not fully confident that the 
American fishing fleet would comply fully or it may have been a safe guard. 
  
The Pacific Island States may have gained the upper hand in this context, as the US agreed to 
ensure that all measures were carried out and it stated that any fish illegally taken from the 
Licensing Area would be compensated promptly at market value. The Pacific Island States 
wanted the US to take all the necessary measures to minimize fishing gear conflicts and to 
ensure prompt and adequate compensation of Pacific Island States’ nationals for damage to 
their gear caused by American fishing vessels.
364
 The US responded to this by stating that it 
would ensure all fishing vessels were fully insured and it would facilitate any claim of 
compensation for damages.
365
  
 
Additionally, the US had to ensure that all measures were taken to facilitate any claim 
relating to the activities of American vessels. This included the market value of any fish taken 
from the Licensing Area without authorization. Prompt settlement duly required the US 
Government to ensure that:  
 
(c) all measures are taken to facilitate:  
 
(i)any claim arising out of the activities of a fishing vessel of the 
United States, including a claim for the total market value of any fish 
taken from the Licensing Area without authorization pursuant to this 
Treaty, and the prompt settlement of that claim;  
(iii) the prompt and full adjudication in the United States of any claim 
made pursuant to this Treaty.
 366
  
 
 
Article 4(4.3) states, The US Government shall ensure that: 
 
(b) all measures are taken to facilitate: 
 
(ii) the service of legal process by or on behalf of a national or 
the Government of a Pacific Island party in any action arising out of 
the activities of a fishing vessel of the United States. 
(iv) the prompt and full satisfaction of any final judgment or 
other final determination made pursuant to this Treaty. .
367
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 The US would also provide legal services on behalf of a Pacific Island State in any action 
arising from fishing vessels’ activities and would ensure the prompt and full satisfaction of 
any final judgment or determination. 
 
The US also had to ensure all measures were taken to facilitate:  
… the provision of a reasonable level of financial assurances, if, after 
consultation with the Government of the United States, all Pacific 
Island parties agree that the collection of any civil or criminal 
judgment or judgments or determination or determinations made 
pursuant to this Treaty has become a serious enforcement problem.
368
  
 
This is conditional on a request being made by the Pacific Island party. 
Furthermore:  
An amount equivalent to the total value of any forfeiture, fine, penalty 
or other amount collected by the Government of the United States 
incurred as a result of any actions, judicial or otherwise, taken 
pursuant to this Article is paid to the Administrator as soon as possible 
following the date that the amount is collected.
369
  
 
Unfortunately, the discharging of US responsibilities pursuant to Article 4 of the Treaty has 
not proved as effective as was originally intended. Pacific Island States’ suspicions about 
American operations have persisted regarding their continued illegal fishing activities in the 
region. This suspicion was aggravated by the negative attitudes and reputation of American 
fishers. For example, five American fishing vessels, illegally fishing in Kiribati’s waters, 
were spotted and photographed by a New Zealand Airforce Orion during its surveillance 
flight across the Pacific in April 1987.
370
 Just a month later, Tradition, an American purse 
seiner, was seized and arrested by Kiribati officials for fishing without a license.
371
 President 
Tabai of the Kiribati sent a strong protest note to the US Embassy in Suva stating that “he 
was disappointed and distressed at the inability of the United States Government to keep its 
own side of the recently signed treaty with small Pacific nations including Kiribati.”372 This 
matter was eventually resolved, but the mixed reputation of the American fishing fleet in the 
region remained. This incident was not isolated, it being not uncommon practice for 
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American fishing vessels to fish without licenses in the region, even after the Treaty came 
into force.  
 
Goodman argues that, 
 
Naturally, the corollary of flag State rights is flag State 
responsibilities. The basic responsibilities of flag States are those set 
out in Article 94 of the 1982 Convention, which requires a flag State 
to effectively exercise jurisdiction and control over ships flying its 
flag, and to take measures to ensure safety at sea. This includes a 
requirement for the flag State to maintain a register of ships flying its 
flag and to assume effective jurisdiction under its internal law for the 
ship, officers and crew in respect of administrative, technical and 
social matters. Measures to ensure safety at sea must be taken with 
respect to: construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships; 
manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of crews; and the 
use of signals, maintenance of communication and prevention of 
collisions.
373
 
 
Flag States are required to conform to the generally accepted international regulations, 
procedures and practices in respect of the things
374
 listed in Article 94(3) and (4) of the 
United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (1982 Convention) that,  
 
3. Every State shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as are 
necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to: 
(a) the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships; 
(b) the manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of crews, 
taking into account the applicable international instruments; 
(c) the use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the 
prevention of collisions. 
4. Such measures shall include those necessary to ensure: 
(a) that each ship, before registration and thereafter at appropriate 
intervals, is surveyed by a qualified surveyor of ships, and has on 
board such charts, nautical publications and navigational equipment 
and instruments as are appropriate for the safe navigation of the ship; 
(b) that each ship is in the charge of a master and officers who possess 
appropriate qualifications, in particular in seamanship, navigation, 
communications and marine engineering, and that the crew is 
appropriate in qualification and numbers for the type, size, machinery 
and equipment of the ship; 
(c) that the master, officers and, to the extent appropriate, the crew are 
fully conversant with and required to observe the applicable 
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international regulations concerning the safety of life at sea, the 
prevention of collisions, the prevention, reduction and control of 
marine pollution, and the maintenance of communications by radio.  
 
The Article also stipulated that a “State which has clear grounds to believe that proper 
jurisdiction and control with respect to a ship have not been exercised may report the facts to 
the flag State. Upon receiving such a report, the flag State shall investigate the matter and, if 
appropriate, take any action necessary to remedy the situation”.375 In this context, the 
responsibility of investigating rests on the US Government, as requested by the Pacific Island 
States; this is outlined in Article 4 of the Treaty. The US Government also has a duty to 
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters 
over ships flying its flag.
376
 Specifically, they are responsible for maintaining the register of 
vessels flying its flag and the assumption of jurisdiction under its internal law vessels flying 
its flag.
377
 Again these issues are consistently covered in the Article 4 of the Treaty.  
 
Financial assurances provided pursuant to this Treaty may be drawn 
against by any Pacific Island party to satisfy any civil or criminal 
judgment or other determination in favour of a national or the 
Government of a Pacific Island party.
378
  
 
At the negotiation, the US proposed enforcement provisions and a process by which licences 
could be issued. It seemed that the US was more confident that such initiatives could be 
effectively implemented and enforced than the Pacific Island States were.
379
 The US is also 
obliged under the international law in general to help the Pacific Island States at the same 
time. The US enforcing the Treaty was a clear signal to American fishing vessels that Treaty 
provisions must be observed. Also, the US really wanted to avoid any more fishing disputes 
and maintain good relationships with the Pacific Island States. The US Government was to 
take the necessary steps to ensure that its registered vessels refrain from fishing in the 
Licensing Area and in waters closed to fishing by Annex I, except as authorised in 
accordance with Article 3 of the Treaty. The Pacific Island States imposed general 
obligations on the US in order to make sure their fishing vessels complied not only with the 
provisions of the Treaty, but more specifically with the Pacific Island States’ applicable 
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national laws.
380
 And this was a major issue for both parties during the negotiation. The 
Pacific Island States ensured that the applicable national laws of the Pacific Island States 
parties and the Treaty would all be observed.
381
     
 
Article 91 of the 1982 Convention allows States to grant nationality to any ship to register in 
its territory and the right to fly its flag according to its own conditions; however, there “must 
exist a genuine link between the State and the ship,”382 and “every State shall issue to ships to 
which it has granted the right to fly its flag documents to that effect.”383 Hence, each State is 
free to fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality, so long as it adheres to minimum 
acceptable international standards, and is free to establish laws and regulations concerning 
the registering of vessels.  
 
Bray argues that the failure to effectively exercise the flag State’s responsibilities is widely 
recognized as the primary cause of IUU.
384
 In many cases, fishing vessels were granted 
nationalities and showed a lack of responsibility under the international law in terms of 
observing the laws of other States. There are international instruments for the flag States to 
control their registered fishing vessels: the United Nations Convention on the Fish Stocks 
Agreement, the FAO Compliance Agreement, regional fisheries agreements, the FAO Code 
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter 
and Eliminate IUU Fishing. 
  
Goodman argues that,  
 
In the fisheries context, however, exclusive flag State jurisdiction has 
been diluted by the establishment of systems for non-flag State 
enforcement. The most far-reaching is the global high seas boarding 
and inspection system provided for in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, 
but there are also boarding and inspection regimes operating under the 
auspices of various regional fisheries management organisations. 
Other collaborative forms of jurisdiction are also becoming 
increasingly common in the high seas fisheries context, such as ‘ship-
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rider’ agreements, and cooperative maritime surveillance and 
enforcement agreements. The increasing use of collaborative forms of 
jurisdiction recognises the practical limitations on flag State 
enforcement, and although not necessarily the most cost-effective 
form of non-flag State enforcement in the fisheries context (since high 
seas patrols and enforcement operations are quite expensive), these 
are a welcome development from a compliance perspective.
385
 
 
 
Article 87 of 1982 Convention states that:  
 
… high seas are open to all States … under the conditions laid down 
by this Convention and by other rules of international law ... 
comprises, inter alia … (a) freedom of navigation; (b) freedom of 
overflight; (c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject 
to Part VI; (d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other 
installations permitted under international law, subject to Part VI; (e) 
freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2; 
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.
386
 
 
And these freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other 
States and with due regard for their rights under this Convention with respect to activities in 
the Area.
387
 
 
Article 116 of the 1982 Convention states that all States and their nationals do have a right to 
fish on the high seas subject to their treaty obligations, rights and duties depicted in Articles 
63(2), 64 and 67 of the same Convention. In the context of treaty obligation, both Pacific 
Island States and the US are covered under the Treaty. These States also have duties to other 
States, in that they must take the necessary measures to conserve living resources within high 
seas.
388
  
 
With reference to the determination of the total allowable catch (TAC) and the establishment 
of other conservation measures for the living resources within the high seas, the States shall 
 
(a) take measures which are designed, on the best scientific evidence 
available to the States concerned, to maintain or restore populations 
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of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum 
sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and 
economic factors, including the special requirements of developing 
States, and taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence 
of stocks and any generally recommended international minimum 
standards, whether subregional, regional or global; 
(b) take into consideration the effects on species associated with or 
dependent upon harvested species with a view to maintaining or 
restoring populations of such associated or dependent species above 
levels at which their reproduction may become seriously 
threatened.
389
 
 
Article 150 of the Convention outlines that activities:  
 
… in the Area shall, as specifically provided for in this Part, be 
carried out in such a manner as to foster healthy development of the 
world economy and balanced growth of international trade, and to 
promote international cooperation for the over-all development of all 
countries, especially developing States, and with a view to ensuring: 
(h) the protection of developing countries from adverse effects on 
their economies or on their export earnings resulting from a reduction 
in the price of an affected mineral, or in the volume of exports of that 
mineral, to the extent that such reduction is caused by activities in the 
Area, as provided in article 151. 
 
Particular reference is made to the developing States in this Article from conservation and 
management, and economic perspectives.  
  
The flag States’ rationales and principles in terms of rights and responsibilities should be 
applied equally to all vessels flying their flags, and “yet the responsibilities of flag States for 
their fishing vessels are, in large part, constituted by a separate regime from that of the 
general maritime industry.”390 
 
In part, this is because the principal international conventions relating 
to maritime safety do not generally apply to fishing vessels, due 
mostly to their size, design, construction and operation. More 
importantly, however, the concept of a responsible fisheries flag State 
must take into account the different way in which fishing vessels 
‘use’ the marine environment ... fishing vessels harvest living marine 
resources (often in large quantities), including both target species and 
other species taken unintentionally as ‘bycatch’ … using fishing gear 
of all types (some of which may be lost or discarded in the sea during 
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or after fishing operations). These activities give rise to two key 
imperatives in the fisheries context. The first is the need for 
responsible fisheries management, to ensure the sustainable use of 
fishery resources and the conservation of the marine environment in 
which those resources are found. The second is the need to prevent, 
deter and eliminate IUU [illegal, unreported and un reulated] fishing, 
and the ‘flags of non-compliance’ which facilitate this activity. These 
issues have led to the development of a separate, and in many ways 
quite different, regime for flag state responsibility in the fisheries 
sector.
391
 
 
 
Goodman argues that,  
 
The system of flag State responsibility is also hampered by other 
institutional failures ... the lack of institutional linkage between the 
flag State responsibilities in the 1982 Convention, which are 
generally accepted as reflecting customary international law, and the 
more detailed responsibilities in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and 
the Compliance Agreement, which have a much lower level of 
ratification and acceptance ... these Agreements could usefully be 
regarded as being generally accepted international rules and standards 
in relation to the duty to cooperate in international fisheries. However, 
there is no provision in the 1982 Convention requiring States to 
comply with any such rules and standards in relation to fisheries, and 
although the UN Fish Stocks Agreement has been ratified by 75 
States, its provisions are not yet generally acknowledged as having 
reached the level of customary international law. Accordingly, there 
is a fragmented system of flag State responsibility in international 
fisheries, with different States claiming to be bound by different rules, 
in relation to vessels fishing for common resources.
392
 
 
 
Active and effective flag State responsibility is fundamental to the conservation and 
management of fisheries resources, especially with regard to the enforcement alleged 
violations. In this context, the US does not register fishing vessels, but ensures that 
allegations of Treaty violations are dealt with accordingly and efficiently.  
The best example of effective flag State responsibility may be found 
in the Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain 
Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States. Under 
the Treaty, the United States agrees to enforce the provisions of the 
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Treaty and licenses issued by the FFA. The United States has a duty 
to take the necessary steps to ensure that US vessels do not fish in the 
Licensing Area and Closed Areas without appropriate authorization. 
The US is also required to assist if requested to investigate the alleged 
breach of the Treaty by a US fishing vessel. To accelerate the 
processing of claims, the US is obliged to facilitate claims made 
against US vessels, including claims for the market value of the fish 
taken without authorization. The US is required to institute legal 
process by or on behalf of national or government of a Pacific Island 
State and ensure prompt and full adjudication in the US of any claims 
made pursuant to the Treaty.
393
  
 
 
  
Compliance Powers 
 
Article 5 designated the procedures that both parties had to follow from the issuance of 
licenses to any legal proceedings for violation of Pacific Island States’ national laws. The 
Pacific Island States permitted American fishing vessels, pursuant to the Treaty, to fish 
within designated areas following the issuing of a license. The Pacific Island States’ rights in 
this context are specified below:  
It is recognized that the respective Pacific Island parties may … 
enforce the provisions of this Treaty and licenses issued thereunder, 
including arrangements made pursuant to Article 3.3 and licenses 
issued thereunder, in waters under their respective jurisdiction.
394
  
 
In the event of arresting an American fishing vessel:  
The Government of … the Pacific Island parties shall promptly notify 
the Government of the United States of any arrest of a fishing vessel 
of the United States or any of its crew and of any charges filed or 
proceedings instituted following the arrest, in accordance with this 
Article.
395
  
 
Fishing vessels of the United States and their crews arrested for 
breach of this Treaty shall be promptly released upon the posting of a 
reasonable bond or mother security. Penalties applied in accordance 
with this Treaty for fishing violations shall not be unreasonable in 
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relation to the offence and shall not include imprisonment or corporal 
punishment.
396
 
 
The arrested vessel and its crew were to be promptly released upon posting a reasonable bond 
or security; any penalties incurred were not to include either imprisonment or corporal 
punishment.
397
 Pacific Island State parties had to promptly notify the American government 
of any arrest made involving an American fishing vessel and any proceedings initiated.  
 
It is possible that the US was not confident that its vessels would fully comply with the 
Treaty’s provisions. This provision provided some safeguards in the event that the US failed 
to assume responsibility for monitoring its fishing vessels. It also revealed some uncertainty 
on the part of the US about its own capacity to effectively implement these obligations; this 
caused the Pacific Island States to lose some faith in the Americans. It revealed that the US 
was aware that it could not control its fishing vessels.  
 
However as mentioned in Article 5(5.6), and with reference to legal proceedings instituted by 
the US, the Pacific Island State parties limited as stipulated below:  
 
Where legal proceedings have been instituted by the Government of 
the United States pursuant to Article 4, no Pacific Island party shall 
proceed with any legal action in respect of the same alleged 
infringement as long as such proceedings are maintained. Where 
penalties are levied or proceedings are otherwise concluded by the 
Government of the United States pursuant to Article 4, the Pacific 
Island party which has received notice of such final determination 
shall withdraw any legal charges or proceedings in respect of the 
same alleged infringement.
398
 
 
However in the event of arresting American fishing vessel, the US was limited as stipulated 
below: 
The Government of the United States shall not apply sanctions of any 
kind including deductions, however effected, from any amount which 
might otherwise have been paid to any Pacific Island party, and 
restrictions on trade with any Pacific Island party, as a result of any 
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enforcement measure taken by a Pacific Island party in accordance 
with this Article.
399
  
 
This meant that the US was not free to apply the embargo provisions of its 1976  Fisheries 
Conservation and Management Act (FCMA),  nor to ban importation of fishing and fish 
products into the US from any Pacific Island States that were party to the Treaty following 
the arrest of an American fishing vessel. This provision was regarded as a major victory for 
the Pacific Island States. It further meant that the Pacific Island States could enforce 
applicable national laws pursuant to the Treaty, allowing all parties to adopt and inform each 
other about the adoption of any provisions in their national laws that affected the Treaty.
400
  
 
Goodman argues that:  
 
… an international governance framework has developed for high 
seas fishing that gives effect to the duty to cooperate through a system 
of regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs), and sets 
out the responsibilities of flag States for ensuring compliance with the 
international fishery conservation and management measures adopted 
by those organisations. The principal flag State responsibilities are set 
out in two instruments: the Agreement to Promote Compliance with 
International Conservation and Management Measures on the High 
Seas (the Compliance Agreement) and the United Nations Agreement 
for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to 
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 1995(the UN Fish Stocks Agreement). 
These Agreements enunciate a range of flag State duties that give 
specific practical effect to the obligation to ensure effective 
jurisdiction and control in relation to the activities of fishing vessels. 
In this way, they could usefully be considered to implement the ‘duty 
to cooperate’ set out in the 1982 Convention much in the same way as 
‘generally accepted international rules and standards’ in MARPOL 
and SOLAS (for example) implement the general obligations in the 
1982 Convention relating to maritime safety and marine pollution.
401
  
 
The Compliance Agreement creates basic obligations for the flag States; they are obligated to 
not only control their vessels’ activities on the high seas, but also to ensure vessels do not 
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undermine the effectiveness of international conservation and management measures.
402
 The 
responsibility for cooperation expressed under the 1982 Convention applies to nationals, 
rather than specifically the flag States.  
 
Goodman argues that,  
 
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement
403
 includes the elements of flag State 
responsibility set out in the Compliance Agreement (Article 18)
404
, 
and adds some important elements of its own to the concept. The first 
new element is a detailed set of responsibilities requiring the flag 
State to ensure compliance by its vessels with conservation and 
management measures, and to take enforcement action where 
necessary, including full and immediate investigation into alleged 
violations, referral to appropriate authorities for the institution of 
proceedings, and the imposition of appropriate sanctions.
405
 
 
 
 
The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
(1995 Agreement) has been very successful and even though its scope is formally limited for 
straddling and highly migratory stocks, its principles are widely accepted; the flag State 
responsibilities in this instrument assist in the conservation and management of fisheries 
resources.
406
  
 
Interestingly the provision in the Fishermen’s Protective Act of 1956 (FPA) regarding 
reimbursement to fishers of fines and losses incurred through arrest for illegal fishing was 
excluded from the Treaty. This made the operators and owners of any American fishing 
vessel arrested entitled to reimbursement.
407
 However, excluding this provision would have 
left the US unable to ensure that its fishing vessels would fully comply with the provisions of 
the Treaty. Hence, the reimbursement provisions of the FPA remained intact; they continued 
to safeguard the interests of the American tuna fleet.  
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 During any period of investigation for an alleged infringement of Treaty provisions, the 
Pacific Island States concerned were required to notify other parties that the license of the 
vessel concerned was in abeyance and that the vessel was banned from fishing in the waters 
of any Pacific Island State party concerned.
408
 This provision did not stipulate a time frame 
for any such investigation, given that this could prove a protracted undertaking. Hence, 
suspect vessels were to cease any fishing activities until the alleged infringement was fully 
investigated (this had to be based on reliable information that the Treaty had indeed been 
violated). If the alleged vessel was found to have breached the provisions of the Treaty, it 
faced a total ban from the region. This would act as a deterrent to other American vessel 
operators, warning them that they could not breach the Treaty with impunity and continue 
fishing under its terms.  
 
It was further provided that:  
If full payment of any amount due as a result of a final 
judgment or other final determination deriving from an 
occurrence in waters within the jurisdiction, for any purpose, of 
a Pacific Island party, is not made to that party within sixty (60) 
days, the license for the vessel involved shall be suspended at 
the request of that party and that vessel shall not be authorized 
to fish in the Licensing Area until that amount is paid to the 
party.
409
  
 
Yet this was a weak approach to demands for the prompt payment of a fine. Having a vessel 
bonded and only released upon payment of a full fine amount would undoubtedly have done 
more to discourage and deter American fishing vessels from violating the Treaty’s 
provisions. Such permissiveness seemed to exhibit a lack of commitment on the part of the 
US to ensuring that its fishing fleets fully complied with the Treaty.  
 
In the Treaty negotiation, the Pacific Island States stated that any American fishing vessel 
fishing within the Agreement Area or water under Pacific Island States’ jurisdiction shall be 
subject to the laws and regulations of the Pacific Island States concerned.
410
 The US 
suggested that Pacific Island States enforce the provisions of the Treaty and licences issued in 
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their jurisdictions. This suggested generic coverage of the enforcement of the entire Treaty 
and its provisions and this was a major change from the US perspective in terms of the 
limitations strictly applied for the major allegation of an infringement. Also the US suggested 
that the Pacific Island States not take further action against American fishing vessels that 
have been dealt with by the US.
411
 The US pushed for the penalties to exclude imprisonment 
and corporal punishment for any violation and infringement of the Treaty by American 
fishing vessels. They also did not want the Pacific Island States to prosecute any American 
fishing vessels that had been penalized by the US already.
412
 The US pushed for the penalties 
to be solely monetary and for them to exclude vessel forfeiture (as deterrence) and they both 
agreed.
413
 The US insistence on the exclusion of imprisonment and corporal punishments for 
Treaty violations may have to do with the US purse seiners’ masters and crew being 
American citizens.  
 
The ATA fishing agreement with FSM, Kiribati and Palau stipulated that they were all 
responsible for the enforcement of the Access Agreement.
414
 This was ineffective and 
problematic, and the United States did not want to go down that road of ensuring its fishing 
vessels complied with the provisions of the Treaty again. Generally, one of the reasons that 
the US wanted to form this Treaty was to get rid off the ATA and to mend their relationships 
with Pacific Island States.    
 
 
Conclusions 
 
While the Pacific regional organizations were established to secure the political and 
economic interests of the Pacific Island States, that objective was complicated by the direct 
(or indirect) influences of foreign and former colonial powers.
415
 The US has remained 
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influential in the region, a fact that is demonstrated by the provisions in the multilateral 
fisheries Treaty.  
 
At initial meetings among Pacific Island States—convened for the purposes of establishing 
the FFA—it had previously been noted that tensions were evident over prospective US 
membership.
416
 This was not the first time that the stance of the US in the Pacific faced 
challenges on political grounds. This had already occurred as a result of Washington’s silence 
over France’s nuclear testing in the region, and its non-recognition of Pacific States’ 200 
nautical miles EEZ, which precipitated legal disputes over American fishing activities in the 
region.  
 
The American Tunaboat Association (ATA) proved a formidable lobbyist in promoting 
fishery industry interests during the FFA negotiations; it remained very influential in terms of 
US fisheries legislation and policy. For some, the proposed Treaty was nearly abandoned 
because of the pressure tactics adopted by the ATA during difficult negotiations and its ‘no 
room to maneuver’ approach. Aware of the political sensitivities in the mix, the US State 
Department got involved to salvage the negotiations as things began to appear out of control. 
Primarily a fisheries industry lobbyist, the ATA appeared to lack the diplomatic and political 
skills needed to handle the negotiation processes.       
 
In the end, the Treaty did gain some concessions from the US, with the government indirectly 
recognizing the sovereign rights of the Pacific Island States over their EEZ and fisheries 
resources therein. As certain American fishing vessels were allowed to operate in the Forum 
States’ designated areas, the US accepted the need to comply with fishing licenses and other 
relevant conditions. That acceptance indicated that the US acknowledged the jurisdiction of 
the Pacific Island States over their EEZ.  
 
The Treaty also helped to rekindle Pacific Island States-US political relations, by being seen 
to pay more attention to the needs of the region. It also helped to reaffirm US political and 
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security interests in the region.
417
 The Treaty thus helped to refocus US relations with Pacific 
Island States and to ‘reclaim’ its dominance in the region’s politics and diplomacy.  
 
While the US took on some responsibility for policing its fishing fleet, this remained 
restricted to vessels covered by the Treaty. In fact, not all American registered fishing vessels 
were obligated to comply with the terms and conditions provided by the Treaty. The 
restriction of US responsibilities to vessels covered by the Treaty could be seen as a failure, 
because the threat of illegal fishing by other American registered fishing vessels remained. 
The Treaty failed to cover all American registered fishing vessels. Vessels flying US flags 
should logically come under the sphere of US responsibility.  
 
The restricting of the American fishing fleet to the fishing grounds depicted in the Treaty 
could be construed as US recognition of national jurisdiction of the Pacific Island States over 
their EEZ. For the first time, it could be argued that the Pacific Island States had gained some 
form of control over the American fishing fleet’s activities. It was also unusual for the US to 
relinquish access to the complete fishing grounds of a designated region, something rarely 
seen in its political, economic and diplomatic practices elsewhere. Gaining this concession 
was seen as a victory from the Pacific Island States’ perspective. In general, then, the Pacific 
Island States and the US achieved some balance in terms of the trade-offs that they 
negotiated. But in achieving that balance, the political dimensions concerned influenced the 
outcomes achieved. 
 
At the Treaty negotiation, the Pacific Island States proposed that any party involved in a 
dispute may request that the Director of the FFA appoint the members of the Tribunal.
418
 The 
tribunal was comprised of 5 members—all fisheries qualified professionals chosen from 
States not involved in the dispute; and decisions made by the Tribunal should have the 
consent of no fewer than three of the members.
419
 The US proposed three members 
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comprising disputed parties and a third party as president of the Tribunal and decision should 
be consent by no fewer than two members. Both agreed that procedures would be determined 
by the Tribunal itself and that the decision would be binding. It looked like the US would 
never be part of the Tribunal because potential disputes would always be between Pacific 
Island State(s) on one side and the US on the other. And because the US would always be one 
party, they pushed to lower the proportional representation to their original three members of 
the Tribunal, to avoid Pacific Island States being over represented in this exercise. They felt 
this would provide an even playing field for the US. However, both parties to the Treaty felt 
that the arbitral Tribunal should exercise its rights with reference to the Treaty not the US or 
Pacific Island States fisheries policy and the US did not want the Tribunal to make a decision 
based on a legal interpretation and analysis of their fisheries policy. Both agreed that each 
party should pay 50% of the fee and expenses of the tribunal.
420
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Chapter Five  
 
An Economic Assessment of the Fisheries Treaty 
 
Introduction  
 
Traditionally, Pacific Island States have relied heavily on marine resources for their 
livelihoods. Often they have developed local economies based on marine resources along 
coastal areas. As the indigenous people of the Pacific, they also established pastoral and 
spiritual relationships with the natural environment. Contact with Europeans introduced 
totally different economic ideologies and practices and as a result of this marine 
environments would never be the same again.  
 
Traditional, subsistence-based economies were altered in some locations following the 
discovery of tuna resources and the associated growth of commercial enterprises in the 1950s. 
This commercial exploitation of Pacific Island States’ fisheries resources was initially 
gradual, pioneered by Japanese fishermen in the early 1920s, who were subsequently 
followed by American and other distant water fishing nations’ (DWFN) fishing fleets in the 
1940s.
421
 The advancement of marine technologies, and the skyrocketing price of tuna 
products on world markets, has opened up the Pacific’s tuna fishing grounds for serious 
competition.
422
 This has resulted in the growing political and economic domination of DWFN 
interests throughout the region.   
 
The tuna resources of the Pacific Island States are now regarded as the most commercially 
productive in the world, providing some 72 per cent of the world’s tuna production with an 
annual landed value of US$1.46 billion in 1993 alone.
423
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 The Pacific islands are the most important fishing region in the world. 
The region supplies an estimated one-third of all landed tuna, 40-60 
per cent of total supply to tuna canneries, and 30 per cent of tuna to 
the valuable Japanese sashimi (raw fish) market. Most Pacific island 
countries have a narrow resource base and small domestic markets, 
resulting in heavy dependence on a small number of export 
commodities. Economic growth for the Pacific islands region as a 
whole has been slow due to insecure and poorly defined institutional 
structures. The South Pacific tuna fishery is the Pacific islands’ main 
natural resource. Tuna stocks have the greatest potential for the 
expansion of exports from Pacific island countries.
424
 
 
Since then, this value has increased substantially. Yet only a tiny percentage of this amount is 
directly generated within some Pacific Island States, through selling licenses to DWFN to 
fish for tuna within the region’s waters.425 The 20 Pacific Island states rely heavily upon their 
oceans as an economic resource, as tuna fisheries constitute up to 40% of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of some States.
426
 The economic returns for the region thanks to the tuna 
catch of 2001 were equivalent to 11% of the combined GDP of all the countries in the 
region.
427
 Pacific Island States now regularly supply more than half of the global demand for 
canned tuna.
428
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 The tuna fishery represents one of the Pacific’s greatest natural 
resources, but only about a tenth of its two billion dollar annual value 
remains in the Pacific. The majority of the catching and processing of 
Pacific tuna is done by foreign boats and factories, and access fees 
currently paid by foreign vessels in Pacific waters amount to only 
around one-twentieth of the value of the fish caught. The people of 
the Pacific deserve a greater share of the revenue from this precious 
resource. Two obvious ways to ensure greater benefits to Pacific 
Island peoples is to increase Pacific Island involvement in the 
catching of fish and their processing into fish products, as well as to 
increase the access fees paid by foreign fishers.
429
 
 
The economic significance of the Pacific Island States’ tuna resources was secured during the 
negotiations of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III) and 
led to the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 (1982 
Convention) and its ratification in 1994. This gave sovereign rights to coastal States—Pacific 
Island States in this case—over resources within their 200 nautical mile exclusive economic 
zones (EEZ). The Treaty on Fisheries between the governments of certain Pacific Island 
States and the United States of America (Treaty) is a classic example of a collective approach 
being used to maximize economic benefits for the Pacific Island States through the 
exploitation and conservation of its precious tuna resources.  
 
The adoption of a Treaty between the Pacific Island States and the US, and previous fishing 
agreements all indicated the economic significance of tuna resources for the region’s 
economies.
430
 From a Pacific Island State parties’ perspective, the Treaty was a 
comprehensive legal regime that promised significant economic benefits.
431
 Under the Treaty, 
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American tuna fleet could fish within the Pacific Island State parties’ EEZs. This activity 
provided a secure and constant flow of tuna to American canning and processing operations.  
 
The Pacific Island States needed some form of sustainable mechanism to secure the flow of 
economic benefits from their tuna resources, and Treaty not only provided financial benefits, 
but it also restricted American fishing vessels’ illegal fishing in the region. The greatest threat 
to the Pacific’s tuna fisheries is overexploitation; as a result of overfishing through harvesting 
“unsustainable amounts of tuna, the economic stability and health of Pacific Island 
communities is under threat as well as the very survival of these fleets whose operational 
margins are pushed to negative as they have to spend more time and effort in catching the 
same amount of fish”.432 
 
The Treaty itself not only provided American purse seiners access to fish in the Pacific Island 
States’ EEZ, but it also provided substantial subsidies and if new subsidies were negotiated 
“then the US treaty in its present form would likely have to be revised. This would put further 
pressure on the US purse seiners to shift operations to the eastern Pacific. Without the US 
treaty the average access fee for Pacific Island countries would drop to 3%.”433 That is, the 
Treaty provided an improved and increased access fee compared to other fishing 
arrangements with the other DWFN.
434
 
 
However, different target HMS species not only have different market landing prices, but 
different vessels with varied operational costs would further complicate the access fee 
discussion and negotiation.   
The four key tuna species that are of commercial value, and are the 
subject of cooperative management arrangements in the South Pacific 
are skipjack (katsuwonus pelamis), yellowfin (Thunnus albacares), 
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albacore (Thunnus alalunga), and bigeye (Thunnus obesus). The 
fishery is dominated by three main gear types, namely, purse seining, 
longlining and to a smaller extent pole-and-lining. The largest fishery 
in terms of the volume of catch is taken by the purse seine fishery. 
The preliminary estimate of the 2000 purse seine catch was 1 038 748 
tonnes. This represents an increase of approximately 1 percent 
compared to the estimated 1999 catch of 1 02 450 tonnes. The 
breakdown by species of the 2000 catch is as follows: skipjack 812 
880 tonnes (up 4 percent from 1999), yellowfin 19 159 tonnes (down 
8 percent); bigeye 28 745 tonnes (down 15 percent).
435
 
 
The global multi-billion dollar fisheries industry employs millions of people and at the same 
time provides food security for a significant portion of the world’s population, yet three 
quarters of the world’s fish stocks are dangerously near depletion.436 The West and Central 
Pacific Ocean is the largest and the least over-exploited tuna fishery in the world, accounting 
for one-third of the global tuna catch.
437
 However, it is not exempt from the threat of 
exploitation and the subsequent loss of significant financial revenue. It is difficult to offer a 
conclusive scientific explanation for the status of the region’s HMS stocks due to the varied 
outcomes of the many studies that have been done.
438
  
The share of the South Pacific harvest taken by Pacific island 
countries is modest, at around 10 per cent. The remaining 90 per cent 
of the value of the catch is taken by Distant-Water Fishing Nations 
(DWFNs) … The distant-water fishing nations pay access fees to the 
Pacific island countries for the right to fish in their waters. These 
revenues are increasing. For example, in 1999 fees amounted to US$ 
60.3 million but are still a small proportion of the total value of the 
total catch ... Licence fees contribute significantly to the public 
revenue of many Pacific island countries … Where foreign fishing 
vessels regularly call at local harbours, additional benefits accrue in 
delivery of goods and services.
439
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Regulation and control of the exploitation of tuna resources in the region is urgently needed. 
This will secure the sustainable development of these vital and strategic resources for the 
long term economic development of the Pacific Island States.  
 
The US tuna fleet accounts for some 95 per cent of American domestic tuna landings.
440
 
However, more than 90% of the region’s tuna resources are caught by fleets not associated 
with the US. Those involved include Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, Phillipines and the 
European Union and these fishing fleets take 900% more than locally based vessels, which 
annually make over US$3 billion from the Pacific Island States’ fisheries resources. The 
Pacific Island States receive around 6% of this, mainly from licensing and access fees.
441
 In 
2003, a Niuean fleet of small boats and outrigger canoes caught around 100 tonnes of tuna; a 
super seiner could catch the same amount in just two days.
442
 
 
The US thus has a secure supply of tuna resources for its industries. Furthermore, they 
subsequently benefit from the added value provided by the domestic canning of tuna. Pacific 
Island State parties stood to benefit from fishing licenses and other royalty benefits regularly 
paid from US sources. In general, representatives from the Pacific Island States and the US 
believed that the Treaty offered a win-win situation.  
 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that some 75% of tuna resources 
around the world had collapsed or been depleted; as a result of this, many DWFN fleets 
moved to the Pacific.
443
 It globally estimated that 50% of the fish caught are caught by only 
1% of fishing boats. Large DWFN fishing fleets used larger vessels with modern technology 
to increase the quantity of their catches and they pocket most of the profits.
444
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The Treaty itself was appealing in that it largely consisted of cash payments and other forms 
of assistance that would benefit all Pacific Island State parties. Added to this, the US 
government was formally party to the Treaty, which was added assurance that the economic 
terms agreed upon would be fulfilled. The cash payment terms and other assistance pursuant 
to the Treaty were considered favorable by the Pacific Island States.
445
 The parties were 
optimistic that the Treaty would benefit all the parties economically.  
 
The tuna fishery is by far the most economically significant fishery in 
the WCPO [Western and Central Pacific Ocean). It is the largest in 
the world, with approximately 2 million tonnes caught annually, 
worth US$2 billion, and comprising roughly one-third of all landed 
tuna.
 
This equates to roughly a fifth of the region’s combined gross 
domestic product.
446
  
 
The fishery is the region’s largest natural resource and is one that offers potential exports, yet 
it is DWFN that are controlling the harvesting and processing of this resource.
447
 The Pacific 
Island States may consider setting up regional fisheries processing plants to process and sell 
finished products. This would undoubtedly increase their profit margins, while at the same 
time maintaining the exploitation rate of the region’s tuna resources in a sustainable manner. 
 
However, the Treaty entered into force on 15 June 1988 and extended for a period of five 
years. It expired in 14 June1993, but in March 2002, both parties agreed to amend and extend 
the Treaty for a further 10 years (until 15 June 2003).
448
 The 2003 extension provided up to 
40 licenses for purse seiners, with an option for 5 additional licenses reserved for joint 
venture arrangements, to fish for tuna in the EEZ’s of the Pacific Island Parties.449 The 2003 
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revised Treaty also contains a number of amendments, such as updating the methods 
available for reporting; a revised procedure for amending the annexes; a revised observer 
program fee formula; provisions on the use of a vessel monitoring system (VMS); and 
general provisions on fishing capacity, revenue sharing and linkages between the Treaty and 
the Convention for the Conservation and Management of the Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
of Western and Central Pacific (Fish Stocks Convention).
450
 The Treaty was then extended a 
further 10 years, until 14 June 2013.
451
 Both parties agreed that in 2012, they would 
renegotiate for a further extension beyond the 14 June 2013 expiry.
452
 
 
As Grynberg puts it,  
 
The financial terms of the revised which come into force in June 2003 
US Treaty (currently US$18 million per annum) fall into three 
categories: (a) annual industry payment representing licence fees for a 
maximum of 45 purse seine vessels and technical assistance; (b) 
observer programme costs paid by industry; (c) economic 
development assistance provided by the US Government pursuant to a 
related agreement between the US Government and the Forum 
Fisheries Agency.
, 
Under current arrangements in the Multilateral 
Treaty USAID pays approximately US$14 million of the US$18 
million of annual returns to the beneficiaries.
453
 
 
The Treaty was by far the most significant fishing arrangement ever reached between Pacific 
Island States and the US and created a multilateral framework that gave American fishing 
fleet access to Pacific Island States’ EEZ.454 Certain conditions and terms must be observed 
by US fishing fleet to preserve their access under the Treaty.   
 
Financial and economic elements were among the key issues raised at the initial meeting 
between the Pacific Island States and US delegations when they met to discuss the fishing 
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agreement.
455
 It reflected the willingness of the Pacific Island States to secure financial 
benefit from their billion dollars fisheries resources was an extra special for both parties in 
the negotiation and tried to find way that they both winners economically.   
 
Provisions of the Treaty 
 
Two provisions of the Treaty stipulated relevant economic objectives. They included, first, 
under Article 2: Broader Cooperation of the principal Treaty, the manner in which the US 
would assist and promote the development of the Pacific Island States’ fisheries resources. 
The second, under Schedule 2, dealt with payments under the original Treaty, while Article 4 
of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the South 
Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA Agreement) did so under the extended Treaty.  
 
Article 2: Broader Cooperation 
  
 In stipulating how the US would cooperate with the Pacific Island States in developing their 
tuna resources pursuant to the Treaty, this Article comprised two provisions. These are 
discussed separately. The first provision, Article 2(2.1), stated:  
The Government of the United States shall, as appropriate, cooperate 
with the Pacific Island parties through the provision of technical and 
economic support to assist the Pacific Island parties to achieve the 
objective of maximizing benefits from the development of their 
fisheries resources. 
 
This offered the US an opportunity to cooperate with the Pacific Island States through 
technical and economic support and to assist them in developing their fisheries resources. 
However, this cooperation was not mandatory. The FFA States’ proposal stated that the 
obligation to provide assistance would arise only at the request of any Pacific Island State 
party and only if assistance was deemed appropriate.
456
  
Fisheries exports from the region consist almost wholly of tuna, 
which is the South Pacific’s most important development resource. 
Canneries in American Samoa, Fiji and the Solomon Islands export 
tuna at slightly higher prices than their Southeast Asian counterparts, 
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but the latter two states benefit from African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) status in the European Union (EU) market.
457
  
Again, accessing world markets for finished Pacific fish products would be challenging in 
terms of price competition (as well as capital and infrastructure), especially when coming up 
against the well-established process plants with generous tax incentives and ‘relaxed’ local 
legislation and regulations.
458
 Hence, the Treaty does not indicate cooperation in terms of 
trading finished tuna products. However, this exercise could fall within the ‘maximizing 
benefit’ framework of the development of the Pacific Island States’ tuna resources.        
 
Regional cooperation among Pacific Island States is seen as a ‘shining example’ of how to 
ensure effective management of fisheries resources through regional organizations and 
institutions.
459
 For the Pacific Island States, the concept of regional cooperation was born out 
of the need for specialized regional bodies to deal with the specific requirements of the 
region; these address everything from national differences to international interests.
460
 The 
economic development of fisheries resources in the region is among the key regional interests 
and is a vital one. As the ‘specialized’ body dealing with fisheries, the FFA had done a good 
job and the Treaty was among its major achievements.    
 
Cooperation among Pacific Island States has been recognized internationally as having 
produced relatively high levels of achievement.
461
 This has been reflected in the cooperative 
and collective approach adopted by the Pacific Island States under the FFA as a regional 
specialized body dealing with fisheries issues, including conservation and management 
measures.
462
 The FFA has been an important and effective regional institution and the 
conclusion of the Treaty is among its great achievements.   
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 The financial significance of the Pacific Island States’ tuna resources was highlighted by the 
establishment of the FFA and its aim to ensure a generation of revenue from fisheries 
resources. In dealing with all fisheries matters affecting its members in the region, the FFA 
was keen to ensure that the people of the Pacific Islands achieved the maximum benefits 
possible from their tuna resources.
463
  
 
As the Treaty did not explicitly deal with the conservation and management of the Pacific 
Island States’ fisheries resources, the previously cited provision placed considerable 
importance on the Pacific Island States’ attempts to get the most out of their tuna resources. 
Under this provision, the US could, in the spirit of cooperation, decide to provide technical 
and economic support to Pacific Island State parties.  
 
Traditionally, fishing agreements between the Pacific Island States and the DWFN have 
largely addressed issues of technical assistance, rather than on any monetary value gained.
464
 
However, the kind of technical assistance provided for the most part did not actually benefit 
the Pacific Island States due to its inapplicability within this region. Local fishers simple did 
not have the necessary skills needed to operate new fisheries equipments. Generally, the 
technical assistance provided to the Pacific Island States only worked in the short term, if at 
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all. Part of this failure, from the author’s personal observations, is due to a failure to provide 
maintenance resources as part of the package. This is quite a common problem with aid-
related projects in the Pacific Island States—local governments often cannot afford the 
maintenance costs involved in foreign aid-initiated projects. 
 
The differences in terms of socio-political and economic circumstances in the region was also 
a crucial factor. Australia and New Zealand are the ‘superpowers’ of the region, and Pacific 
Island States expected their assistance through regional cooperation. However, these 
‘superpowers’ also had significant interests elsewhere and geopolitical changes arguably 
made the Pacific less important to them. As Bergin and Michaelis note: 
  
With the end of the Cold War, and the strategic interests of outside 
powers in the region declining, the strategic importance of the PICs to 
Australia is, however, quite modest. In economic terms, too, Australia 
does not have a compelling interest in the region. Its main economic 
relationships lie elsewhere.
465
  
 
DWFN developed a reputation for making promises that were never fulfilled. Their negative 
experiences when receiving technical assistance in the past forced Pacific Island States’ 
leaders to consider adopting a fresh approach to fishing agreements.  
 
Under the Treaty, US$250,000 per annum was allocated to Pacific Island State parties for 
technical assistance upon request, as coordinated by the Administrator.
466
 More emphasis was 
placed on direct cash payments; this took time, however, given the lack of collective 
cooperation even after the establishment of the FFA in 1979.  
Regional arrangements for the Pacific Island States were urgently needed, as was 
international cooperation, particularly with regards to the DWFN.
467
 This could be an 
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effective way to ensure the economic benefits of the region’s fisheries resources are secured 
at regional and international levels.  
 
However, this technical assistance fund increased to $US1.8 million per annum under the 
terms of the extended Treaty.
468
 The sums involved were deposited into the bank accounts of 
Pacific Island State parties in New York, although the FFA was designated to administer the 
fund. All Pacific Island State parties had equal access to the fund through project proposal 
submissions made to the FFA via the Ministries of Foreign Affairs within the respective 
countries concerned. This fund was open to project bids, excluding any of an overtly military 
nature. 
 
 
Observer Programme 
To assist enforcement officers carry out their duties, the operators of 
foreign fishing vessels are required to give full access to authorized 
officers of the licensing State to the vessel’s log book and catch 
records. Examination of the logbook and catch records can reveal if 
the vessel has complied with the licensing State’s laws.469  
 
It is also important to collect correct data regarding the catch and general 
activities of the vessels and to ensure that the vessels observe the agreed upon 
terms and conditions.
470
  
 
The costs of an observer program would be paid by the American fishing vessels concerned 
(with these costs including travel expenses, salaries, allowances, full insurance and 
training).
471
 The expenses and costs of observers would be paid annually in lump sums to the 
Administrator according to the following formula. 
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The number of licensed United States vessels multiplied by the 
average annual number of trips per vessel for the latest licensing 
period for which information is available multiplied by 20 per cent 
multiplied by the cost per trip (US$4,000) equals a lump sum 
payment. In addition in the first two years following 15 June 1993, an 
additional payment of US$15,000 per year for training shall be made 
to the Administrator.  
 
Administrative Costs 
Article 7(7.2) of the Internal Agreement of the extended Treaty stipulated an amount set a 
side for administrative costs. Hence: 
The Administrator shall make quarterly deductions from the accrued 
money received pursuant to the Principal Agreement, equal to the 
administrative costs incurred during the previous quarter, provided 
that the total deductions for the Licensing Period shall not exceed the 
total amount approved in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.  
 
The Administrator thus received the administrative costs involved upon parties’ approval of 
the relevant budget items, including the direct costs of performing the functions and other 
services pursuant to the Treaty and the Internal Agreement.
472
 The administrative cost was 
estimated to be US$200,000 per annum, subject to any other changes.  
 
Hanich and Tsamenyi argue that the  
 
LOSC [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982] 
describes the expectations placed on coastal States by the world 
community in regard to their EEZ ... three important obligations: 
conservation; optimum utilization; and a duty to co-operate.
473
  
 
 
Article 61 of the 1982 Convention requires that coastal States manage and conserve fisheries 
within their EEZs and determine the total allowable catch (TAC) of fisheries resources in 
their EEZ. It also indicates that they must in the process ensure proper conservation and 
management measures are taken to avoid over exploitation. At the same time, Article 62 of 
the 1982 Convention obliges those same coastal States to share fisheries surpluses and to 
promote the optimum utilization of the living resources within their EEZ. This reflected 
DWFN’s concerns that coastal States would drastically limit other parties’ use of the living 
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resources within their EEZs and many developing coastal States did not have the capacity for 
maximum harvest and allocation of surplus for developed DWFN fishing fleet. 
 
 
Development 
 
In some respects Article 2 could be viewed as a failure by the Pacific Island States, given 
that it did not make cooperation mandatory. Some argue that the US should have been 
committed to unconditionally supporting a maximization of Pacific Island States’ 
economic benefits through the further development of their fisheries resources. However 
another interpretation of this provision is that the Pacific Island States were not willing to 
determine when and how the US might act to assist them in maximizing the economic 
benefits of their tuna resources. The question of how the Pacific Island States could 
achieve optimum economic benefits from the development of their fisheries resources so 
long as cooperation to that end remained conditional upon the goodwill of the US 
remained unresolved. 
 
One of the difficulties encountered by Pacific island States in terms of economic 
development generally (and specifically in terms of fishing) has been the longer term 
inadequacy of the economic models chosen. The imposition of foreign economic models by 
local but overseas-trained economists, and the exclusion of local social, political, economic, 
cultural and environmental factors have all been in part responsible. 
 
In addition, there has been a deficit in terms of the capital, infrastructure and expertise needed 
to provide sound foundations that would foster economic development in the long term. The 
Treaty did not provide adequately for assistance in the development of Pacific Island States’ 
fisheries resources. The modest funding provided was primarily designed to assist individual 
Pacific Island State parties, rather than to serve the collective regional requirements (such as 
the possible establishment of a regional cannery plant). 
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to develop fisheries resources.  
 
The full development of Pacific Island States’ fisheries resources requires the establishment 
of local fisheries industries, with fish products gaining unlimited access to the US and other 
markets. The Treaty failed to provide the Pacific Island State parties with such access to US 
markets. Without this, the Pacific Island States cannot take full advantage of their fisheries 
resources under the Treaty, nor indeed any other fishing arrangements. Currently, the Pacific 
Island States are still simply suppliers of tuna resources, not suppliers of value-added finished 
products.   
 
This is a reality at odds with the purposes outlined in the Treaty Preamble, indicating the 
desire of both the Pacific Island States and the US to maximize the benefits flowing from the 
development of the fisheries resources within the EEZ of the Pacific Island State parties. 
Under the Treaty, therefore, it would seem that the US has at least some degree of moral 
obligation to ensure that the tiny Pacific Island States’ economies receive the maximum 
financial benefit possible from their tuna resources.  
 
Article 2(2.2) of the Treaty stipulated that the US should seek to promote the maximization of 
Pacific Island States’ benefits from the operations of its fishing vessels pursuant to the 
Treaty. This Article stated: 
2.2 The Government of the United States shall, as appropriate, 
promote the maximization of the benefits generated for the Pacific 
Island parties from the operations of fishing vessels of the United 
States licensed pursuant to this Treaty, including: 
 
(a)  the use of canning, transshipment, slipping and repair facilities 
located in the Pacific Island parties;  
(b)  the purchase of equipment and supplies, including fuel supplies, 
from suppliers located in the Pacific Island parties; and  
(c)  the employment of nationals of the Pacific Island parties on board 
licensed fishing vessels of the United States.  
 
This provision contains similar conditions to those already mentioned under Article 2(2.1) 
regarding US cooperation. These stipulated that the US would, as appropriate, promote the 
maximization of the benefits generated from the facilities and services provided by the 
Pacific Island States for American fishing vessels, pursuant to the Treaty. It may seem as 
though the US wanted to limit its obligations by using the words ‘as appropriate’ within the 
context of the request. Of interest here is the fact that American purse seiners required 
sophisticated facilities of the type that were often not available in the Pacific Island States. 
The facilities used to service American sophisticated fishing vessels are owned by American 
or foreign companies, which offer very little local employment and thus fail to benefit local 
communities.
474
 Spare parts, for instance, are air freighted from the US or countries other 
than the Pacific Island States.
475
  
 
Paragraph (a) of this Article stated that the American fleet will use the canning, 
transshipment, slipping and repair facilities located within the Pacific Island States party to 
the treaty. The cannery plant processing tuna under the Treaty, which is located in Pago Pago, 
American Samoa, was owned by an American company. This plant also employed local 
labour, but American Samoa was not a Pacific Island State party to the Treaty. Accordingly, 
Pacific Island State parties did not benefit from this cannery, even though it was processing 
tuna resources harvested by an American tuna fleet pursuant to the Treaty.  
 
The Pacific Island States widening cooperation for economic benefit with the US through 
operations and facilities already existed in the region to be used by the American fishing 
vessels and their catches.
476
 This was a huge achievement for the Pacific Island States’ 
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negotiation team and FFA members in general. This issue would also benefit the region as a 
whole through the sharing of the advanced technologies possessed by the US—an 
achievement on its own. The US showed a willingness to provide technical and economic 
support to assist the maximization of the development of the region’s fisheries resources 
through use of facilities in the region such as canneries, transshipment, fuel and equipment 
supplies, slipping and repair supplies and employment of locals on the US fishing vessels. 
Theoretically, this was a very generous offer from the US to the Pacific Island States, 
economically-speaking.   
 
In paragraph (b) of this section of Article 2, it is stated that the American tuna fleet is to buy 
equipment and supplies, including fuel, from suppliers located in the Pacific Island States. 
Again equipment and supplies for the sophisticated American purse seiners were not 
provided by the Pacific Island States; the fuel was supplied to the region by foreign oil 
companies. This provision, therefore, does little to assist the promotion or maximization of 
Pacific Island States’ ability to benefit from the operation of the American tuna fleet. The last 
paragraph of this Article stipulates that American fishing vessels are to employ locals as 
crew. Outwardly this seems promising as a means of securing employment for Pacific 
Islanders, but no indication is provided as to the number of locals that must be so employed. 
Moreover, local crews may lack the skills and experience required to handle purse seining 
techniques.  
 
At the Treaty negotiation, the US brought up the need for both parties to co-operate in the 
rational management of fisheries resources to ensure their conservation and optimum 
utilization.
477
 In this context, the US offered a beneficial co-operation package to deal with 
not only the conservation and management of the fisheries resources, but also their maximum 
utilization for economic gain. Even the Pacific Island States could see the paradox being put 
forward by the US—any significant economic benefit would always outweigh everything 
else. Therefore, it was necessary to fine tune and clarify what the US had proposed so far.
478
 
 
The other issue would be the fact that, should the Pacific Island States request such 
assistance, it would be up to the US to decide whether the request was appropriate. In other 
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words, much depended on the application and implications of their interpretation and how 
they negotiated the issue. The concept of an appropriate request needed definition. The US 
insisted that this not be a requirement, claiming they needed it to remain generic.
479
 However, 
Article 64 of 1982 Convention encouraged co-operation between coastal States and others, 
not only for conservation and management purposes, but also to maximize utilization of 
fisheries resources.  
 
The fisheries interaction between the governments of the States 
whose nationals dominate the fishery and the governments of the 
South Pacific countries provide an important political and economic 
link between the two sides. The two sides do not often share the same 
common vision on how the tuna resource should be managed. 
Understanding the different dynamics at play in the fishery and the 
diverse national interests at stake, is fundamental to appreciating how 
regional cooperation has been shaped in the South Pacific.
480
 
 
Transshipment is another service addressed under this provision, again to maximize Pacific 
Island State parties’ ability to benefit pursuant to the Treaty. Under the original Treaty, 
transshipment services were not included—this function was carried out at sea. Under the 
extended Treaty however, transshipment was included; it was carried out in Pacific Island 
State parties’ ports as part of a package designed to maximize Pacific Island States’ benefits.  
 
The transshipment provisions of the extended Treaty were explicitly outlined in Part 4 of 
Annex I, as were the relevant procedures. The operator of the US fishing vessel was required 
to notify the Administrator and appropriate Pacific Island States’ authority of the 
transshipment details, including its international radio call sign, its position, the species taken 
and the catch amount.
481
 A location request would then be made so the transshipment could 
occur.
482
 All transshipments had to be authorized by the Pacific Island States and a full report 
of any transshipment had to be submitted.
483
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 The master and crew of the American tuna vessel undertaking the transshipping was to assist 
the officer authorized by the Pacific Island State party. This officer was given access to the 
fish being transshipped and any other related information. In the last six months of 1993, 360 
transshipments took place in Pacific Island States’ ports; it total these were worth some US$ 
3.6 million.
484
 The American purse seining fleets do not transship their catches in the Pacific 
Island States’ ports. However, transshipments of American vessels are carried out in the ports 
of American territories such as Guam and Titian before they are shipped to canneries in 
American Samoa and Puerto Rico.
485
 The future of design-specific transshipment facilities in 
the Pacific region will depend primarily on how Article 62 of the 1982 Convention is 
interpreted and enforced.  
 
It will also depend on the capacity to provide and manage transshipment facilities and on the 
size and types of foreign fleets operating in the South Pacific.
486
 Japanese purse seiners’ 
catches are landed in Japan's ports. Taiwanese purse seiners’ catches are transferred on the 
high seas and transported to Thailand, Japan and the US.
487
  
 
Overall, the main flaw in the Article 2 provisions of the Treaty lay in their failure to make it 
mandatory for the US to cooperate in ways designed to promote and ensure maximum 
benefits for the Pacific Island States. 
 
 
Access Fee and Funds Distribution 
 
In 1999 the combined annual tuna catch was equivalent in value to approximately 11% of the 
combined GDP of FFA member Pacific Island States. Revenue from tuna canning 
contributed up to 42% of the gross domestic product (Kiribati and Tuvalu). The access fees 
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paid are significant components of the national economies of 7 of the 14 Pacific Island 
States.
488
 Hanich and Tsamenyi argue that,  
 
These tuna resources of the area are enormous in relation to the 
national economies (of the Pacific small island developing States). A 
purse seine vessel, in a single haul can capture enough tuna to match 
the value of a year’s exports from one of the smaller countries.489  
 
Other associated natural elements also come into the equation, as they affect the revenue of 
the Pacific Island States. One example of this is the El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) 
Index, which also affects the quality of the fisheries resources.
490
 
 
The economic benefits gained from the Pacific Island States’ fisheries resources and their 
impact overall is huge. They offered some form of economic relief to some Pacific Island 
States for the first time. At the same time, however, there are some concerns. As Parris and 
Grafton put it,        
 
Whatever EEZs may have delivered to PICs, they have coincided 
with a substantial increase in fishing effort and harvests ... the total 
harvest of tuna has more than doubled since the 1980s, and the region 
now supplies about 40% of the world’s global catch of tuna. The 
latest data suggests that catches of some tuna in the region may have 
peaked, such as yellowfin tuna, and that some stocks, such as bigeye 
tuna, may even be overexploited. Another worrying trend has been a 
70% decline in the catch per unit of effort of yellow-fin tuna in the 
western Pacific over the past 50 years, although the significance of 
this trend in terms of what it implies about declines in tuna 
populations is disputed.
491
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Most tuna caught by large purse seiner vessels were from Pacific Island States’ EEZ and 
Western and Central Pacific alone. This came to a total landed value worth of some US$ 2 
billion, with only about US$60 million in access fees paid to Pacific Island States.
492
 
 
Pacific Island States very much relied on their fisheries as primary sources of protein and, for 
some countries, some 40% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 2001, Papua New 
Guinea received $US5.84 million in access fees as part of their $US3.4 billion GDP; the Fiji 
Islands’ access fees for the same period of time were $US212,000 out of a total $1.8billion 
GDP.
493
 Employment in tuna industry related projects had an significant economic impact on 
the Pacific Island States.
494
 
 
 
Greenpeace argues that,  
 
Each year industrial fishers make over US$3 billion from the 
Pacific’s fish resources. Out of this, Pacific nations receive around 
6% mainly from licensing and access fees. These foreign fishing 
fleets take 900 per cent more than locally based vessels. For example 
in Niue, a fleet of small aluminium boats and outrigger canoes caught 
an estimated 100 tonnes of the main tuna species for the whole of 
2003 – a super seiner would catch this much fish in just two days. 
Left unchallenged, this exploitation will destroy our ocean and Pacific 
Island economies that have few other resources. Pacific communities 
will lose their greatest resource.
495
  
The exploitation and management of these strategic resources is a huge concern for the 
Pacific Island States.     
 
The Treaty is said to be working efficiently and to the benefit of all involved. It has been 
viewed as a model of international and fishery cooperation. Issues that arise are typically 
addressed in formal annual consultations between US Government and Pacific Island States 
representatives, or during informal discussions (which also take place on an annual basis). 
The Department of State has specific authority to act for the US.  
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Article 61 of the 1982 Convention outlines that coastal States’ right to determine their 
allowable catch, but at the same time specifies that they are instructed by Article 64 to 
cooperate with DWFN to establish the TAC.    
 
Article 62 of the 1982 Convention outlines the objectives regarding how coastal States 
harvest their resources; they must promote optimum utilization and give other states access to 
their surplus of allowable catch (as arranged in official agreements). The Article clearly 
indicated “ … the significance of the living resources of the area to the economy of the 
coastal State concerned … the requirements of developing States in harvesting part of the 
surplus and … minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually 
fished in the zone …”496 The Preamble of the Treaty makes a point of “Recognizing the 
strong dependence of the Pacific Island parties on fisheries resources and the importance of 
the continued abundance of those resources.”497  
  
It is also significant to acknowledge that Article 72 of the 1982 Convention prohibits any 
State from transferring fishing access rights to a third party. This stops access certificates 
being sold on for less to someone else, which would lead to economic disaster and 
environmental devastation for the Pacific Island States and their tuna resources.    
 
The lack of any other framework which could provide the basis for 
the determination of an allowable catch for the shared stocks poses 
some problems for the South Pacific countries. An additional layer to 
the complexity of determining an allowable catch is that other coastal 
States with important tuna fisheries in the region are not members of 
the Agency. These are Indonesia and the Philippines. It would not be 
possible to set a regional total allowable without consideration for the 
catch in Indonesia and the Philippines.
498
 
 
In the early stages of their involvement in the Pacific, US access fees under the American 
Tunaboat Association (ATA) were relatively low in comparison to that paid by the 
Japanese.
499
 It did not take long for this access fee to escalate due to the rapidly increasing 
demand for tuna on the world market and increased competition between and among DWFN 
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fleets. Other major issues helped alleviate pressure over access fees; for instance foreign aid 
began to be a part of fishing package agreements. These issues were also influential in the 
negotiation process.
500
  
 
Fisheries had been regarded as offering a “primary development opportunity for many 
developing Pacific Island States. These States are some of the poorest and smallest States in 
the world. For some, their EEZ tuna resources are their only significant resource and are vital 
to their national well being. Pacific Island States depend upon these stocks as a traditional 
and important source of food; as a critical form of revenue (US$60-70 million in access fees); 
for employment (25,000 regional jobs) and for income (expenditure by locally based vessels 
is worth US$130 million).
501
 
For industrial fisheries, tuna is the main target and distant-water 
fishing fleets from several countries outside the region participate 
through access agreements; in fact, Pacific island national fleets take 
only about 6.5 percent of the total catch of around 1 million tonnes. 
Small-scale coastal fisheries are divided between those targeting 
export products and those fishing for domestic consumption. Export 
production includes high-value products for specific niche markets, 
for example sea cucumbers, snapper and mother-of-pearl shells.
502
  
Another issue of concern for the region’s fisheries was the fact that the data and information 
seemed to be inaccurate and incomplete. The information and data used in policy-making 
were anecdotal. Pacific Island States were concerned that the fishing activities in the high 
seas would impact the fisheries stocks of the whole region and, subsequently, the economies 
of Pacific Island States.    
 
Hunt argues that,    
 
The future of tuna stocks is of great socio-economic importance to the 
region because stocks constitute the region's major renewable 
resource. The ability of tuna to generate substantial and sustainable 
income flows has recently come into focus because of the poor 
economic performance of most PICs (when compared with Caribbean 
island states, for example), a reduction in aid flowing to the region 
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and rapid and unsustainable exploitation of forest resources 
(principally of Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands).
503
  
 
The economic impact and revenue of the Treaty and other fishing arrangements in the region 
varies from government to government. For instance, in Kiribati and Tuvalu 30% and 50% of 
government revenue, respectively, came from tuna.
504
 Many are concerned about the amount 
paid to the Pacific Island States in access fees. As Joseph (Director of Marshall Islands 
Marine Resources Authority) puts it, “The amount and the value of the fishery taken out of 
the Pacific waters amounts to about four billion dollars. And by all assessments the Pacific 
Islands are not getting a fair share of that four billion dollars.”505   
 
Greenpeace states that:  
 
Powerful fishing nations use their financial clout to pressure 
developing coastal States to exchange access to their fish resources 
for cash payments or even aid. More often than not these legal 
agreements lead to resource depletion for the coastal State. This 
report is a detailed look at these access arrangements as they relate to 
tuna. It examines how they are used by powerful fishing nations to 
sustain their distant water fleets. It also shows the impact this has on 
the economies and natural resource sustainability of the coastal 
countries which sell the access.
506
 
 
The FFA was established in order to ensure the sustainability of Pacific Island fisheries 
resources. These resources should generate financial benefits through providing expertise for 
member States directly involved with fishery negotiations with DWFN, operating regional 
register fishing vessels and vessel satellite monitoring system.
507
 At the negotiation, both 
parties had their own individual bargaining advantages; the Pacific Island States have the 
largest tuna reserve in the world, while the US is the most powerful country in the world. 
This situation created interesting dynamics around the negotiation table. Other individual 
trade arrangements between certain Pacific Island States and the US also added to the 
atmosphere. 
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The development of local processing plants would benefit individual countries and the region 
as a whole economically.  
 
Most Pacific states are in the stage of sale of licenses, Kiribati is 
moving slowly to on-shore processing, while PNG, Fiji, Samoa and 
Solomon Islands have processing facilities and are developing 
national fleets. Other, cross cutting development considerations are: 
Proper development of the Fisheries Sector presupposes adequate 
national and regional development strategies to make the right 
decisions. Such strategies hardly exist in the Pacific region. 
Development of the sector should contribute to social and economic 
development, employment and food security and is dependent on 
good governance.
508
 
 
The development of local canneries would require local and foreign investments, who would 
need incentives to secure a constant flow of tuna for the local processing plants.
509
 The US 
purse seine fleet concentrated in the Western and Central Pacific, mainly due to their 
abundance of tuna and the waters being dolphin-free, as well as the capacity constraints on 
the fisheries resources in the Eastern Pacific.
510
 
 
A difficult issue when negotiating any fishing arrangement is that of the access fee: how 
much DWFN are willing to pay and whether this is acceptable to the Pacific Island States 
concerned. Access fees are always a sticky issue in any fishing arrangement.
511
  
 
Traditionally, fishing arrangements between the Pacific Island States and DWFN were 
predominantly based on aid and technical assistance.
512
 Recently, access attained via cash 
payments was allowed in order to create more flexible and lenient conditions.  
 
The FFA’s principal role was to negotiate DWFN’s optimum access fees and associated 
terms to help maximize advantages for the Pacific Island States.
513
 The most practical and 
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basic instrument for revenue generation from the region’s tuna resources lay in the selling of 
licenses to DWFN to fish within Pacific Island States’ waters. Even though the financial 
benefits generated for the Pacific Island States through selling licenses were not huge, they 
significantly contributed to national budgets.
514
  
 
Grynberg argues that,   
 
Access=Average Price of Tuna × Average Catch per Vessel × 
Minimum Rate of Return. This access fee formula or variants thereof 
have been used by Pacific Island countries as a method for calculating 
access fees for over a decade. On the basis of current estimates US 
purse seine owners are paying USD120,000 for access as compared 
with USD250,000 for access from Japan, Korea and Taiwan. EU 
purse seiners will pay an extra €65,000 (USD70,000) for access.515 
 
 
This formula contrasts sharply with the access fee provisions under the Treaty; 
the fee is highly subsidized and not related to the catch levels. This means 
vessels’ operators have no reason to under-report or mis-report.516 
 
The financial benefits reaped by Pacific Island States varied depending on location of the 
species fished and the size of national jurisdictions.
517
 While these financial benefits were 
based on those factors, they were also subject to variations in the market prices of the 
different species.
518
 For instance, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands (Marshalls), Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Solomon Islands 
(Solomons) cover 14 million sq. km.
519
 This equates to some 69 per cent of the total Pacific 
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Island States’ national jurisdiction, within which US and DWFN fishing activities have taken 
place.
520
  
 
Grynberg states that,  
 
The ‘access fees’ are usually set by negotiation between a PIC and 
representatives of a distant water fleet. The fee in the purse seine 
fishery is normally a percentage of the expected catch for a year 
multiplied by its expected price. The Japanese currently pay a fee of 
about 5% of expected value to fish under such bilateral agreements. In 
other cases, there is a lump sum demanded for access. For example, 
while Kiribati sets fees of approximately 5% of the value of catch 
under bilateral access arrangements for purse seine fishing, it has 
been charging the longline vessels of Korea and Japan $US181 000 
per vessel.
521
 
 
Hunt asserts that in 1993, the access fee levels were estimated to be 3.1-5.1% and that, with a 
total of $US60 million paid by DWFN to the Pacific Island States, in contrast to the usual 
bilateral fishing arrangements, the US operates under a regional agreement that sets the 
annual fee at $US18 million (for 10 years under the 1993 agreement). The US Tuna Boat 
Association is subsidized by the US government, which provides $US14 million; the 
association itself contributes $US4 million to the fee of $US18 million.  Under the Treaty a 
$US1.8 is also paid annually to the project development fund (PDF) by the FFA.
522
 
 
 
Hunt also argues that, 
 
Fee levels under bilateral agreements were often less than they could 
have been due to under- and non-reporting of catches to the SPC, 
particularly by Taiwan and the Republic of Korea. Mandatory port 
transhipment, begun in June 1993, has improved purse seine catch 
data, now virtually complete. As well as the indirect benefits of more 
accurate catch data in terms of setting of access fees there are direct 
benefits of transhipment to PICs hosting the purse seiners.
523
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 The Treaty is the only multilateral agreement with the US in force and commentators 
describe it as an example of how fishing arrangements should be, because it allows for 
increases in access fees. This makes it unlike bilateral fishing arrangements, where Pacific 
Island States compete among themselves and the access fee goes down.
524
 
   
Some Pacific Island States find it difficult to co-operate with others because it would be 
disadvantageous and it does not serve their best economic interests. The Nauru Group is an 
example of effective co-operation among certain Pacific Island States as best serves their 
interests. Ultimately, Pacific Islands States have no choice but to stick together for the benefit 
and interest of the region as a whole.
525
 
 
Greenpeace indicates that there have been studies that show that reductions in the number of 
vessels fishing in the region increase access fees for the Pacific Island States. These increased 
between 10-40% and in a “modelling exercise conducted in 2000, theoretical reduction of 
Pacific seine fleet effort to less than 50% of 1996 levels showed fleet revenues would fall by 
only 15% but that costs would fall by 30%. Most significantly, resource rent (i.e. access fees) 
would have more than doubled and returns to coastal States from tuna access fees would have 
risen by 39% under the existing fee structure.”526  
 
Throughout the Treaty negotiations, the access fee issue was among the most difficult to 
resolve. It took four meetings for both parties to resolve the fee issue, and each involved hard 
bargaining on both sides.
527
 This was primarily due to the US offering largely technical 
assistance, when the Pacific Island States wanted more in the way of cash payments.
528
  
Under current conditions most analysts agree that the distant water 
tuna fleets in the WCPO (and throughout the world) are operating 
under very tight margins and that access fees in the range of 5% to 
6% of catch value, which most Pacific Island Countries seek and are 
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able to achieve, are near or at the maximum which the fleets will 
pay.
529
  
 
 
There are economic employment benefits in the region; for instance, the canneries in 
American Samoa provide jobs for thousands of people within and outside Samoa.
530
 
 
The deep division between Pacific Island States and DWFN, especially in terms of the 
management and allocation of fishing rights, has prevented the Pacific Island States from 
fully benefitting from their tuna resources.
531
 This was abundantly clear during the Treaty 
negotiation. Even the negotiations of the 1995 Agreement and the Fish Stocks Convention 
were effected. It seems that the divisions between the two groups may not be resolved any 
time soon, because their vital interests are represented by their opposing views on the issues.  
 
Industrial tuna fishing is by nature a high risk, high skilled and capital 
intensive industry (particularly purse seine). By the late 1980s when 
Pacific Island States first started seriously considering establishing 
their own tuna industries (partly in response to ongoing low access 
fees) … Island States discovered that they had access to the fish, but 
not the far more lucrative distribution and retail parts of the industry 
... In sum, by the time the Pacific Islanders were ready to invest, tuna 
harvesting and canning had become unprofitable, but going into raw 
material trading or retail/distribution, which were profitable activities, 
was not a serious option for the Pacific Island countries.
532
  
 
In November 1986, the Pacific Island States and American delegations agreed upon the 
access payment of US$12 million per annum for a period five years started from June 14, 
1988 until June 15, 1993.
533
 Breaking down this payment, the US paid US$10 million in 
cash, while US$2 million was paid by the US Fisheries Industry (ATA pays US$50,000 per 
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 The discussion on access fee payment took four sessions, and finally both parties agreed for $US 12 millions 
for five years at the fourth meeting held in Nuku’alofa, Tonga 1986. 
vessel – 35 minimum and US$250,000 technical assistance).534 All payments pursuant to the 
Treaty and other subsidiary Agreements were received by the Administrator (the Director of 
the FFA) for distribution and allocation purposes. This amount was estimated to be nine per 
cent of the landed value of tuna caught in the Pacific Island State parties, which almost 
doubled the fee paid by other DWFN currently fishing in the region.
535
 Hence, the Treaty 
produced the best fishing access fee outcome ever concluded in any fishing arrangement in 
the region’s history of fisheries agreements.536   
 
The access fee was divided into two main pools: some 85 per cent was allocated to Pacific 
Island States based on catch ratio, the remaining 15 per cent distributed to all Forum member 
countries excluding Australia and New Zealand. The formulae of access fee distribution, 15% 
distributed for all Pacific Island parties and remaining 85% distributed base on catch ratio in 
their respective EEZ; not only a fair formulae for all the Pacific Island States, but also the 
highest return by far.
537
 
 
The 15 per cent comprised of project aid and technical development with two funding 
recipients: (1) an Economic Development Fund, dealing with small fisheries development 
projects and subject to United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
allocations of US$66,666.67 per country each year; and (2) a Technical Assistance Fund to 
finance consultancies, training and relevant meetings, for which each country was allocated 
US$16,666.67 annually.     
 
The access fee was reviewed during negotiation for a further extension of the Treaty. The 
FFA Annual Report summarized the access fee received by the FFA as the administrator 
under the Treaty in 2006:  
  
A total of $22,099,344 (2006: $21,861,481) was received from the 
US as payment for the 19th licensing period, and interest receipts. 
From this amount, the US Government contributed US$18 million, of 
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which $17,820,000 was received in June 2006, and the balance of 
$180,000 paid in September 2006. Distribution of the funds was 
based on the current procedures provided in Article 1 of Schedule 1 
of the Internal Agreement. The procedures require that a total of 
US$18 million is to be distributed as follows: Administration budget 
is deducted first; A total of US$1.778 million for Project 
Development Fund (PDF) is then deducted; 15% from the balance is 
distributed equally to the 16 Pacific Island Parties; and 85% from the 
balance is distributed based on the catch made in the Parties’ 
waters.
538
 
 
 
In June 2006, the Project Development Fund payment received by the FFA totalled US$1.778 
million, which was distributed equally to all Pacific Island parties (US$111,125 each), apart 
from Australia, which donated its share back to the FFA Secretariat, and New Zealand, which 
donated its share to Tokelau.
539
 In June of the same year, the 15% (a total of US$2,355,360) 
was distributed equally to the Pacific Island parties, with each of the 16 Pacific Island States 
receiving US$147,210 each.
540
 In December of the same year, the 85% allocation of a total 
US$13,979,368 was distributed to the Pacific Island parties in December 2006 based on the 
catch ration agreed upon under the Treaty.
541
 
 
From an economic perspective, the access fee is the way to go for the Pacific Island  
States, even though the estimation of the ‘right’ cost is always challenging. As Hunt puts it,  
… the estimation of rents is very difficult--fishers always claim that 
costs are high and rents low. In any case rents vary from vessel to 
vessel, fleet to fleet and from season to season. Therefore, the usual 
method employed to extract the resource owner's share of the rent in 
the region is a fee based on the expected value of catch. While the 
proportion of value of catch and licence fee methods are distortionary 
(compared with a royalty) and transfer risk to the fishing nation, they 
are easy to calculate and provide a relatively more certain level of 
income for the resource owners than would royalties.
542
 
 
Imposing certain terms and conditions on DWFN fleets to compliment the access fee would 
increase the economic benefits gained by the Pacific Island States through off-shore 
employment and other activities.
543
 At the same time, generally DWFN industrial purse-seine 
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and longline fleets create only a marginal number of job opportunities for coastal States and 
economic connections attached to domestic ports and markets.
544
 Maximising access fees for 
the Pacific Island States seemed to be the only viable way, yet other options have been 
developed—for instance, Fiji used a small-scale, long-line model to create a successful 
export, while Solomon Islands have created a substantial bait fishery.
545
 
 
The classical example of such collaboration in the region is the Treaty 
on Fisheries between the Governments of certain Pacific Island States 
and the Government of the United States. Under the Treaty, the 
United States Government and tuna industry pay for the right to fish. 
In consideration of payment of such fees, the South Pacific countries 
agree to provide access for up to 40 US purse seiners in their EEZs. 
US purse seiners operate in all sixteen EEZs of the South Pacific 
countries on similar terms and conditions although individual 
reporting requirements have to be complied with when fishing in the 
EEZs.
546
 
 
The Pacific Island States are just like “those coastal States with little capacity to develop their 
own fishery-based industries, engaging in the resource renter strategy may remain the only 
option. It is therefore essential that access agreements are negotiated according to principles 
and standards that safeguard sustainability, ensure the maximum benefits to the coastal State 
(the custodian of the resource for its people), and ensure that the risks arising from 
overfishing, financial losses and socio-economic pitfalls are minimized.”547 
 
Part 1, Schedule 2 of Annex II of the Treaty outlined the access fee payment to be paid by the 
US and is quoted below.   
1. The amounts payable as set forth in this paragraph: 
(a) Annual industry payments shall be made as follows:   
(i) for the first annual Licensing Period, a lump sum of US$1.75 
million for 35 vessels, with the next five licenses to be made available 
for the same pro-rate payment as the first 35 licenses, and an 
additional 10 licenses to be made available at US $60,000 per vessel; 
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(ii) for the subsequent annual Licensing Periods, 40 vessels licenses 
calculated on the same basis as the 40 vessel licenses in sub-
paragraph (a) and indexed to the price of fish as set forth below, with 
10 additional licenses to the made available at US$  60,000 per vessel 
and indexed to the price of fish as set forth below.  
 
The US had to pay US$50, 000 per vessel for the first 40 vessels, and US$60,000 per vessel 
for ten extra vessels.
548
 A total of 50 licenses would be made available for American fishing 
vessels during the five year licensing period.  
Hanich and Tsamenyi argue that,  
 
There is no doubt that EEZs have brought Pacific Island States some 
benefits and increased economic opportunities. Access fees deliver 
needed financial contributions to governments … The EEZs have also 
become an important motivation for DWFNs to donate foreign aid 
into the Pacific. For example, fisheries access was the original 
motivation for one of the region’s largest donors, Japan, and 
continues to be a major factor driving its Pacific aid policies. In 1998-
99, Japan donated approximately US$152.7 million of bi-lateral aid to 
the region.
549
 
  
 
It is estimated that 10% or less of the total catch is taken by Pacific Island States, which 
makes up about 41 % of the catch coming from their EEZs. Approximately 3.5 - 6% (or 
around $60-70 million) of the value of the catch is returned to Pacific Island States in access 
fees.
550
 These figures are self-explanatory in terms of offering little revenue to the Pacific 
Island States, with the bulk of the benefit going to the DWFN.     
 
Schedule 2 of the Treaty also outlined vessel payment calculations, as cited below: 
(ii) Calculation and Application of Indexing Factor 
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A. To obtain the indexing factor by which the Adjusted Individual 
Vessel Payment shall be calculated, divide the Average Estimated 
Landed Value for the preceding four quarters by the Base Price.  
 
B. To obtain the Adjusted Individual Vessel Payment, multiply the 
Base Vessel Payment by the indexing factor obtained in Paragraph 
(ii) A. 
 
C. In no case shall the Adjusted Individual Vessel Payment be less 
than the Base Vessel Payment. 
 
The definitions of these indexing factors for calculation of the vessel payment were outlined 
in Part 1(b)(a-g), Schedule 2, Annex II of the Treaty.
551
 The Treaty’s Administrator had to 
consult US representatives when the price categories changed in order to revise the 
formula.
552
 In addition:  
There shall be no pro-ratio of the Base Vessel Payment or the 
Adjusted Individual Vessel Payment. There shall be no refunds of the 
Base Vessel Payment or the Adjusted Individual Vessel Payment 
following license issuance pursuant to Annex II.
553
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The extended Treaty increased the access payment from US$12 million under the original 
Treaty to US$18 million per annum. The Administrator was to make available a maximum of 
55 licenses for American fishing vessels over the ten year licensing period. 
 
Additional agreements were added under the extended Treaty relating to payment procedures 
and distribution. These Agreements included the Agreement Among Pacific Island States 
Concerning the Implement and Administration of the Treaty on Fisheries  Between the 
Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of 
America (Internal Agreement); and the Agreement Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA Agreement).  
 
The FFA Agreement provided procedures for the allocation of funds referred to within the 
principal extended Treaty for the purposes of developing the Pacific Island States’ fisheries 
resources and the role of the FFA in relation to the allocation of the fund on behalf of the 
Pacific Island State parties pursuant to the Treaty.  
 
Pursuant to the Agreement, the FFA shall control and administer the fund. It is agreed that the 
fund will solely be used for the purposes of supporting economic development in accordance 
with section 531(e) of the 1961 US Foreign Assistance Act.  
 
Under the FFA Agreement, both the FFA and the US emphasized the need to:  
… continue and strengthen the ties of friendship, understanding and 
co-operation which have historically linked the United States and the 
peoples of the member States of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries 
Agency.
554
 
 
In addition, the Preamble of the principal Treaty noted the commitment of the Pacific Island 
States to fully developing their economies by providing employment for the people of the 
region. Also expressed was the belief that economic co-operation would benefit both the 
people of the South Pacific and the US.  
 
Article 4 of the Agreement outlined the amount of the fund and its specific purpose quoted 
below in full.  
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4.1 During the time this Agreement is in force, the Government of the 
United States shall make annual cash payments to the FFA for the 
fund – from the Agency for the International Development – in an 
average amount of fourteen million U.S. dollars (US$14,000,000), 
subject to the availability of funds for this purpose. The Government 
of the United States shall provide such fund in accordance with either 
of the following: 
 
(a) fourteen million U.S. dollars (US$14,000,000) annually; or 
(b) ten million U.S. dollars (US$10,000,000) for 1993 and fourteen 
million U.S. dollars (US$14,000,000) annually thereafter. An 
additional four million U.S. dollars (US$4,000,000), otherwise 
payable in respect of 1993, is payable in accordance with a schedule 
to be notified by the Government of the United States following the 
entry into force of this Agreement.  
 
4.2 The FFA shall, in accordance with Article 3.1 above, obtain 
annual assurance from the Pacific Islands States party to the Treaty on 
Fisheries referred to in Article 2 above that any payments made under 
this Agreement were used solely to support economic development 
purposes, and not for military or paramilitary uses. Nothing in this 
paragraph shall be construed to confer audit rights under this 
Agreement other than as provided in Article 3.3 above.  
 
The Internal Agreement stipulated the terms and conditions regarding how the fund should be 
distributed and allocated. Any payment received by the Administrator pursuant to the Treaty 
would be deposited in American currency in an ensured bank account in the Pacific region, 
allowing the fund to earn the highest interest available.
555
 It was the sole responsibility of the 
Administrator to distribute funds under the Treaty.
556
 The auditor of the FFA was required to 
audit the account in relation to payments made pursuant to the Treaty prior to the distribution 
of funding.  
 
The distribution of the fund pursuant to the Treaty started by deducting FFA administrative 
costs, which were outlined previously. The remaining fund was then divided into two pools. 
The first 15 per cent (an estimated $US1.23 million) was distributed equally among the 
Pacific Island State parties. Australia donated its received share to the core budget of the 
FFA.
557
 The remaining 85 per cent (an estimated US$6.93 million) would be distributed 
based on the volume of catches from the Licensing Areas of the respective Pacific Island 
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State parties. Most amounts were distributed between Papua New Guinea and the Federated 
States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Palau and Marshall Islands.
558
  
Access fees, however, represent only a small fraction of the value of 
the tuna fish harvested by foreign vessels. Currently, average access 
fees are a little more than 4 percent of the value of the catch (that is, 
the reported catch - illegal fishing by some countries may be high). 
To capture additional benefits many of the islands are endeavoring to 
develop further their own commercial fishing capabilities as well as 
improve their port, fish processing and transshipment facilities 
associated with offshore fishing operations.
559
 
 
 
Investing in fisheries development is a risky undertaking and governments in the region may 
only provide assistance for the fisheries industry through building infrastructure and other 
initiatives.
560
  
 
The distribution of funds by the Administrator should be carried out as soon as practical, but 
no later than six months after the end of the Licensing Period.
561
 The Administrator should 
also maintain a separate fund for the observer costs stipulated in Part 7, Annex I of the 
Treaty.
562
 The operator of the American fishing vessels was made responsible for the costs of 
the observers, which were paid annually as a lump sum to the Administrator.
563
 The formula 
for the observer payment was based on the:  
… number of licensed United States vessels multiplied by the average 
annual number of trips per vessel for the latest licensing period for 
which information is available multiplied by 20 percent multiplied by 
the cost per trip (US$4,000 equates lump sum payment. In addition in 
the first two years following 15 June 1993, an additional payment of 
US$15,000 per year for training shall be made to the 
Administrator.
564
  
 
The Administrator was required to apply the fund in the manner specified by the Pacific 
Island State parties at an annual consultation, pursuant to Article 7 of the Treaty.  
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The Pacific Island States should not make the mistake of relying too strongly on the 
economic hope offered by the 1982 Convention; they should continue to promote the 
economic development of their fisheries resources and to secure overexploitation.
565
 
 
Initial attempts by the PICs to obtain reasonable access to resource 
rents accruing from their fisheries were hampered by their negotiation 
experiences with the Japanese, who in the early 1980s harvested 
about three-quarters of the tuna stocks. Moreover, early experiences 
of multilateralism in the 1970s in other areas, such as air 
transportation, which have been less than successful have made some 
PICs reluctant to collaborate and bargain as a group.
566
  
 
The multilateral approach to fishing arrangements proved unpopular with some DWFN, 
particularly the Japanese, who usually manipulated the negotiation using a ‘divide and 
conquer’ strategy by refusing to negotiate multilaterally, leaving the Pacific Island States to 
compete against eachother.
567
 Cooperation among Pacific Island States in terms of seeking 
better access fees was the only way to go in terms of collective negotiation. The Nauru Group 
spearheaded this and, subsequently, the Treaty. At the same time, the DWFN started to 
compete amongst themselves, which was a reverse of the bilateral approach and access fees 
increased as result. This improvement was basically determined by the Pacific Island States 
shift from a bilateral to a multilateral approach—DWFN had no choice in the matter, because 
the owners of the tuna resources had spoken.  
 
Although some cooperation between PICs has been successful, it may 
be possible that PICs could improve potential payoffs through further 
co-operation, particularly on economic issues ... better bargaining 
power in terms of access fees with DWFNs from the current mean 
level of about 40% of the total rent … increased resource rent and 
greater population resilience from moving to lower rates of 
exploitation that could more than double the resource rent from the 
fisheries.
568
  
 
Cooperation is not necessarily a bad thing and both the Pacific Island States and the DWFN 
would be better off if they embraced cooperation and negotiation in a way benefitted both 
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groups.
569
 Fisheries management is nothing new; fisheries resources to which people have 
open access cannot be maintained if subjected to a rational level of exploitation.
570
 The 
region’s fisheries sector is among the primary drivers of Pacific Island States’ economic 
development. In some Pacific Island States, the fishery is the power house of their economic 
development.
571
  
 
The promotion of sustainable fisheries and the implementation of 
regional and national arrangements to ensure that fisheries resources 
are utilized rationally are major social and economic policy issues in 
the South Pacific and most states and territories are attempting to deal 
with overfishing of inshore resources.
572
 
 
DWFN’s fleets are attracted to the Pacific region’s fisheries resources mainly due to 
unavoidable fishing restrictions and/or declining fisheries stocks in other parts of the world. 
HMS resources are highly mobile and catches fluctuate between seasons annually.
573
 The 
Pacific Island States should also work hard on the implementation and enforcement of the 
terms and conditions of fisheries agreements—including the Treaty—in order to maintain 
their tuna resources in a sustainable manner.     
 
The harmonization of terms and conditions of access for foreign 
fishing vessels is intended to provide a framework in which all fishing 
vessels operate under the same regulations. If a multinational fishery 
is to be managed effectively, fishing vessels must comply with the 
same terms and conditions regardless of which EEZ they fish.
574
 
 
The harmonization of the Pacific Island States fisheries resources established due to the high 
mobility of both the tuna and the fishing fleets. Harmonized terms and conditions include 
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licensing, not transshiping at sea, full access being given to authorized officers by operators 
and submitting catch logs for operations.
575
 
 
Parris and Grafton argues that,  
A major strategy pursued by PICs to achieve the desired economic 
benefits from their tuna fisheries has been ‘domestication’, or the 
process of developing and/or then integrating domestically located 
harvesting and processing sectors to serve export markets.
576
 
 
Pacific Island States encouraged domestication through growing their domestic tuna industry. 
Industry development conditions should be attached to access arrangements.
577
 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The future of the Pacific Island States’ ability to economically benefit from their fisheries 
through either selling fishing licenses or direct exploitation depends on the how HMS stocks 
in the region are managed and exploited,
578
 through relevant regional and international 
instruments. Parris and Grafton argue that,  
PICs have chosen to focus on the harvesting sector in terms of their 
public sector investment. Unfortunately, the harvesting of tuna 
generates highly variable revenues, requires large upfront sunk costs 
and substantial technical requirements. The high investment costs and 
the fickle nature of fishing has meant that mistakes have been made 
that are financially burdensome for some PICs.
579
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Lack of natural resources in the South Pacific has remained the major impediment to Pacific 
Island States’ economic development.580 Even though tuna resources exist in abundance 
throughout the region, offering potential long-term economic advantages, the essential 
infrastructure needed to develop these potential resources is lacking.
581
   
 
Nevertheless, Pacific Island State parties see an opportunity in the Treaty to develop their 
fisheries resources. As demonstrated in this Chapter, the Treaty does not differ from other 
fishing agreements in regard to selling fishing licenses to the DWFN. However, access 
payments made by the US under the Treaty are higher than those for any other DWFN fishing 
in the region. That premium is more a result of US political and military interests in the South 
Pacific than it is a commitment to a genuine economic program designed to benefit the 
Pacific Island States (in terms of the long-term development of their tuna resources). Overall, 
the Treaty did not alter the economic processes nor benefit the Pacific Island State parties as 
expected. 
 
The financial benefits obtained by the Pacific Island State parties are relatively minor when 
compared to the substantial economic benefits gained by the US under the Treaty.
582
 
Generally, the access fee paid by US under the Treaty and other DWFN fishing agreements 
has been estimated to be around five per cent of the value of canning tuna.
583
 Accordingly, 
the US has benefited both politically and economically.  
 
The higher access payment package provided by the Treaty has underlined the close 
cooperation that has developed between Pacific Island State parties and the FFA. Although 
the FFA performed admirably throughout the Treaty negotiation, it has yet to meet the 
                                                          
580
 Fisheries in the Pacific: Coherence Between Development and Commercial Objectives, prepared by DG 
DEV/AIDCO Fisheries Task Force (include B. Van Helden/D. Friedrichs, T. Schmale, H. Pilgaard (DEV/C/4); 
J.Prade, J. Favre (DEV/B/4); F.Affinito/V.Dowd (DEV/C/I) & R.Noe (AIDCO C/5), Pacific Issues Paper No. 1, 
I\fed\gener\fish9.doc, Brussels, 18 February (2002:4-5). 
581
 Taking the Tuna Out of the Can: Rescue Plan for the World’s Favorite Fish, Greenpeace International, 
Amsterdam (2007). 
582
 Parris, H. and Grafton, R.Q. “Tuna-Led Sustainable Development in the Pacific”, Asia Pacific School of 
Economics and Governments, Australian National Univesity, Canberra (2005:4). 
583
 Hunt, C. Pacific Development Sustained: Policy for Pacific Environment, Australian National University, 
Canberra (1998: 62); See also Christy, C. Forms of Foreign Participation in Fisheries: Coastal State Policy 
(1983); Clement-Jones, R. Public Investment and Taxation: Approaches to Investment, East-West Center, 
Honolulu (1987). 
challenge of adopting a more aggressive position in promoting the sustainable development 
of Pacific Island States’ fisheries resources into the longer term.584  
 
The Pacific Island States’ ability to take advantage of and sustain the potential economic 
benefits of their fisheries resource depends on how they manage these resources. 
Management requires the collection of accurate and complete data, which can inform the 
creation of an effective, sustainable model of exploitation. Environmental conservation and 
management initiatives should also be part of the access package.  
 
In the Pacific, access to fisheries has typically been granted on a 
bilateral basis, either between a DWFN government and a Pacific 
government, or between a Pacific government and a foreign fishing 
association or company. Agreements are usually renegotiated each 
year and determined on the basis of the previous year’s price and 
catch. Since the 1970s, fees paid to Pacific ACP states have slowly 
risen from around four percent of the catch value to the current rate of 
around five or six percent.
585
 
 
Bilateral fishing arrangements are secretive in nature. It is very hard to find out the exact 
fee and the other components that make up the whole package. This creates opportunities 
for corruption.
586
 
  
For the Pacific Island States to rectify the overall imbalance that exists between the access 
fees obtained and the benefits gained from the US (and other DWFN), they must urgently 
consider other options. These include direct foreign investment through joint ventures, which 
could provide employment opportunities for local populations.
587
 Locally-owned fisheries 
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industries require access to relevant fishing equipment and technologies in order to compete 
with foreign operators in the region and to access the world markets with their fish products.  
 
Grynberg argues that,  
 
The US agreement with extensive subsidies is far more conducive to 
sustainability because it is multilateral in nature, transparent to all 
parties and in large measure respecting of environmental and marine 
standards established in the Pacific Islands. The US treaty is widely 
regarded in fisheries circles as a model and that US Distant Water 
Fishing Fleet behaviour in terms of sustainability and monitoring is 
exemplary. The USA is widely seen as the DWFN that is least 
involved in under-reporting and misreporting. The reason for this is 
because the treaty is based on access fees that are decoupled from fish 
catches. Thus whether the US fleets reports catches on the high seas 
or on the EEZ of the Pacific Island Countries it will not affect the 
amount of access it will pay in the current years. Thus the US Treaty 
imposes an access fee regime that is the equivalent of a lump sum tax 
and thus does not distort behaviour.
588
 
 
The development and environmental conservation of the fisheries resources in the region is of 
paramount importance for the Pacific Island States now and the future. These resources are 
vital sources of food and have a serious impact on the welfare of the region’s population. 
However, the adoption of the 1982 Convention (and the concept of EEZ in particular) has 
brought about some advantages and some disadvantages for the Pacific Island States. For 
instance, the land-sea ratio is now 1:51.
589
 
 
Another consideration for PICs, in terms of the domestication of their 
fishing industry, is the very substantial cost associated with fisheries 
management. In a number of countries outside of the region the costs 
of fisheries management exceed the potential benefits from the 
fisheries. This suggests that a ‘go-it-alone’ strategy in terms of 
harvesting and managing tuna may be a costly exercise for PICs that 
may generate few, if any, net benefits. The question for advocates of 
‘domestication’ is, therefore, what should be the nature of the 
partnerships between PICs and DWFNs that will maximise the 
payoffs to the Pacific states.
590
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 In addition, a regional cannery could potentially be run, operated and managed by the Pacific 
Island States through the FFA. These developments would nevertheless have to face the 
difficult problem of gaining access to the US and other markets. Appropriate technology and 
expertise would be required; governments of the region would have to be directly involved in 
the complete process, which would extend from initial negotiation through to the possible 
establishment of a regional cannery. Getting this venture to work will require strong central 
government direction and economic vision. Pacific Island States also need to get directly 
involved in negotiations with the US government and the American fisheries industry over 
protectionist measures taken against overseas fish products entering US markets.  
 
Relative socio-political and economic circumstances among Pacific Island States would be 
constantly challenging in terms of the environmental conservation and management of the 
region’s fisheries resources. As a region, the Pacific Island States share common conservation 
and management interests in terms of tuna resources and yet have their own separate national 
development strategies that are not always aligned:   
With the exception of their dealings with the US in which they act 
collectively, most dealings with DWFNs have been through bilateral 
dialogue. While the advantage is that they are able to tailor the 
outcomes to suit their national interests, DWFNs have been 
successful in playing one country off against another resulting is a 
dissipated return in access fees. It is argued that collective bargaining 
and having a centralized licensing system would strengthen rather 
than weaken the South Pacific countries negotiating powers and 
potentially increase revenue from the resource.
591
 
 
Greenpeace asserts that while maximizing economic revenues for the Pacific Island States’ 
fisheries by reducing effort and fishing capacity would reduce pressure on fisheries stocks:  
… it will not alone guarantee that tuna fishing will be sustainable. 
Under current tuna access agreements, coastal States assume all the 
risks associated with resource depletion as the fees they receive are 
based on a percentage of the present-day cash-value of the estimated 
catch taken by foreign fleets.
592
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The socio-economic desperation among Pacific Island States puts pressure on fish stocks; 
individual governments feel the pressure of their legal obligations under regional and 
international environmental instruments and institutions.  
 
The annual average tuna harvest from the region is currently about 1 
million metric tonnes with a landed value close to US$1.7 billion. 
Approximately 90 per cent of this catch is harvested by distant-water 
fishing nations who pay access fees of approximately 4 per cent of 
their gross revenue of the catch.
593
 
 
It has been argued that the access fee is very much under market value, although a proper risk 
premium for vessel owners is justified.
594
 
 
HMS is the most important tuna species in the region, with a US$3 billion price tag. It 
provides Pacific Island States with about 10% of their combined GPD, as well as providing 
employment for 6-8% of the population (21,000-31,000 people).
595
 Therefore, taking the time 
to consistently, seriously consider how tuna resources in the region are exploited will be the 
key to maintaining sustainable development in the long term. Even though the Treaty was 
lucrative deal from the Pacific Island States’ perspective (in terms of both monetary aid and 
technical assistance),
596
 careful further consideration is required regarding the key provisions 
for the future. As one international group of activists have argued: 
 
Pacific Island governments need to realise that the key to increasing 
income from their tuna fisheries in the long term, is to cut fishing 
effort in the over-fished and unsustainable fisheries in the short term. 
This is also how they will preserve the valuable tuna resource for 
future generations.
597
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Chapter Six 
 
Conceptual Analysis of Key Issues 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses some of the key concepts relating to the Treaty on Fisheries between 
the governments of certain Pacific Island States and the United States of America (Treaty). 
These concepts cover international politics and diplomacy, including trade-offs between 
powerful United States of America and its foreign policy interests and the Pacific Island 
States depicted in the Treaty, and are outlined in terms of their possible implications and 
applications. This discussion highlights how these concepts relate to the Treaty.  
 
Regional fisheries conservation co-operation among Pacific Island States is discussed 
with reference to the policies of existing regional organizations. Here we identify the 
roles played by each organization with reference to implementation and enforcement. 
This leads to a discussion about the traditional conservation and management of 
fisheries as an alternative and how this could now serve as a relevant and effective 
mechanism.  
Ideological rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union in the Pacific played a crucial 
role in the formulation of the Treaty. This demonstrated US foreign policy in action, 
with the negotiation process producing an international agreement. This discussion also 
includes political and diplomatic relations between the Pacific Island States and the US, 
and the emergence of key new players in the region’s politics and diplomacy, namely 
Japan, China and Taiwan. During the life of the Treaty, dramatic changes have occurred 
in the region’s geo-politics following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
 
The Treaty is something of a test case that illustrates the contrast of political attitudes 
between the power of the US on the one hand and the much weaker, poorer Pacific Island 
States on the other. Here, the trade-offs between the two sides are analyzed by outlining the 
rationale underlying their initial intentions and what emerged as the final version of the 
Treaty. The questions pertain to what the Pacific Island States and the US achieved and how 
they reached particular outcomes.  
 
The relationship established between the US and the Pacific Island States and developed over 
the past fourteen years under the Treaty has yielded benefits in other related areas.
598
 One 
important example is the negotiations to establish the Convention for the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean 
(Fish Stocks Convention). The distinction between the Fish Stocks Convention and the 
Treaty is that, the Treaty is primarily an access arrangement for US vessels, while the new 
Convention establishes conservation and management measures to be adhered to by all 
countries and fishing entities with vessels operating in the region.
599
 One key issue that the 
US hopes to see addressed under the Treaty is the issue of excess fishing capacity and the 
prospect of too many vessels catching too many fish.
600
  
The Treaty and the Fish Stocks Convention form a strong foundation for US involvement and 
cooperation with the States of the Western and Central Pacific.
601
 This was based on 
American tuna fleet operating in the region, which widened and strengthened relations 
between governments and the commercial interests and fisheries sector and was the main 
source of close cooperation between the Pacific Island States and the US.  
The South Pacific Regional Environment Program (SPREP) established some 15 years ago 
aimed to protect the region’s environment and its sustainable development in close 
cooperation with Australia, New Zealand and the US.
602
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SPREP is the best opportunity for us to both influence regional 
Pacific environmental policies and encourage coordinated approaches 
on environmental and sustainable development issues. With greater 
commercial development, the region’s unique wildlife and plants are 
at risk. With a decreased USAID presence in the region, US 
participation in SPREP sends a strong signal that the Pacific region 
remains a priority for us.
603
 
 
Tuna (as raw material and in finished products) are very popular globally in comparison to 
other fisheries and therefore demand is always high. At the same time, the threat of over 
exploitation and the depletion of tuna resources is very real. 
  
Tuna is one of the world’s favourite fish. It provides a critical part of 
the diet for millions of poor people, as well as being at the core of the 
world’s luxury sashimi markets. But global tuna stocks are under 
threat. Many tuna species are now listed as either endangered or 
critically endangered. In fact, global tuna stocks are disappearing. 
Stocks of the most iconic and valuable of all the tuna species, the 
magnificent bluefin, are on the brink of collapse. Those of other 
species, such as bigeye and yellowfin, are fully or over-exploited in 
all oceans.
604
 
 
The rapid increase in distant water fishing nations (DWFN) fleets from all over the world 
fishing for tuna is likely to have an adverse effect on the region’s tuna resources. Several 
decades ago, the world’s appetite for tuna increased the number and capacity of tuna fishing 
vessels of DWFN (include the US) in the Pacific’s tuna fishing grounds and while this may 
seem alright now, the situation is not immune from the global over exploitation trend.
605
 
 
Dealing with DWFN fleets was a constant challenge for Pacific Island States in terms of 
monitoring and policing. The concept of a Regional Register aimed to collect relevant 
information about fishing vessels for monitoring purposes; access consideration was given to 
vessels in the Register with good standing.
606
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There is major concern within the governance and management of the Pacific Island States’ 
tuna fishery that the existing strategies may be insufficient to secure long-term sustainability 
and to ensure that the rate of harvest is not greater than the regeneration rate.
607
 An ‘act-now’ 
approach is definitely required to prevent the depletion of the region’s HMS stocks.  
 
Regional Cooperation in Fisheries Conservation and Management  
 
In the South Pacific, there are 30 Pacific Island States, including 14 independent States, eight 
self-governing States and eight colonies.
608
 This comprises a population of five million 
people (0.1 percent of the world’s population) and 10,000 islands, which support the greatest 
diversity of cultures, languages and history of any region in the world. A marine economy 
under a traditional subsistence system was the traditional practice in this setting. This 
persisted until European contact arrived, introducing Western ideologies including 
capitalism. 
 
The marine politics of the Pacific Ocean were further accelerated by an introduction of 
technologies signalling a new era in the exploration and exploitation of the region’s marine 
resources.
609
 Subsequently, the discovery of tuna changed the region’s political and 
diplomatic relations—not only between and among Pacific Island States, but with foreign 
fishing nations as well.
610
 The huge demand for tuna in world markets attracted foreign 
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fishing nations into the region and illegal fishing activities became common practice.
611
 
These violations occurred because Pacific Island States lacked the resources needed to 
properly conduct effective surveillance and patrolling of their waters.  
 
The Pacific Island States felt ignored, notwithstanding the protests that they made through 
various diplomatic channels about the need to control tuna poaching activities.
612
 
Collectively, the need to harness group resources to end such exploitation was recognized. 
This realization motivated the establishment of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency 
(FFA) in 1979.
613
 The Treaty, in turn, resulted in part from the Pacific Island States’ 
frustration over their lack of control over tuna fishing without a licence in their EEZs. Hence 
the Treaty was seen as a means of safeguarding and protecting tuna resources, while also 
generating some financial returns through the sale of licenses to foreign fishing operators.
614
   
 
At the May 1987 South Pacific Forum meeting in Apia, Samoa (after the Treaty had been 
signed a month earlier), the idea emerged that Japan might be keen participate in a 
multilateral fishing arrangement similar to the arrangement with the US.
615
 The Director of 
the FFA was asked to facilitate discussions. The Forum saw a fishing arrangement with Japan 
as economically advantageous, as it would provide competition for the US over access fees 
and other technical assistance.
616
 However Japan did not want to compete commercially with 
the US through a collective fishing arrangement with the Forum countries.
617
 While Japan 
maintained stable relations with Pacific Island States, US policy toward the region had been 
inconsistent. Washington was desperate to reclaim its superiority in the region and the Treaty 
was seen as the most appropriate political and diplomatic means to serve this purpose.   
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However, in the 1980s, Japan proposed that the Forum and DWFN discuss the possibility of 
setting up a broad-based regional fisheries organization.
618
 The proposed body would deal 
with all fisheries issues, including the conservation and management of the region’s fish 
stocks. With the biggest fishing fleet presence in the region, Japan stood to benefit from 
seeking the support of other DWFN for such an organization.
619
 Hence, Japan saw such an 
organization as an opportunity to become directly involved in the region’s fisheries. This was 
an attempt by Japan to become a member of the FFA in order to have greater influence in the 
region’s fisheries business. This proposal was rejected by the Forum for obvious reason. 
From the Forum’s perspective, such an organization would minimize its bargaining power in 
negotiations and other ongoing issues with DWFN, and could prove disadvantageous for the 
region as whole. Access fees and the terms and conditions of fishing arrangements would be 
compromised and illegal fishing activities exacerbated. Moreover, regional and international 
environmental organizations were already dealing with and supporting Forum members in 
fisheries conservation and management programmes.
620
 In other words, the Forum countries 
would be better off under current arrangements from both an economic and an environmental 
conservation perspective in the longer term. Also if such an organization was set up, then it 
would create a ‘conflict of interest’ for DWFN; Japan and other potential DWFN would 
benefit more than the Pacific Island States.       
 
Nor would the US support such an organization, since it would undermine its economic and 
political stance in the region. Again, it can be argued that by pushing the Treaty negotiation 
process, the US aimed to block any multilateral fisheries arrangements between Pacific Island 
States and any DWFN, particularly Japan. The debate over the conservation and management 
of the region’s fisheries resources was thus to remain a political challenge between and 
among Forum countries.
621
 Forum countries responded to different DWFN according to the 
levels of foreign aid and technical assistance received. That is, foreign aid from DWFN 
varied according to bilateral links and the kind of assistance package provided.
622
 These 
factors served to complicate the collective stance adopted by the Pacific Island States.  
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 The Pacific Island States increasingly realized the potential economic benefits that lay in the 
exploitation of tuna resources and the rapid increase of foreign fishing vessels operating 
illegally.
623
 These activities posed imminent threats to the region’s tuna resources, making 
depletion a distinct possibility. Hence, there was a definite need to control and regulate the 
exploitation of tuna in a sustainable manner. Constant surveillance and patrolling the Pacific 
Island States’ EEZ was needed. Foreign countries (in particular Australia and New Zealand) 
could carry out some of these tasks in addition to their financial and technical assistance.
624
 
Certainly this task was practically impossible for the Pacific Island States on their own, given 
the huge financial costs involved and their lack of relevant technical and professional 
expertise.  
 
The Treaty was perceived as a suitable mechanism for controlling and minimizing illegal 
foreign fishing activities—and one that could also provide economic benefits.625 Once in 
force, the Treaty began to successfully curb illegal fishing operations in the region, 
particularly those conducted by American-registered fishing fleets.
626
  
  
The Pacific Island States have constantly struggled to implement and enforce the 
international and regional environmental, conservation and management instruments to which 
they are signatories.
627
 In fact, the full enforcement and implementation of these instruments, 
as originally designed, has proven near impossible. Such fulfilment would force heavy 
economic constraints upon populations already struggling financially to meet their basic 
needs. Countries in the Pacific region are predominantly reliant on foreign aid, overseas 
remittances and other forms of financial and technical assistance.
628
 Imposing further 
restrictions on fishing activities for environmental purposes could prove unduly onerous. That 
is, Pacific governments have to be ‘flexible’ in terms of the enforcement of imported 
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environmental instruments in order to prevent further restrictions being placed on coastal 
communities whose livelihoods are heavily affected.   
 
Legislating for international and regional instruments is one thing, but enforcement is quite 
another. The gap involved relates to the fact that when these instruments were drafted they 
did not adequately account for the region’s social, economic, political and cultural 
circumstances. Yet consideration of these issues was essential when establishing such 
instruments. Hence, any ‘wholesale’ imposition of environmental measures could prove 
ineffective. At the same time, these instruments were accompanied by foreign aid packages, 
which ‘forced’ Pacific Island States to implement these provisions, if only superficially, in 
order to secure aid flowing into the region.
629
 Cosmetic compliance became a common 
practice throughout the region in many cases.  
 
A more united position could help to reinforce national jurisdiction over fisheries resources 
and could enable Pacific Island States to generate financial gain when selling fishing licences. 
The advantage of collective co-operation among Pacific Island States would thus be to create 
a stronger joint stance over the sovereign rights issue and ensure better financial outcomes.
630
  
 
Regional organizations were established in the hope that they would benefit all members 
through political, economic and environmental co-operation.
631
 Yet bringing together 
countries with different social, political and economic circumstances proved challenging, 
their historical and political ties to powerful foreign countries further complicating the matter. 
Moreover, external donors substantially funded these organizations, whether in the form of 
individual government grants or a combination of sources that included inter-governmental 
and non-governmental (NGO) agencies.
632
 Accordingly, the institutional funding factor 
complicated the region’s political dynamics.  
 
Pacific Island States remained economically reliant on foreign aid and related financial and 
technical assistance, particularly from Australia, New Zealand, the US, individual European 
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countries, the European Union and international NGOs. Asian countries also became 
increasingly involved in the region.
633
 Japan’s aid to the region increased markedly, 
sometimes for political reasons including their opposition to a proposed South Pacific whale 
sanctuary.
634
 
 
China and Taiwan have also emerged as major players in the Pacific in the last few 
decades.
635
 China’s involvement has to do with its determination to maintain its ‘One China 
policy’ and to prevent the Pacific Island States, particularly those that are members of the 
United Nations, from officially recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign state.
636
  
 
For its part, Taiwan seeks the support of Pacific Island States in its quest for official 
recognition. From some Pacific Island States’ perspectives, such rivalry is propitious because 
this ‘Asian Cold War’ helps ensure that assistance keeps flowing freely into the region.637 
Here there is less interest in taking sides than in gaining aid. In some respects, this resembles 
aspects of the Cold War era’s ideological rivalry between the US and Soviet Union (when the 
Pacific Island States saw enhanced levels of foreign aid forthcoming from these superpowers 
and some of their allies).
638
  
 
The Taiwan-China struggle for recognition in the region has had a negative impact on certain 
Pacific Island States and it seems likely it will continue to be a major concern in the future. 
This is due to foreign aid competition between the two entities, which can involve 
governments as well as oppositions in recipient Pacific Island States.
639
 China-Taiwan rivalry 
in the region has thus added to the long term political problems facing the region at regional 
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and national levels. Poverty, poor governance and corruption have exacerbated these 
problems.  
 
The United Nations’ specialized agencies and other international bodies have played an 
important role in the region’s fisheries cooperation and plans for environmental conservation. 
For example, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) has made a major 
contribution to the region’s environmental programme, although its originally forecast 
enforcement effectiveness has yet to materialize.
640
  
 
The purpose of Pacific regional cooperation for the conservation and management of the 
region’s fisheries resources is essentially political and economic. Political advantages derive 
from the unified stance taken over important issues. This reflects common regional interests, 
in particular entitlements under international law to exert national jurisdiction over EEZs. 
However, the Pacific Island States have also had some different and at times hidden political 
agendas reflecting opportunistic national attitudes. This has been increasingly evident in 
Pacific Island States’ politics. Cultural differences and contrasting political arrangements 
with current or former colonial powers have also played a fundamental role. What a Pacific 
Island State decides is to its immediate national advantage can often override the wider 
collective interest.
641
 Fiji gained more from direct US bilateral aid and technical assistance 
than it received through the Treaty.
642
   
 
While Australia and New Zealand have played an important role in the region’s political and 
economic development, they cannot compete with other interested foreign powers 
particularly China, Japan and Taiwan. Pacific Island States in the Forum have some political 
advantages because they are unified over peace and security issues within the region. The 
ideal of regional cooperation bringing economic independence to the region has yet to 
emerge and could prove a difficult mission to achieve. This is due to several factors: a lack of 
natural resources, restricted access to foreign markets and no subsidies on shipping and 
freight rates to overseas destinations.  
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 Environmental and conservation programmes funded by international and regional agencies 
have not brought about substantial differences and they lack direct and active political 
arrangements with foreign governments (direct bilateral and government-based funding 
programmes providing needed infrastructure). That option seems more effective than 
assistance received through multilateral agencies. The Treaty demonstrated the effectiveness 
of the Forum-US arrangement in terms of a political and environmental conservation 
arrangement.  
 
The ineffective enforcement and implementation of environmental and conservation 
measures generally resulted from the mixed economic circumstances of Pacific Island States, 
including their contrasting demographic, trade, natural resources, land and EEZ profiles.
643
 
Land and marine resources vary from country to country, as do individual economic 
circumstances. This makes it difficult to devise environmental programmes that suit all 
Forum members. While Australia and New Zealand have the capacity to implement effective 
regional environmental programmes, this is beyond most other Pacific Islands States.  
 
Relations between Pacific Island States and Australia and New Zealand have not always run 
smoothly. Some suspicion and distrust persists due to the fact that both countries have placed 
the interests of their Western allies and partners (especially the US) ahead of Forum country 
interests. This was an issue at the Forum meeting in Niue, where Fiji threatened to withdraw 
from the proposed regional fisheries organization if the US became a member.
644
 Forum 
member countries were spilt over US membership.  
 
Here, two issues were at stake: Australia and New Zealand were supportive of US 
membership but not necessarily for the sake of the Forum. More important were the 
economic advantages of access to US markets and the opportunistic attitude of those Pacific 
Island States seeking to secure US foreign aid and other financial and technical assistance. 
This created quite complicated and sophisticated political calculations.   
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 In retrospect, it appeared that the Forum needed to revisit its objectives in order to 
accommodate recent political changes in both a regional and global context. An effective 
environmental framework is needed to ensure the sustainable exploitation of the region’s tuna 
resources before they are further depleted. While political considerations slow the process, 
tuna resources could disappear without an urgently needed action plan for sustainability being 
effectively implemented.  
 
Pacific Island States lack choice due to economic desperation and their political vulnerability 
to the manipulation of powerful foreign countries. In a sovereign State world, bilateral aid is 
donor self-interested—something Pacific recipients cannot ignore. They are very much 
focused on aid; less attention paid to the social, political and economic consequences of any 
assistance. Generally, foreign aid can be seen as a form of political and diplomatic influence 
exerted over Pacific Island States for the benefit of the foreign donor.  
 
Yet collective co-operation among Pacific Island States also has positive political advantage 
in terms of helping to highlight vital issues. The Treaty demonstrated the benefits of 
collectivism in dealing with the US.  
 
The FFA has no management responsibilities as such, but it does facilitate and collate the 
decisions made by Forum members. It also assists in the conservation and management of the 
region’s fisheries resources. Foreign fishing vessels are allowed to carry out fishing activities 
in the region under any legal and valid fishing arrangement that is registered in the Regional 
Register and has good standing.
645
 This scheme is designed to deter foreign vessels from 
violating fishing terms and conditions and to avoid bans from operating in the region. The 
FFA must reinforce fishing agreements so that terms and conditions of access remain within 
an environmental conservation and management framework and promote the sustainable 
development of fisheries resources in the Pacific.
646
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What of agreements relevant to the Treaty that followed its inception? One of significance 
was the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks (1995 Agreement).
647
 This provided important environmental conservation and 
management measures helping to secure the sustainable development of the region’s tuna 
resources. It generally encourages Parties to the 1995 Agreement to take up other regional 
and international environmental conservation and management instruments to assist in the 
sustainable development of tuna fisheries in the region. This sustainable development should 
be qualified by economic and environmental factors, including special requirements of 
developing States.  
 
At the Preamble of the 1995 Agreement, parties pledged to:  
… ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks … improve 
cooperation between States … provide more effective enforcement by 
flag States, port States of the conservation and management measures 
… ensure the need to avoid adverse impacts on the marine 
environment … ensure the need for specific assistance, including 
financial, scientific and technological assistance, in order that 
developing States san participate effectively in the conservation, 
management sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks …         
 
Article 7 of the 1995 Agreement outlines the conservation and management measures to be 
observed by fishermen operating in national waters and in the high seas. This reflects the 
highly mobile nature of tuna. States (either local or foreign) fishing in the high seas have 
responsibilities, as indicated in Article 7(8). They: 
… shall regularly inform other interested States, either directly or 
through other subregional or regional fisheries management 
organizations or arrangements, or the other appropriate means, of the 
measures they have adopted for regulating the activities of vessels 
flying their flag which fish for such stocks on the high seas.  
 
This obligation is needed to closely monitor all fishing activities carried out in the high 
seas—to provide and gather data to assist in the scientific assessment of the tuna in the 
region. It is a responsibility of the flag State to ensure that its fishing vessels comply with the 
agreed upon terms and conditions. These are a collective and cooperative effort on behalf of 
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nations and their nationals engaged in the fishing of highly migratory tuna to ensure the long-
term sustainable development of tuna. As stated in Article 7(2):  
Conservation and management measures established for the high seas 
and those adopted for the areas under national jurisdiction shall be 
compatible in order to ensure conservation and management of the 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory stocks in their entirety. To 
this end, coastal States and States fishing on the high seas have a duty 
to cooperate for the purpose of achieving compatible measures in 
respect of such stocks.    
 
These measures must remain compatible with Article 61 of the United Nations Convention 
on the law of the 1982 (1982 Convention), specifically outlined in Article 7(2)(d)&(e), which 
instructs them to:  
… take into account the biological unity and other biological 
characteristics of the stocks and relationships between the distribution 
of the stocks, the fisheries and geographical particularity the region 
concerned, including the extent to which the stocks occur and are 
fished in areas under national jurisdiction … take into account the 
respective dependence of the coastal States and the States fishing on 
the high seas on the stock concerned … 
 
States interested in the high seas are required to cooperate (through appropriate fisheries 
management organizations in the region) in order to ensure effective conservation and 
management.
648
 Such cooperation shall include States that enter into consultation in good 
faith with evidence that stocks are threatened
649
 and able to establish organizational means 
“in such an arrangement, which agree to apply the conservation and management measures 
established by such organization or arrangement, shall have access to the fishery resources to 
which those measures apply.”650 If there is no such organization or arrangement, then the 
coastal States and States fishing in the high seas are required to establish such an organization 
or appropriate arrangement to ensure the conservation and management of HMS in the high 
seas.      
 
Article 19 of the 1995 Agreement outlined compliance and enforcement mechanisms in order 
to ensure that a flag State’s fishing vessels are obliged to comply with the agreed upon terms 
and conditions. In the event of an alleged violation, an immediate investigation and a prompt 
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report must be sent to the organization and State concerned. It is expected that the vessels 
concerned will fully cooperate with the investigation by providing information. Penalties 
included detention or sanctions being imposed on a flag State preventing them from fishing in 
the high seas. The master and crew can be suspended from that vessel. An indefinite ban of 
masters and crew who have committed serious violations of fishing agreements operating in 
the region was considered as a form of deterrence for potential violators.      
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement provides a useful start in dealing with 
the problem stipulating that only those States which are members of 
an organization … The fact that article 11 of the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement allows international fisheries organizations to determine 
the nature and extent of the participatory rights of new members 
would suggest that it is not possible to completely deny access to 
vessels which fish on the high seas.
651
  
 
Article 20 of the 1995 Agreement states international cooperation in enforcement of the terms 
and conditions of the Agreement. State parties to the Agreement shall cooperate with 
fisheries management organizations in order to ensure compliance and the enforcement of 
conservation and management measures for tuna. The flag State was given responsibility for 
directly investigating alleged infringements of the Agreement with other interested parties, 
the outcome of the investigation being provided to parties concerned.  
 
Such co-operation to cover management of the HMS in the high seas was also indicated in 
Article 64(1) of the 1982 Convention, which stated that coastal States and States whose 
nationals fish for tuna in the region shall:  
 … co-operate directly or through appropriate international 
organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the 
objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout the 
region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone.  
 
This provision supports efforts to conserve and manage the exploitation of HMS in general 
and beyond national jurisdictional waters. It also demonstrates that the conservation of HMS 
must be a priority of all parties involved in fishing within a particular area or region.  
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Article 61 of the 1982 Convention deals generally with conservation and management 
measures designed to prevent marine resources within EEZ being overexploited. It 
encourages coastal States and competent international or regional organizations to co-operate 
in enforcing and implementing those measures while securing the maximum sustainable 
yield. To be effective, these measures rely on the availability of relevant and reliable 
scientific information and data.     
 
Article III(2) of the FFA Convention stipulates the conservation and management efforts 
required of the Forum countries in dealing with HMS, stating that:  
… the coastal state has sovereign rights, for the purpose of exploring 
and exploiting, conserving and managing the living marine resources, 
including highly migratory species, within its exclusive economic 
zone or fishing zone which may extend 200 nautical miles from the 
baseline from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured.  
 
Pacific Island States have sovereign rights to not only explore and exploit, but also to 
conserve and manage, living marine resources in general and HMS within and outside their 
national jurisdictions. The inclusion of the high seas in the conservation and management 
effort is a significant contribution to the sustainable development of the HMS in the region as 
whole.  
 
Gathering and collecting all relevant information possible regarding HMS within or outside 
the EEZ is of great significance from a conservation and management point of view. Future 
strategies for fishing quota are determined by the accuracy and sufficiency of data collected 
and gathered. Data requirements are clearly outlined in Annex IV of the HMS Convention.     
 
Article 2(2.1) of the Treaty states that the US government shall co-operate by providing 
technical and economic support to the Pacific Island States to help them get the maximum 
benefit from the development of their fisheries resources. In the event of an alleged violation 
of the terms and conditions of the Treaty, and upon request by the Pacific Island States, the 
US is to fully investigate an alleged infringement and report back with an outcome—an 
action that has either already been taken or will be taken within a two month time frame.
652
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The DWFN and the Pacific Island States hold different views about the sustainable 
management of the HMS in the region. The Pacific Island States view the international and 
regional conservationism of HMS in terms of the legal instruments that suit or serve the 
interest of the DWFN, whether in terms of the availability of scientific information and 
marine technologies. Yet, they also see this as a further economic constraint burdening 
already poor economies.  
 
Pacific Island States need fresh initiatives they can incorporate into existing frameworks to 
provide better conservation and management measures that encourage the sustainable 
development of the HMS and that economically benefit both Forum countries and DWFN. 
Currently, the latter comes first. The economic benefits for Pacific Island States and the 
DWFN of the over-exploitation of tuna resources could be short term, but the environmental 
effect on the HMS could last much longer. The FFA needs to come up with new conservation 
and management strategies that primarily focus on the conservation and management of 
HMS. 
High priorities are assigned by governments to policies aimed at 
institutional strengthening and capacity building because of the 
importance of fisheries among these countries ... Regional fisheries 
cooperation in the South Pacific is well-established, successful and, in 
many cases, a cornerstone of national foreign policy.
653
  
The Pacific Island States realize they are individually weak in almost all respects and 
therefore are vulnerable to the manipulation of powerful DWFN when it comes to fisheries-
related issues. A regional collective approach has more political and democratic weight in 
dealings with foreign powers, in fisheries and other matters. When established in 1979, the 
FFA was mandated to assist the Pacific Island States by coordinating fisheries policies and 
activities.      
Generally, three institutions are significant when it comes to the conservation and 
management of the region’s fisheries resources. The first of these is the South Pacific Forum 
Fisheries Agency (FFA), which is responsible for the assistance of the Pacific Island States’ 
fisheries policies.
654
 The second, the South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme 
(SPREP), assists Pacific Island States regarding the adverse effects of human activities on 
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fisheries,
655
 while the third, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) with its Coastal 
Fisheries Programme (CFP), aims to manage and develop fisheries resources in a sustainable 
manner.
656
 
After the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III), the Pacific 
Island States regionalized their tuna management approach to a greater extent than any other 
region
657
 because tuna resources are the only viable economic assets in the entire region. 
Good management of these resources would secure the future economic independence of the 
region. It would be ideal if the Pacific Island States consistently agreed on environmental 
issues, however this is often not the case.  
Differences of opinions and policies between the South Pacific 
countries have not resulted in conflict. Often disagreements are 
discussed openly and settled through a process of consensus 
commonly referred to as the “Pacific Way” The process of 
consultations, however, which the South Pacific countries have 
developed is unique and reflect the cultural and traditional values of 
Pacific Islanders. These values inculcate in them a sense of consensus 
and consultations, which ultimately enable differences between to be 
discussed amiably and resolved amicably.
658
 
 
Regional cooperation among Pacific Island States and DWFN, as demonstrated in the Treaty, 
would help in the conservation, management and exploitation of the region’s fisheries 
resources. Regional co-operation is essential due to the high migratory nature of tuna and 
proper regulatory frameworks and proper infrastructure must be put in place to attract private 
investors to local processing plants for the locally-based fishing fleets.
659
  
 
 
During the 1980s, the US rejected the Pacific Island States’ sovereign rights claim over their 
EEZs and argued that Pacific Island States were not willing to negotiate management of tuna 
within their EEZs. In the early stages of the Treaty negotiation, the US reversed its position. 
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As a result, through the Treaty the Pacific Island States greatly benefitted from the 
establishment of very generous access fees.
660
  
From the fisheries management point of view, two main features of the HMS tuna are 
overwhelming significant from a conservation and management point of view—the regional 
nature of the stocks and their high mobility. These characteristics mean that regional 
management approach is way to go.
661
 The FFA, WCPFC and SPC are the three principal 
agencies responsible for the region’s fisheries conservation and management.  
South Pacific countries have been able to harmonize their policies 
with respect to a number of measures that aim to control and monitor 
the activities of fishing vessels that target the tuna resource.
662
 
Inaccurate information and misreporting on fishing efforts have serious implications for 
fisheries management.
663
 The FFA has a clear function in assisting Pacific Island States in all 
fisheries issues including monitoring and policing. The Niue Treaty on Fisheries Surveillance 
and Law Enforcement (Niue Treaty) provides a framework for enforcement.
664
 
Regional cooperation among Pacific Island States was important until they became 
independent and the UNCLOS III was negotiated. The FFA is leading the charge for the 
cooperative management for the region’s HMS stocks and this has been a successful exercise 
due to common issues among member States, for instance, similar political system; EEZ 
would bring economic independent and fisheries resources was means to an end.
665
  
The Agency was able to work successfully because there were no 
competing interests amongst the South Pacific countries. They had a 
common adversary, namely the distant water fishing nations 
(DWFNs), and therefore it was easy for them to define their interests 
vis-à-vis the goals of the DWFNs.
666
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The conservation and management of tuna resources in the region has always been 
challenging due to the fact that countries’ limited capacity and resources. The detection and 
investigation of fishing violations is insufficient.
667
  
The Pacific Island States’ paradox rests on their individual differences and circumstances, 
ranging from relying on aid and remittances to self-reliance. The sustainable conservation 
and management of the region’s tuna stocks is fundamental to the long-term economic 
development of the Pacific Island States and is sustainable if the stocks are effective managed 
in order to prevent over-fishing.
668
 
Cooperative management of shared fish stocks in the South Pacific 
provides an interesting backdrop for any analysis of regional fisheries 
cooperation because the countries involved are so diverse with 
varying degrees of dependency on the shared fish stocks.
669
 
 
Newly adopted fisheries management regimes were also part of international and regional 
efforts to ensure HMS are not endangered. The biggest achievement in recent years for the 
conservation and management of the region’s tuna resources seems to be the adoption of the 
Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Pacific (Fish Stocks Convention).
670
 Parties were FFA member States and DWFN fleets 
fishing in the region’s EEZ and high seas,671 and its aim to achieve sustainable development 
of the tuna resources in the long term. It is also significant because the Pacific Island States 
and the DWFN have to come together to manage and develop tuna resources of the region. 
  
The region needs a credible surveillance and enforcement capability 
to effectively back up demands for reasonable access fees. Australia 
provides significant surveillance assistance to the region, including 
through Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) fisheries surveillance 
patrols (500 hours per annum).
672
 
 
The tension between the coastal States and the DWFN over rights to manage and exploit over 
HMS impacts their cooperation. Attempts to undermine coastal States’ management of their 
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EEZ and historical opposition to the introduction of various measures for foreign fishing 
vessels foster antagonism for both parties.
673
 The unequal power relationships between 
Pacific Island States and the DWFN undermined regional attempts at effective management 
by pressuring individual Pacific Island States not to impose regional measures such as 
minimum access terms and conditions for DWFN vessels.
674
  
The whole exercise of managing tuna purse seine fishing capacity, 
becomes more complicated because of the multispecific composition 
of the catch. There are two major species that dominate the purse 
seine catch: skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis) and yellowfin (Thunnus 
albacares). The third species caught in the purse seine fishery is 
bigeye (Thunnus obesus), with a significantly lower proportion of the 
purse seine catch.
675
  
 
The fast paced exploitation of tuna resources in the western central Pacific was the major 
reason for the adoption of the Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific 
Purse Seine Fishery (Palau Arrangement),
676
 designed to enhance the sustainable 
development of their fisheries resources.
677
 
 
Unless there are strong flag State controls over vessels that fish on the 
high seas and regionally agreed measures to curtail effort, overfishing 
on the high seas could result in the dislocation of an industry 
dependent on those stocks… The lack of information on vessels 
operating in the high seas areas thus leaves a gap.
678
  
 
The Pacific Island States’ harmonizing terms and conditions of access include regional 
registering of DWFN, port state enforcement, effective flag state responsibility, a violations 
and prosecutions database, cooperation in fisheries surveillance and law enforcement and a 
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satellite-based vessel monitoring system.
679
 Regional cooperation among Pacific Island States 
under these measures brought effective fisheries management on tuna resources, especially in 
fisheries arrangement, for instance, state responsibility under the Treaty.    
The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fiosh 
Stocks (1995 Agreement) recognizes the special requirements required by developing States 
for the purpose of conservation and management of their fisheries resources; it also requires 
the cooperation and assistance of developing countries in monitoring, control, surveillance, 
compliance and enforcement (including training and capacity-building, development and 
funding of observer programmes).
680
  
The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing (FAO Code) recognizes developing 
countries’ need for special assistance for the management their fisheries resources and also 
the cooperation among organizations and institutions’ financial and technical assistance and 
training.
681
 Illegal, unregulated and unreported (IIU) fishing activities are among the major 
threats to fisheries management for developing countries, mainly due to the high mobility of 
DWFN fleets and lack of resources and expertise to adequately address the issue of IIU.
682
  
Misinformation and incorrect data have become common, with fishing vessels reporting 
catches as being from the high seas when they are actually from national jurisdiction.
683
 
Under the Treaty, this is a serious issue, because Pacific Island States would lose out on their 
access fee (85% component).  
Port State enforcement is regarded as being an effective tool in terms of compliance with 
conservation and management measures and in terms of the legislation banning the 
importation of fish caught illegally from somewhere else; however, the effectiveness of these 
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measures is based on the close cooperation of the Pacific Island States.
684
 Lack of 
background information about fishing vessels’ compliance records and regions previously 
fished is among the major problems of dealing with IUU fishing, and the FFA developed a 
Violations and Prosecutions (VAP) Database that contains information on vessels that have 
violated Pacific Island States’ national fisheries laws.685  
Surveillance & Enforcement: 
The Niue Treaty promotes effective regional surveillance and enforcement through 
cooperation and coordination between parties. They allow one party to extend its fisheries 
surveillance and law enforcement activities to the territorial seas and archipelagic waters of 
another party.
686
  
 
Traditional Fisheries Conservation Practice: An Alternative Option  
 
Current conservation measures imposed on Pacific Island States’ environmental programmes 
are based on Western principles that have proven ineffective for the purposes of 
implementation and enforcement. The reasons for this have already been discussed—namely 
economic circumstances, lack of technical expertise and cultural diversity. The two former 
issues are commonly acknowledged problems in the South Pacific, but the last has received 
inadequate consideration under the terms of the current regional and international 
environmental conservation regimes. Consequently traditional environmental conservation 
mechanisms deserve attention, with a view to possibly integrating them into the current 
Western-based Convention. This would represent a challenge to existing arrangements, but 
still warrants consideration as an alternative framework in that it would provide for the 
effective conservation and management of the region’s fisheries resources. 
 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in creating a single environmental conservation strategy from 
the multitude of cultural diversity that exists in the Pacific, some common indigenous 
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environmental conservation principles are discernible. The indigenous people of the Pacific 
have practised traditional conservation measures effectively for centuries. Indigenous people 
can be distinguished as those who may possess a particular spiritual relationship with some 
distinctive natural environment over time and place. These principles are founded on 
traditional religious beliefs that may embrace special relationships with the natural 
environment and that are comprehensive, indivisible and indispensable. People belong to 
their environment in a spiritual as well as a physical sense.  
 
This traditional environment concept is based on a belief that the welfare and livelihood of 
people has been determined supernaturally. These forces have earthly representatives, 
including chiefly elites, claiming divine origin. Deities determined agricultural harvest and 
fishing yields, but this was based on how people treated the environment in which they lived. 
Although these values have eroded, they retain some support in daily practice.  
 
Fisheries species often require long-term periods of recovery, although certain types are 
seasonal, meaning they have ample time to recover. Locals recognized that different species 
have different rates of recovery, which are needed to prevent adverse environmental impacts. 
Key decision-making processes, at least in Polynesia, were restricted to the chiefly classes, 
not the majority of the population. The current depletion of the South Pacific’s fisheries 
resources began with an asymmetrical exchange between populations and marine resources, 
where people extracted too much from and returned too little to the natural environment. The 
need to restore a balance of exchange between populations and the natural marine 
environment grew increasingly urgent. 
 
Introduced exploitation had a huge impact upon the socio-political and economic settings of 
Pacific Island States.
687
 It rewarded the maximum exploitation of fishing resources with 
minimum effort made in terms of sustainability—contrary to the principles practised by 
traditional subsistence systems. As a result, for the first time the Pacific Island States’ fishing 
resources faced a growing threat of over-exploitation.
688
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The international community’s introduced environmental conservation and management 
measures, designed to control and regulate regional exploitation of tuna resources, sent mixed 
messages. Although they established some controls over tuna exploitation, they did so while 
the world market in the West experienced the heaviest demand for this species. Conservation 
of tuna resources through these controls risked being seen as a political façade that appeared 
to formally regulate a pre-existing over-exploitation process.  
 
The disregard for traditional conservation principles under current international and regional 
environmental frameworks may be a result of the perceived ineffectiveness of those 
principles. Traditional conservation principles, however, deserve serious consideration along 
with social political and economic factors. A balanced framework of traditional mechanisms 
and modern practices is needed.  
 
… the social and economic costs of stock collapses as a result of 
overfishing are catastrophic for coastal States, in terms of their 
impacts on the local economy as well as political and social stability 
and food security. This is especially so in many ACP countries where 
the overwhelming majority of the coastal population relies on 
subsistence fishing as a dominant source of food. In most cases the 
importance of subsistence fishing is not fully appreciated …689  
 
 
Fisheries access agreements present huge food security and other socio-economic risks for 
coastal States and these risks need to be significantly reduced to safeguard sustainability and 
mutual reinforcement; DWFN (US in particular) should take flag State responsibility and for 
the Pacific Island States to stick for multilateral access arrangement as the best so far.
690
 
 
International Regional Fisheries Conservation Measures 
 
Existing international and regional fisheries environmental conservation and management 
measures were introduced to the Pacific Island States through international and regional 
organizations and institutions.
691
 These measures are believed to have originated in part from 
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pressure exerted by environmental lobbying groups in countries with fishing fleets operating 
in the Pacific. This created a conflict of interest for DWFN signatories to international and 
regional fisheries conservation and management conventions who had operating fishing fleets 
with a potential capacity to over-exploit the region’s tuna resources. In order for the region’s 
tuna resources to be maintained in a sustainable manner, the DWFN need to maintain close 
relationships with their fishing fleets. Currently, however, it is up to Pacific Island State 
parties to monitor the operation of foreign vessels—the DWFN play virtually no role in this. 
Having the DWFN equally involved in the monitoring process could make the system more 
effective, as they would ensure their fishing vessels are fully compliant with existing fishing 
arrangements.
692
 It has been proven that the implementation and enforcement of conservation 
and management measures by the Pacific Island States on foreign fishing fleets is not as 
effective as was expected.
693
  
 
Sustainable development means that economic development is possible without 
compromising the natural environment—in this instance, tuna resources. It is possible to 
exploit such resources without harming tuna stocks. In actual practice however, this concept 
may be flawed. The exploitation of tuna resources in the region is a constant process; it is a 
seven days a week operation, which gives tuna stocks little chance to recover. Sustainable 
development may be a contradictory concept in that any form of substantial development, 
including the exploitation of tuna does, has an adverse impact upon the natural environment. 
This serves primarily the interests of those involved in the fishing industry, not necessarily 
the tuna stocks. The case for preservation of these tuna resources for future generations is 
irrefutable.   
 
The conservation, management and development of the Pacific’s tuna resources are shared 
responsibilities among Pacific Island States, international environmental organizations 
(including relevant United Nations specialized agencies) and tuna fishing countries. Pacific 
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Island States cannot carry the sole responsibility for implementing effective environmental 
conservation in the region due to lack of funds and the unavailability of relevant expertise.
694
 
International financial and technical assistance is core to such an effort.  
 
Thus, the dilemma facing Pacific Island States is economic privation on the one hand and the 
need to enforce environmental conservation standards on the other. However, the full, 
practical enforcement of such instruments is a totally different issue altogether and, in most 
cases, impossible. For centuries, people’s livelihoods and welfare has predominantly been 
based on the marine economy; to strictly regulate the only affordable source of food by 
imposing imported conservation measures would be near impossible. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that Pacific Island States’ economic circumstances have varied 
both in terms of their political association with foreign countries, and in their renewable and 
non-renewable resources.
695
 These are issues that have an impact on the effectiveness of the 
environmental conservation of the region. Some Pacific Island States have historical 
associations and political relations with certain foreign powerful countries and are at an 
advantage compared to others.
696
 Natural resource endowments vary, including fisheries 
resources. The availability of quality tuna specified under the Treaty varies among countries 
in the region and this signifies an unequal distribution of marine and other natural resources.  
 
Fisheries conservation and management is seen by Pacific Island States as an economic 
constraint on their pursuit of sound economic development. Further, the limitations imposed 
on Pacific Island States selling fishing licences to foreign fishing vessels have had a 
significant economic impact, while at the same time providing environmental conservation 
and management safeguards for the region’s fisheries resources.697  
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The full enforcement of a regional and international environmental mechanism is still a 
challenge that Pacific Island States have yet to achieve.
698
 Some implementation has occurred 
through the incorporation of these instruments into national fisheries and conservation 
legislation. It is suspected that this has been done primarily to please foreign aid donors and 
to avoid any awkward political and economic fallout from them through failure to legislate. 
To a certain extent, environmental measures may be seen as a strategic move designed to 
attract financial and technical assistance. In general, becoming a signatory to certain 
international or regional agreements, and subsequently incorporating those instruments into 
domestic legislation, can help to guarantee foreign aid.     
 
Cultural development is here considered to be a form of sound economic development 
encompassed by traditional values and beliefs. In the Pacific, different cultures co-exist yet 
share common cultural principles based on a collective orientation model with both social 
and natural dimensions. This would comprise a form of economic development that is based 
on traditional frameworks, minimizing environmentally adverse effects through forms of 
sustainable economic development.  
 
The environmental conservation of fisheries resources in the region is difficult given the 
different levels and processes of enforcement and implementation of environmental 
conversation measures.
699
 These may operate under contrasting socio-political and economic 
arrangements that are at times complicated and sophisticated. At a national level, this may 
comprise districts that are either land or coastal based, and where approaches to 
environmental conservation are different. Coastal areas are marine-orientated, while those 
that are land based have an emphasis on conservation that is of a different nature, making it 
difficult to synthesize measures suitable for both.  
 
At the regional level, Pacific Island States have formulated regional environmental 
conservation measures through organizations based on directives from the international 
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environmental organizations.
700
 Although Pacific Island States have formulated an 
environmental framework largely based on their own interests, these measures have been 
derived and/or borrowed from international environmental systems, the conservation 
mechanism viewed in some quarters as a potential economic threat to the region.  
 
It is vital that fisheries conservation and management is active at a local level, where a sound 
government-community partnership is needed in order to implement and enforce 
conservation measures effectively. Relevant government departments have lobbied for the 
significance of the management of tuna resources at present and the future, but getting this 
endorsed by their governments is another matter.
701
 International and regional research 
centres need to get involved in this dialogue on conservation issues. Local communities can 
be supportive and active in conservation efforts, provided they are given clear responsibilities 
that make them feel they are playing a crucial role in the conservation process.  
  
Other factors seen as obstructing environmental conservation include increasing 
unemployment, rapid population growth and poor governance. Restricting the sale of fishing 
licences for foreign fishing fleets authorized by international organizations would worsen the 
situation. Fisheries resources seem the only viable resources in the region. Agricultural 
exports were dominant revenue earners decades ago, but protectionism and overseas market 
restrictions have forced Pacific Island States to rely heavily on fisheries.  
 
The question of whether Pacific Island States receive a fair price for their tuna is debatable. 
Obviously, countries that are desperate to survive financially may not always get the best 
price—they will take whatever offer is put forward. Part of the problem involves the foreign 
fishing nations putting pressure on Pacific Island States or relevant regional agencies for 
fishing access.  
 
Educating people about the environmental conservation of fisheries resources is another 
possible means of preventing environmentally adverse effects upon fisheries resources. A 
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programme like this could operate in schools and in the community, which would help over 
the longer term.  
 
International and regional environmental institutions do not guarantee the effective 
management of tuna resources, and it is the sole responsibility of the Pacific Island States to 
implement, monitor and enforce such management. This responsibility is yet to be fully 
implemented. Resources in terms of human expertise and technical and financial assistance 
are means that would make such a programme work in the region.  
 
The conservation effort for the management of tuna resources—in the South Pacific in 
particular and in the world at large—should be a global one, made through processes ranging 
from sustainable tuna exploitation, to orderly world markets and consumption levels. In this 
way, all parties involved in these industries would contribute to the conservation and 
management of the region’s tuna stock. This would curtail regional and global cooperation 
among countries concerned through financial and technical assistance packages, and an 
exchange of relevant technologies.  
 
Tuna management institutions in the region should be prioritized as policy development 
issues, including effective and realistic guidelines aligned with international environmental 
requirements. Collecting accurate data and information on tuna fishing activities in the region 
would help formulate an exploitation framework to conserve and manage tuna resources 
more sustainable.  
 
The environmental consequences for the region’s tuna resources in both the short and long 
term are enormous if direct action is not taken urgently. This threat is not restricted to any 
particular country but applies to the region as a whole. Other environmental problems include 
the destruction of coastal habitat, land pollution by agricultural chemicals and fertilizers and 
the lack of expertise and appropriate equipment available for the disposal of toxic 
substances.
702
  
 
The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) provides some support in preparing 
conservation and management policies by gathering relevant information regarding the 
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fisheries resources of the region. The main task of the FFA, however, is to seek a better price 
for tuna through negotiation.  
 
The key idea in setting up the FFA was to assist the Pacific Island States in the management 
and development of fisheries resources, especially the HMS. The FFA was a response to the 
United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III), which recognized the 
coastal States’ sovereign rights over resources within 200 nautical miles of their coasts.703  
 
From the Pacific Island States’ perspective, the FFA was seen as a mechanism that would 
constantly and permanently manage the economic benefits flowing from fisheries resources. 
As signs of overfishing in the region started to become visible, the FFA was confronted by 
the need to control the exploitation of the region’s fisheries resources, particularly the DWFN 
illegal fishing activities in the region; this was for the sustainable economic benefit of the 
region.
704
 The aims of the FFA were helped by not having membership allocated to DWFN.  
 
The FFA was established in 1979 with 16 members; it had a Secretariat, the Forum Fisheries 
Committee was the governing body and an International Convention was adopted in that 
year.
 705
 However, the mission of the Agency was to manage the region’s fisheries resources, 
in particular the vast tuna stocks in the western and central Pacific Ocean, in a sustainable 
manner.
 706
 This was due to the rapid increase of foreign fishing vessels roaming the region 
fishing grounds for tuna to satisfy the enormous global demand for tuna.  
 
The Tuna Commission was established under the requirements provided by the Convention 
on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean (Fish Stocks Convention).
707
 The Tuna Commission was established 
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by the FFA with the aim of providing a means for the sustainable development of region’s 
tuna resources.  
 
The South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP)
708
 is a regional organization 
that was established by the Pacific Forum States to protect the region’s natural environment, 
including its fisheries resources. SPREP has made an international commitment to the 
conservation of the natural environment and its resources at the regional level. It promotes 
sustainable development in the region.  
 
SPREP provides programmes to support member States in planning and managing their 
environmental programmes as a whole region. The SPREP’s mandate:  
… is to promote cooperation in the Pacific islands region and to 
provide assistance in order to protect and improve the environment 
and to ensure sustainable development for present and future 
generations.
709
 
 
The assumption here “is that people of the Pacific islands are better able to plan, protect, 
manage and use their environment for sustainable development”. SPREP’s focus “is to 
sustain the integrity of the ecosystems of the Pacific islands region to support life and 
livelihoods today and tomorrow.” 
 
SPREP has two main programmes: Islands Ecosystem Programme (IEP) and Pacific Future 
Programme (PFP). Under the IEP, there is a programme that directly deals with fisheries 
resources including tuna; this states that: 
… coastal and marine environments will be the focus of considerable 
attention throughout the life of the plan. As a principal support for life 
and livelihoods throughout the region, community-based initiatives 
will continue to be the basis for much of SPREP’s Programme in 
coastal and marine ecosystems. Understanding social and economic 
driving factors in community decision making in relation to resources 
use and conservation, and empowering local communities through co-
management of projects will be critical elements of the programme.
710
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The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (1982 Convention) gave coastal 
States the responsibility to conserve and manage their HMS resources, but failed to provide 
significant mechanisms for implementation. This was an example of ineffective international 
delivery for practical and needed forms of application. It resulted from the unfair trade-offs 
between powerful and weak countries and complex diplomatic and political negotiations 
within the international community. The 1982 Convention was intended to be a regime that 
encouraged coastal States (often poor) and powerful DWFN to cooperate for the conservation 
and management of the HMS. But the Convention did not explicitly specify how coastal 
States were meant to cooperate.  
 
To conserve and manage HMS in the Pacific region, there is a serious need for both Pacific 
Island States and DWFN to cooperate for the conservation and management of the HMS both 
within an EEZ and the high seas. The high seas should be treated through a legal mechanism 
that provides for the constant management and exploitation of tuna throughout their 
migratory routes. Non-regulated HMS fishing activities in the high seas would provide a 
greater threat to tuna sustainability than anything else.    
 
Susskind argues that the most obvious approach to sustainable development is to ensure that 
the renewable resources are exploited in a sustainable manner and can be determined based 
on profit maximization or biological sustainability.
711
  
The Brundtland Report (which popularized the idea of sustainable 
development and postulated the need to link economic development 
and environmental protection) assumes that effective responses to 
global environmental threats can be found within the key actors 
would accept the importance of sustainability.
712
  
The concept of sustainable development is defined and interpreted in many ways depending 
on the disciplines concerned.
713
 The basic implication of the concept of sustainable 
development is that present generations should leave the future generation with a stock of 
quality of life assets no less than what we have inherited.
714
 The concept also covers human-
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made assets, human capital and natural environment
715
 (the whole environment surrounding 
human beings regardless of their geographical location). Sharp argues that: 
The concept of sustainable development embodies a belief that people 
should be able to alter and improve their live in accordance with 
criteria which take account of the needs of others and which protect 
the planet and future generations. Thus people’s rights and 
responsibilities form the crux of any discussion of any discussion of 
sustainability.
716
    
 
The Treaty provided a sustainable development approach for the economic development and 
conservation and management of the region’s fisheries resources. The approach consists of 
measures acceptable to both parties and serves their interests, regardless of their wide ranges 
of differences.  
 
The sustainable development of the region’s fisheries resources would be a challenge, 
especially from the Pacific Island States’ perspective. This is due basically to the rate of 
exploitation and the fishing technologies methods employed had an impact on the fisheries 
resources and a great challenge to sustain such resources.
717
         
 
Harley and Maunder argue that there are numerous problems with Maximized Sustainable 
Yield (MSY), such as the uncertain biological processes and the impossibility of maximizing 
all species independently.
718
 That is, if maximizing the yield of a target species caused the 
population of a by-catch species to collapse, then a trade-off between yield and maintaining 
the by-catch species must be considered. Such a trade-off is encapsulated in the conservation 
and management objectives through modifying factors and the precautionary strategic 
approach.
719
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Fisheries catches consisting of other species are among the major criticisms of the concept of 
MSY.
720
 The recommendation was to reduce fishing efforts based on an assessment of the 
species overexploited.
721
 
 
MSY is typically defined on the basis of a given age-specific fishing 
mortality. For any given fishery this mortality is achieved through 
gear selectivity (or age-specific availability). In a multigear fishery it 
results from a combination of the selectivity of each gear and the 
relative efforts allotted to gears; different gears may produce different 
levels of MSY.
722
 
 
Game theory is concerned with the strategic actions of different actors—how their interests 
are intertwined and how the outcome is processed throughout the negotiation.
723
 Pacific 
Island States chose their sustainable development strategies and at the same time tried to 
understand the US position on the issue. From the outset of the Treaty negotiation, both 
parties fully understood each other’s positions; the issue was how far each could go. 
Ultimately, however, the Pacific Island States had clearly stated their position and US could 
not do anything about it. The US found itself under pressure and surrounded by the terms and 
conditions of the Treaty as well as other regional and international obligations regarding the 
conservation and management of fisheries resources. Froyn argues that: 
 
In development of such international institutions, countries are like 
game players that must choose their strategies based on their beliefs 
about the likely choices of others. The existence of international 
regimes will, thus, not ensure optimal levels of cooperation. Failure to 
solve the problem of providing international public goods is well 
known, and an institution’s level of success will depend on the 
different country’s response to the agreed-upon set of rules 
(design).
724
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There are several significant areas in which Pacific Island States have not achieved 
cooperation in fisheries; most notably, they have not shared economic information about tuna 
industries or aid, or negotiated access/licensing arrangements collaboratively, despite the US 
multilateral Treaty providing evidence that regional negotiation could yield substantial 
benefits.
725
 Underdal argues that: 
 
Where international management can be established only through 
agreement among all significant parties involved, and where such a 
regulation is considered only on its own merits, collective action will 
be limited to those measures acceptable to the least enthusiastic 
party.
726
 
 
The process of making an international treaty is a complex one and requires an outcome that 
serves all parties. And international and regional cooperation among States due to how their 
interests are considered in the negotiation process of the institutions concerned. In the Pacific, 
there is no acceptance at all, and therefore all parties’ interests must be taken into serious 
consideration.  
 
With the establishment of the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (Fish Stocks Convention), 
the Pacific Island States also have to work with distant water fishing countries, some of 
whom oppose Pacific Island States on key issues.
727
  
 
Japan was a difficult opponent for the Pacific Island States in the negotiations leading up to 
the establishment of the Fish Stocks Convention.
728
 Japan promises to continue to be a strong 
opponent of Pacific Island States wishing to be allocated the tuna resources in their EEZs, 
arguing that fishing states have at least equal rights to the resources and that highly migratory 
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resources do not ‘belong’ to the zone in which they are caught.729 The fact that Japan has 
fishing relationships with some Pacific Island States (mostly PNA states) has tended to create 
divisions in regional cooperation to achieve recognition for issues such as allocation by 
fishing zones. Other DWFN in the Fish Stocks Convention include the United States, Korea, 
China, Taiwan and the European Union, who are all highly industrialized, with considerable 
wealth and other resources at their disposal to underpin negotiating strategies.
730
  
 
The Fish Stocks Convention provides new opportunities for the Pacific Island States to secure 
better benefits from their tuna resources and takes a holistic approach towards fisheries 
management. It requires parties to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(Commission) to include a precautionary approach in the long term.
731
 The Fish Stocks 
Convention’s objectives over HMS are consistent with the 1982 Convention and the 1995 
Agreement.  
 
The Fish Stocks Convention intends to establish a Tuna Commission
732
 that can determine 
conservation and management measures for highly migratory fish stocks throughout the 
Convention area, with input from a scientific committee and a technical and compliance 
committee. The Fish Stocks Convention will also establish a secretariat that will operate 
according to the principle of cost effectiveness and will be appointed on the basis of their 
scientific and technical qualifications. 
 
The Commission is not given any specific role in allocating participatory rights. Instead it is 
to develop criteria for the allocation of total allowable catch, taking into account a number of 
different factors (such as catch history and the needs of small island developing states).
733
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However, the establishment of the Commission is a starting point and its relationship with the 
FFA is yet to be seen.
734
  
 
SPREP is the South Pacific component of the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP) Regional Seas Program. SPREP has 
many programs in the area of marine and coastal environment, 
including an environmental impact assessment program and a marine 
pollution assessment program aimed, inter alia, to develop 
monitoring capabilities throughout the region and identify marine 
pollution types and sources.
735
 
 
  
Under the fishing agreement, there are terms and conditions of the access regarding catch 
data for high seas operations and onboard observers’ duties and functions, and if data are 
suspected than, terms and conditions changed, for instance, in mid-1993, Pacific Island States 
changed from at-sea transhipment to transhipment in-port.
736
 
 
The 1982 Convention really pushed the DWFN fleets out from the Pacific Island States 
respective EEZs to the high seas and the adoption of the Fish Stock Agreement
737
 adopted in 
1995.
738
 However, both instruments provide conservation and management measures for 
HMS in EEZs and the high seas as well.  
 
The FAO Compliance Agreement
739
 was designed to address issues such over-capitalization, 
larger fishing boats, flags of convenience and other deficiencies that contributed to illegal, 
unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing; its purpose was to establish flag State 
responsibility for fishing fleets on the high seas and to deter vessels from seeking registry in 
countries with lax enforcement capacity in order to avoid having to comply international 
conservation and management measures in general. 
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 The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO Code) recognizes the protection 
of the marine environment including all critical fishery habitats, artisanal and small-scale 
fisheries and a participatory approach of industry, fish workers and environmental 
organizations in decision-making processes.
740
 
 
The very objective of the Fish Stocks Convention is to ensure the tuna stocks of the region 
are conserved and managed in a sustainable manner. Deciding the total allowable catches 
(TAC) was a significant landmark in light of previous practices.
741
 Apart from the TAC, the 
Fish Stocks Convention’s text demonstrated that it was not well equipped to deal with other 
economic issues, let along significant institutional ‘gaps’ in the conservation and 
management framework.
742
 
 
Among the key principles of the 1995 Agreement were the precautionary approach, 
cooperation amongst stakeholders and consistency in management across national and 
international boundaries, and the Fish Stocks Convention (the regional operational 
framework corresponded to the 1995 Agreement).
743
 
 
Domestic and International Interactions 
  
Throughout the negotiation process of the Treaty, there were no major public reactions 
throughout the South Pacific on the part of any major environmental groups, government 
affiliated bodies or NGO- sponsored organizations.
744
 In part, this reflected the role of culture 
in the region’s politics, and the historical and political relationships among Pacific Island 
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States themselves and the region as a whole with the US.
745
 That is, the US remains the main 
superpower in the region, and although not openly condemning French nuclear weapons 
testing in the region, it has generally maintained good relationships in the region.  
 
A similar situation occurred at the international level—that is, no major protests emerged 
during the negotiations, even at the actual signing of the Treaty. This may highlight the role 
played by the US in the world and its allies, particularly Australia (but to a lesser degree, also 
New Zealand), in the Pacific. Also demonstrated was the well-established position of the US 
in global economics and politics, it being rare for any country to openly criticize the US. This 
limited interest in Pacific tuna may be seen as advantageous to the US. However, an open 
protest from the international community in relation to the fairness of the Treaty would assist 
the Pacific Island Sates politically and economically.   
 
For the Pacific Island States the treaty was, first and foremost, political and economic in 
nature; they wanted to ensure that tuna resources within the region were managed and 
developed in a sustainable way. At a local level, most populations were not really interested 
in political or diplomatic arrangements with foreign countries—this Treaty included. 
Governments, business communities and investors were those most interested in the Treaty, 
mainly for economic reasons.  
 
The domestic politics of international relations are varied as far as commitment to 
international agreements is concerned. This applies to the Pacific, where governments have 
taken holistic approaches to conservation in order to be seen to be marginally fulfilling 
international commitments. In the Pacific, governments face varied economic circumstances, 
which have impacted on conservation commitments. Within Pacific Island States, conditions 
may vary markedly from district to district, which can further complicate the implementation 
of the international commitments made by their governments.  
 
However some local environmental groups have been established to educate the community 
in the conservation, management and development of fisheries resources. Local communities 
have, however, also remained suspicious of such working relationships; sometimes see them 
as maintaining links with former colonial powers that have previously subdued the growth 
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and independence of local populations. Most Pacific populations do not understand the 
meaning of conservation of tuna resources and of conservation more generally. Generally, 
conservation is best achieved under sound economic conditions; if the Pacific is unhealthy 
economically then the imposition of further environmental restrictions will leave entire 
populations struggling to survive.   
 
In 1993, the total market value of tuna taken from Pacific Island States’ EEZ was estimated 
to be around US$1.4 billion and 80% of this total catch was taken by purse seine vessel and 
main DWFN active operators are Japan, US, Taiwan and South Korea.
746
 
 
The US is the only DWFN party to a regional multilateral fisheries 
access arrangement, with a total annual fee of US$18 million paid 
regardless of the amount of tuna caught. The total fee paid by the US 
represents roughly 10% of the value of the fish taken by the US fleet 
… The US has now become the most responsible operator in the 
region and sets the benchmark for compliance and payment of 
reasonable access fees.
747
 
 
 
Trade-offs in the Treaty  
 
One of the major trade-offs under the Treaty was the issue of sovereign right, where the US 
does not recognize any form jurisdiction over tuna in any EEZ. Unlike the Pacific Island 
States, the US does not claim national jurisdiction over tuna within its EEZ. However, under 
the Treaty, the issue of sovereignty was acknowledged in the Preamble.   
 
The rationale behind this refusal to recognize maritime claims beyond the 12-mile territorial 
water limit was based on political and economic considerations. The US realized that it 
would make future tuna exploitation in the Pacific—and any exploration and exploitation of 
sea bed mineral resources outside territorial waters—difficult for them.748  
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 The exclusion of sovereign rights over tuna within the Pacific Island States’ EEZs from the 
Treaty was a victory for the US, but at the same time a failure for the Forum States. 
Interestingly, it is rare for Australia and New Zealand not to defend their sovereign rights 
over tuna in this regard. Australia and New Zealand may support US interests in the region in 
the hope of securing access to US markets, and world markets in general, where the US is the 
major player. To achieve this, Australia and New Zealand have to carefully put themselves in 
a diplomatic position.  
 
The Treaty reflected something of the political and diplomatic complications of international 
treaty processes and related economic and trading interests. It may also seem that Pacific 
Island States were somehow persuaded by Australia and New Zealand with similar fashion 
through foreign aid, and with other financial and technical assistance. Apart from foreign aid, 
some of the Pacific Island States had special political and diplomatic associations and 
arrangements with New Zealand in particular. This exercise may demonstrate that the 
ANZUS treaty is still alive and well.  
 
The Forum States have different degrees of historical, cultural and political relations that 
further complicated their close ties, creating some suspicion and distrust among members. 
The Forum is a kind of ideal regional body that attempts to bring countries together for a 
better future as a region, but beyond the surface there are political tensions.  
 
The Treaty also demonstrated that international politics involves dealing what best for 
individual country’s interests over collective cooperation in regional level. In the South 
Pacific, close cooperation among Pacific Island States depends on the particular countries 
involved. In dealing with the US, a totally different approach and shared new positions were 
devised to suit both parties. This is common practice in the region.  
 
Forum countries politically and historically influenced by the United Kingdom share similar 
political systems based on the Westminster system of government.
749
 This influence has been 
reaffirmed by Australia, New Zealand and Western democratic countries, particularly during 
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the Cold War. Even though Pacific Island States have similar political systems, they are 
culturally different.  
 
There is thus a constant struggle among Forum countries to develop political systems that are 
totally different from traditional systems. However, while foreign ideologies sound exciting 
to Pacific Island States, they are ultimately colonizing tools.  
 
Asian countries, namely China, Japan and Taiwan, have shown a growing interest in the 
region but for different purposes.
750
 China is very much interested in pushing its ‘One China’ 
policy, seeking acknowledgement from Forum States that Taiwan is part of China.
751
 At the 
same time, Taiwan is very active in pumping aid into the region to seek support as an 
independent country. The rivalry between Taipei and Beijing could potentially cause 
problems in the Pacific political landscape due to both countries providing support to 
governments and their opposition throughout the region.
752
 
 
The US has been very supportive of Taiwan and there are economic reasons for this: Taiwan 
is a major buyer of US military hardware and advanced weapon systems.
753
 This has caused a 
rift between the US and China. Other issues of rivalry between Taiwan and China can act as 
advantages for the region in terms of foreign aid competition.
754
  
 
On the other hand, Japan’s interest in the region is more specific to fishing and, recently, 
lobbying in opposition to the idea of a Pacific Whale Sanctuary.
755
 Japan is a major aid donor 
to the South Pacific in all areas, through direct financial assistance and technical and 
economic development projects. Japan has pushed its interests through development 
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assistance to the region. All forms of foreign aid are welcome by Pacific Island States, 
however they should be mindful of the hidden agendas of donor countries.  
 
During the negotiation of the Treaty, the US indicated that it wanted a multilateral fishing 
agreement—the first of its kind (fishery agreement) in the world.756 The Treaty demonstrated 
to a certain extent that Pacific Island States are weak parties, in that they were forced into a 
position where they could not bargain effectively, especially when dealing with the US. This 
was evident during negotiation processes where the US, with the help of Australia and New 
Zealand, made things proceed smoothly. The US did not alter its foreign policy (for instance, 
its position on the EEZ regime) when dealing with Pacific Island States. In dealing with the 
US, there was little room to manoeuvre.    
 
One of the reasons for the US not recognizing claims of full sovereign rights over the EEZ 
was simply to protect its fishers from prosecution for illegal fishing and to secure a constant 
flow of tuna resources to its cannery plants. However, the benefit received by the Pacific 
Island States as a trade-off was a financial package under the Treaty and other forms of 
technical and financial assistance.  
 
Asian countries, particularly Japan, China and Taiwan, replaced British and, to a certain 
extent, Australian, New Zealand and US aid. Japan is the leading aid donor for the region.
757
 
Japan’s foreign aid appears designed to gain the Pacific Island States’ votes in the 
international forum.
758
 Their primary short-term motivation was likely to be votes on 
international forum issues directly affecting them.
759
 China ‘bought’ relationships with 14 
Pacific Islands with her ‘smile diplomacy’ and got a lot of attention.760 Both China and 
Taiwan accused each other of bribing Pacific Island State politicians and officials.
761
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China’s courtship of the Pacific Island States took place at all levels, through invitations to 
people ranging from national leaders to local influential individuals. At the same time, 
Chinese officials were also visiting the Pacific Island States more frequently.
762
 There were 
more Pacific Island States prime ministers, presidents, ministers and senior officials invited to 
China, Japan and Taiwan than any other country in the world; both China and Taiwan 
emphasized bilateral relations and contributed to intergovernmental regional organizations (in 
1996 China made its first contribution to the Forum).
763
  
 
The competition between China and Taiwan was ongoing on all fronts and lobbying and 
threats were part of the whole process. China was the first and only Asian country to become 
a full member of the South Pacific Tourism Organization (SPTO) in 2004, after Australia and 
New Zealand lobbied for China and China threatened for Pacific Island States would vote for 
Taiwan membership would not allow Chinese tourists to visit.
764
  
 
The One China policy became a big issue in terms of Pacific Island States-China relations.
765
 
The Pacific Island States were also aware of how to play the diplomatic card against China 
and Taiwan. Nauru recognized Taiwan in 1980 and in 1999, with Nauru confirming an 
unwavering friendship with Taiwan; China tried unsuccessfully to block Nauru’s entry to the 
United Nations as a form of punishment.
766
  
 
As Pacific peoples become aware of China’s practices, more Islanders 
become concerned about being targeted by Chinese expansion. Many 
leaders privately support Taiwan’s independent and its bid for UN 
membership but, under pressure from China, and from Australia and 
New Zealand that support China in return for concessions to them, 
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most governments in the Islands (and the world) profess the ‘One 
China Policy’.767 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The major shortcoming of the Treaty was its exclusion of Pacific Island States’ national 
jurisdictions over their 200 n.m. EEZ. This demonstrated the influence of US foreign policy 
in the region and elsewhere in the world. It also indicated the fact that US political and 
economic interests can override bilateral or multilateral negotiations and treaties—the Treaty 
revealed their firm stance.  
 
Conservation and management politics of fisheries resources in the Pacific region desperately 
need to be revisited; policies need to explicitly define their objectives in order to give those 
resources a chance to survive. The current rate of catch of Pacific Island States’ fisheries 
resources HMS is growing ever closer to overexploitation and possible depletion. One of the 
reasons for this is the fact that powerful DWFN fishing in the Pacific has not been effectively 
challenged at international levels.   
 
Pacific Island States are not regarded as significant actors at the highest levels of international 
politics and diplomacy for obvious reasons; outside of the tuna arena, they have little capacity 
to command political influence internationally. Although Pacific Island States have good 
quality tuna and raw materials, these are sold to big trans-national fishing processors owned 
by the US and other powerful countries and do not benefit the region.  
 
There was speculation in various quarters about the possibility of setting up a regional 
cannery processor in the Pacific region for tuna.
768
 This initiative never materialized and it 
suspected that the Pacific Island States were discouraged from pursuing such a project by big 
transnational cannery corporations. This was in order to avoid the competition of cheap 
labour, attractive tax incentives and flexible regulation and legislation and, most importantly, 
to avoid any disruption to their access to the region’s tuna resources. It is also suspected that 
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foreign investors were discouraged from getting involved. Foreign aid to the region was 
restricted to the conservation, management and development of tuna and was not ever used to 
create finished products for sale in world markets.   
 
The Pacific Island States are not powerful actors in the international scene politically or 
economically, therefore they can be manipulated by major powers regardless of international 
law. That is, in most cases, the foreign policy of powerful countries is always a priority. The 
Treaty demonstrated just this—the US acting contrary to the Law of the Sea Convention is 
the case in point. A region that is desperate for an economic miracle and is fully dependent on 
foreign aid cannot afford to challenge foreign donors. The Pacific Island States play down 
any major differences to avoid jeopardizing the flow of aid to the region.  
 
Similar scenarios apply to the enforcement and implementation of international and regional 
conservation and management measures in the region. The Pacific Island States played a 
diplomatic role in this context by integrating international and regional conservation 
conventions into their national legislation as part of their international commitments. 
International instruments were integrated into relevant regional bodies and then into national 
law and policy.  
 
Regional bodies are predominantly (if not entirely) funded by foreign donors and related 
financial packages in the form of technical expertise.
769
 Some Pacific Island States have 
reluctantly implemented international environmental measures in order to avoid economic 
consequences of foreign aid. This is common in the region.  
 
According to the Treaty and other fishing arrangements, the main task data collected is 
related to the amount fish taken, rather than to fish quotas. This poses immediate threats to 
the region’s tuna resources, as catch reports are often misleading.770 It may advantage foreign 
fishing vessels, because there are no limitations imposed on catch quota.  
 
The Agreed Statement within the Observer Programme (Observer Programme) is a statement 
agreed upon both parties (Forum States and the US) to the Treaty regarding provisions for 
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Pacific Island State observers aboard American fishing vessels in accordance with the Treaty. 
This project wanted to allow those on board these vessels to observe that vessels crew were 
complying with the Treaty. Observers also had power:  
… to stop, to move to a specified location, and to facilitate safe 
boarding and inspection of the vessel, its licence, gear, equipment, 
records, facilities, fish and fish products.
771
  
 
It was further stated that the Master and the crew of American vessels were not to obstruct or 
interfere with any observer duty specified under the Treaty. This provision may be seen as an 
advantage to the Pacific Island States, in that it gives them the authority to board and inspect 
fishing vessels. The system was regarded as impartial and non-discriminatory in order to 
verify and comply with Treaty provisions. These provisions provided useful and important 
sources of data and information on catch, vessels, species and size as well as the location of 
vessels, which indicated the location of certain species and their quantity. Port inspection and 
fish sampling also assisted data collection and information gathering for conservation and 
management analysis purposes.  
 
The Observer Programme also required the US to notify an Observer Coordinator of any 
difficulties regarding observers on board a fishing vessel.
772
 In the event that an observer had 
to use equipment, the crew of the vessel were expected to help the observer.  
 
Aligned with the Article 61 of the 1982 Convention regarding Coastal States responsibilities, 
this programme was to take:  
… into account the best scientific evidence available … shall ensure 
through proper conservation and management measures that of the 
living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not and angered by 
over-exploitation … the coastal State and competent international 
organizations, whether sub-regional, regional or global, shall co-
operate … 
 
Under the Treaty, the Observer Programme would attempt to prevent tuna resources in the 
region being over-exploitation. It is a ‘joint venture’ between the Pacific Island States and the 
US to prevent over-exploitation of the tuna resources in the region and was intended to 
benefit both parties in the short and long term.  
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Tuna should be harvested to ‘optimum utilization’ yet not compromised in terms of the 
conservation and management measures outlined. This is clearly stated in Article 62 of 1982 
Convention regarding the right of the coastal state to determine the harvesting capacity of its 
EEZ. In the Treaty, there is no clear indication of the arrangement needed to harvest tuna 
resources in the Treaty area. In other words, the American fishing vessels under the Treaty 
could have unlimited access to the tuna (and other species) resources and areas allowed under 
the Treaty. This could be a drawback of the Treaty from a conservation and management 
perspective. Here there is no measure or formula of allowable catch, although data have been 
collected for decades regarding tuna resources in the region through relevant government 
departments (Pacific governments), parties of fishing arrangements (under SPC, FFA, other 
regional organizations) and of FAO (and other international organizations). The Treaty does 
emphasize the conservation and management of tuna resources, as well as the importance of 
maximizing the economic benefits for the people of the region.  
 
The 1982 Convention (subsequent regional instruments) provided Pacific countries (coastal 
states) with substantial conservation and management measures to prevent HMS from being 
exploited both within and outside the EEZ of coastal States.
773
 These measures would 
undoubtedly safeguard the sustainable development of the HMS not only in the Pacific but 
also worldwide. However, this is reliant on the enforcement and implementation of those 
measures by coastal States (including Pacific Island States).  
 
The conservation and management of the region’s marine resources, including HMS, will 
continue to be among the most challenging ongoing issue for governments in the Pacific.
774
 
The different socio-economic circumstances of the Pacific Island States are an added 
complication to the formulation, implementation and enforcement of environmental 
conservation and management measures. The sustainable development of the HMS in the 
region will be determined by all parties to the Treaty and DWFN other than the US. But the 
Forum is the primary body needed to realistically sustain HMS on a fair and sound economic 
basis.  
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Overall, the Treaty can be considered a relative success because it has achieved its expected 
outcome by consistently aligning itself with existing regional and international environmental 
instruments. Despite its shortcomings, it nevertheless represents an achievement for the 
Pacific from a fishery conservation perspective and as a safeguard for the future.  
 
Since UNCED the concept of sustainable development has taken on 
increasing international importance. Over the past decade the small 
island states of the Pacific have achieved only slow growth in real per 
capita incomes. Real GNP in the PICs grew at an average of only 
about 0.1% annually from 1983 to 1993. The lack of economic 
development, when combined with high population growth rates and 
unsustainable exploitation of natural resources, has led to significant 
social and economic problems in the Pacific islands, including 
permanent environmental damage.  
 
Some suggestions have been made to assist the conservation and management of the Pacific 
Island States’ fisheries resources and optimize productivity and profitability at the same 
time.
775
 Fisheries management measures consider economic factors, fishing gear used and 
tuna species target and specify EEZs or high seas. A detailed understanding of these issues is 
important because they are core to any management process and progress; they determine 
effectiveness. Also, carefully considering social, cultural and political issues can help a 
management approach to be more effective. The education and training of not only 
environment professionals but also local communities is important so people can make sense 
of why the measures have been put in place and why they are significant. Fisheries 
management should a combination of western and Pacific traditional principles.  
 
Part of the problem with the region’s fisheries management is communities’ ignorance, the 
lack of information available and the failure to find a balance between economic benefits on 
one hand and environmental conservation on the other. Close cooperation among Pacific 
Island States remains the most positive and effective way of managing fisheries negotiation 
and management issues in the region. Access fees can only be increased through collective 
cooperation among the Pacific Islands States and with the support of other regional 
organizations. Establishing networks with relevant international organizations and institutions 
would be an effective approach to the conservation and management of the region’s fisheries 
resources.  
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Chapter Seven 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined the international treaty negotiations between Pacific Island nations 
and the United States of America that led to the conclusion of an important resource sharing 
agreement in detail. It has also explored the wider legal, political and economic implications 
of that agreement. The topic was chosen not just for its intrinsic interest, but for the insight it 
offers into how the Cold War impacted the South Pacific and how small, weak nations can 
maximize their leverage when dealing with powerful states. I have argued that the 
development of the Treaty in Fisheries Between Governments of Certain Pacific Island States 
and the United States of America was not simply a resource sharing arrangement. It was also 
tool for stabilizing US relations with Pacific states and for keeping the Soviet Union out of 
the region.  
 
The thesis began by describing the environment in which a multilateral fisheries agreement 
became a necessity. In the Pre-Treaty era, the Pacific Island States were deeply concerned 
about the American tuna fishing fleet’s refusal to recognize their sovereign rights over 
resources within their respective EEZs. As was discussed in chapter two, this culminated in 
the seizure of the Danica and the Jeannette Diana. These disputes were the catalyst for the 
Pacific Island States beginning access negotiations with the USSR. These disputes not only 
demonstrated the strong opposition of the US to Pacific Island States’ claim of sovereign 
rights over their marine resources, but they also had a major impact on US industry, 
particularly American tuna processors and canneries. Therefore from Washington’s 
perspective, the Treaty was a means to secure the US purse seine fleet full access to the 
Central and Western Pacific’s rich tuna stocks and to revive the US tuna industry.  
 
The Pacific Island States and the US each brought a complex range of multi-dimensional 
interests and preferences to the negotiation table. The Treaty negotiations contained strong 
strategic and diplomatic dimensions. The fact that the State Department quickly became 
involved in negotiations indicated the level of US concerns about Soviet actions in the region. 
Unable to wield material power, the Pacific states were forced to play the Soviet card and to 
seek media coverage to the highlight their plight. They were successful in gaining some 
support through news media reporting of their concerns within and beyond the region. This 
increased the pressure on the US to reach an agreement.  
 
The thesis also reveals how Pacific Island States engaged the US throughout the negotiation 
process in a way that helped to establish some new patterns of bilateral diplomatic relations 
among the Pacific Island States themselves. Pacific Island leaders agreed collectively that, 
notwithstanding their own socio-political, economic and cultural differences, they could 
cooperate effectively within this political and diplomatic process.  
 
The Treaty that resulted provided a fair access fee for the US purse seine fleet to have fishing 
access to Pacific Island States’ EEZs and also stabilized the relations between the Pacific 
Island States and the US. It taught the Pacific Island States the great lesson that multilateral 
cooperation was the most advantageous approach when addressing fishing resource issues. 
Previous bilateral fishing arrangements had proven disappointing; negotiations had been 
secretive and access fees had been low as DWFN used a ‘divide and conquer’ approach. In 
contrast, the Treaty demonstrated the power of a collective approach, giving Pacific states 
control over access to their fishing grounds and maximizing their leverage.  Negotiations 
were open and transparent among all the parties involved. 
  
Could the success of the fisheries treaty be learnt from? Certainly, the multilateral approach 
employed in this case would be valuable in other negotiations, particularly in dealing with the 
region’s resources. Given that island states have the disadvantage of being small and 
scattered across an enormous area of ocean, negotiating costs are always high. They will 
always struggle to enforce their maritime boundaries. Regional cooperation remains the key 
to maximizing the benefits of the region’s resources. Regional cooperation on maritime 
issues in the Pacific surged during the 1980s and 90s and the Treaty was one of the 
highpoints. Other achievements include the Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with 
long Driftnets in the South Pacific Driftnet 1989 (the Driftnet Convention), South Pacific 
Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty 1986, and the Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries 
Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific Region 1992 (the Niue Treaty).  
 
The case examined here also points to the important role of institutions. The Treaty can be 
seen as a classic example of how a regional institution—in this case the FFA—spearheaded 
negotiations from the beginning through to a satisfactory outcome. The role of the South 
Pacific Forum is another success story for the Pacific Island States; this providing a means to 
openly discuss and address regional issues internally and also with Australia and New 
Zealand. Looking to the future, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
provides Pacific Island States with the opportunity to protect the long term sustainable 
development of their fishery and to ensure economic returns. Through the Commission, the 
Pacific Island nations and the DWFN need to cooperate in terms of sustainable development 
and economic optimization of the region’s fisheries resources. Pacific Island States should 
look into long term strategies for the conservation and management of their tuna resources.   
 
This thesis also outlines some of the issues around sustainability raised by the agreement.  
The analysis in Chapter Six shows there has been very active work done by the Pacific Island 
States through the FFA in regards to the conservation and management of the region’s 
fisheries resources.  
 
That notwithstanding, the Pacific Island States continue to face formidable challenges in 
promoting the region’s development and sustaining its fisheries. Exploiting these resources 
provides development for some Pacific countries. At the same time, issues such as corruption 
and government ineffectiveness pose real risks to fish stocks in threatening careful 
management and long-term economic benefits.
776
 As Greenpeace observed recently: 
There is overwhelming evidence that fisheries access agreements, as 
they have been implemented over the last 30 years, are by and large 
unsustainable. The results of independent evaluations of tuna 
agreements, while less damning than the mixed-species agreements, 
also show that they are negotiated and executed with a complete 
disregard for responsible fishing practices. Access agreements 
respond primarily to industrial fishing country interests and needs, 
leaving coastal States to assume all of the long-term risks associated 
with resource depletion, and undermining regional fisheries 
agreements aimed at achieving sustainability.
777
  
 
The global demand for tuna products remains a constant threat to the conservation and 
management of the Pacific Island States’ tuna resources. The harvesting and development of 
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these stocks must be done in a sustainable manner that benefits both Pacific Island States and 
the DWFN.
778
 
  
The Regional Register of Foreign Fishing Vessels (Regional Register) is one key mechanism 
for regional enforcement purposes. This collects data from foreign fishing vessels, and 
decides when vessels have violated the terms of fishing agreements. The Regional Register 
was adopted as a key aspect of the enforcement procedures under the Treaty, as was 
discussed in Chapter Three.  
 
The Treaty should not be seen in utopian terms. It did not bring a complete end to continuing 
tensions between Pacific Island nations and the American registered fishing fleet. Indeed, not 
long after the Treaty was signed, unlicensed American fishing vessels were again identified 
fishing in the region. This shows that the issue of illegal fishing persisted in the region as a 
major problem. However the Treaty and US commitment to it did directly contribute to 
greater control over the American registered fishing fleet in the Pacific. The US also assisted 
the region in the conservation, management and development of the region’s fisheries.    
 
Finally, the Treaty also played a part in reviving political and diplomatic relations between 
the Pacific Island States and the US by affirming the US’s leading role in the region. This 
was vitally important to Washington in the Cold War context and, as was discussed in 
Chapter Six, remains relevant as newer Asian players (particularly China, Japan and Taiwan) 
play an increasingly important role in the region’s maritime affairs.  
 
 
The Future of the Treaty 
 
Where to from here? The future of the Treaty is difficult to forecast, and its eventual utility 
may well be determined by the viability of the region’s tuna resources. One possibility raised 
in the closing stages of the thesis is that, in addition to securing a regular flow of tuna into 
American markets, the Treaty could also serve as a template for future exploration and 
exploitation of the region’s potential mineral resources. The Treaty could therefore be 
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advantageous for the US into the longer term should this region’s sea bed mineral resources 
prove worth extracting. If that does eventuate, then Pacific Island nations will face the huge 
challenge of having to go through some kind of similar treaty formulation process with the 
US.   
  
In the South Pacific, there has been an increase in joint ventures over recent years, although 
experience to date has been disappointing. Few have met the expectations of their Pacific 
Island partners in terms of generating profits and employment, or providing the level of 
training required for countries to allow them to play a larger role in the fishing operations or 
management. Investment in a domestic fleet has been an option taken up, at one time or 
another, by most Pacific Island countries, with pole-and-line vessels being the usual form of 
participation.  
 
Finally, any future review of the Treaty will need to look at the science of the region’s 
tuna stocks and the challenge of sustainable development. The very best scientific 
research on tuna stocks needs to be reflected in the ongoing development of legal and 
policy frameworks. Unless that knowledge is taken into account, the rate of exploitation 
of the region’s fish resources may ultimately come to threaten the economic benefits for 
the Pacific Island States that were so hard-won in the negotiations that led to the 1987 
Treaty. 
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